Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MANAGUA578
2006-03-14 22:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Managua
Cable title:  

NICARAGUAN ELECTIONS REGIONAL REPORTING: MADRIZ

Tags:  PGOV KDEM SOCI NU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0004
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #0578/01 0732252
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 142252Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5590
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0581
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000578 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM SOCI NU
SUBJECT: NICARAGUAN ELECTIONS REGIONAL REPORTING: MADRIZ

REF: MANAGUA 511

Classified By: AMBASSADOR PAUL TRIVELLI. REASONS 1.4 (B,D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000578

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM SOCI NU
SUBJECT: NICARAGUAN ELECTIONS REGIONAL REPORTING: MADRIZ

REF: MANAGUA 511

Classified By: AMBASSADOR PAUL TRIVELLI. REASONS 1.4 (B,D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Meetings with political, economic, and
civil society leaders in the department of Madriz suggest
that the department's Liberal roots remain strong, and that
the FSLN can be beaten there, despite the fact that it
currently controls most municipalities and enjoys
considerable support and funding from European NGOs. Of the
main emerging political movements, only that of Eduardo
Montealegre appears to have made significant inroads in
Madriz, co-opting much of the traditional PLC structure and
forcing the PLC to recruit new, less experienced
representatives. As in other departments, representatives of
the various Liberal camps proclaimed a strong desire for
unity to defeat the FSLN in November, and urged the USG to
pressure all of the party leaders in Managua to come to
terms. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) On March 8-9, poloff and political FSN traveled to
the northwestern department of Madriz on the Honduran border,
and met local leaders to discuss the political and economic
situation in the department eight months ahead of November
national elections. Among our interlocutors were
representatives of the "Vamos con Eduardo"/National Liberal
Alliance (ALN),the Alliance for the Republic (APRE) and
"Amigos de Alvarado", the Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC),
"Movimiento Herty 2006", the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE),
Etica y Transparencia, the Catholic Church, and the PLC mayor

of the small municipality of Totogalpa. Post will report on
social and economic issues septel. Since 1990, Madriz has
generally been a strong department for the PLC, illustrated
by the results of the 2000 municipal elections when the party
took seven of nine municipalities. However, when the PLC ran
a weak campaign in 2004 and the non-FSLN vote was sharply
divided, the Sandinistas reversed the balance, taking seven
towns. Nonetheless, even that year, the combined
"democratic" vote would have been enough to win every
municipality in the department except the capital of Somoto,
where the FSLN defeated all other parties combined.



3. (C) Madriz is unquestionably one of the poorest and most
neglected departments in Nicaragua. Other than maintaining
one good road running through the department, there is very
little that the GON or National Assembly has visibly done to
develop infrastructure and promote economic growth in the
department in recent years. As an example of "Managua's"
lack of interest in the department, numerous interlocutors
pointed out that Arnoldo Aleman's daughter, Maria Dolores,
nominally represents Madriz as a regional deputy in the
National Assembly, despite the fact that she has never once
visited the department or shown the slightest interest in it.
(Maria Dolores was the subsitute deputy for Elvin Rene
Pineda, who represented Madriz, and she replaced him after
his December 2004 death.) There is little doubt that the
FSLN will try to capitalize on such feelings of neglect by
the PLC and three successive democratic governments.

FSLN HISTORICALLY WEAK IN MADRIZ, BUT BOOSTED BY 2004
ELECTIONS AND EUROPEAN LARGESSE
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4. (C) All interlocutors agreed that while the FSLN has been
historically weak in Madriz, its seven mayors elected in 2004
have exploited their positions to make inroads for the party.
According to everyone we met, numerous European (mainly
Spanish) NGOs have brought large amounts of money into the
department in the last two years. They allege that the FSLN
has carefully used these funds for patronage and vote buying,
implementing infrastructure projects in Sandinista
neighborhoods and building houses for FSLN voters, while
blatantly neglecting those that do not vote FSLN.
Representatives of all the non-Sandinista parties (including
supporters of Herty Lewites) fear that the FSLN will leverage
this European largesse to buy significant numbers of votes on
election day. PLC department head Indalecio Gonzalez took
the widespread complaints about "Spanish" activities one step
farther, claiming that individuals with connections to the
ETA terrorist group had found refuge in Madriz and were
supporting the FSLN there. Emboffs asked Gonzalez to provide
specific names or details, but he was unable to do so.
(Note: Post will request details on the NGOs and their
leadership. If we verify the veracity of these allegations,
the Ambassador will engage his Spanish counterpart on the
matter.)

5. (C) Other alleged factors favoring the FSLN in Madriz
include direct financing of the party's campaign by foreign
governments (including the Government of Venezuela),and the
claim that a number of Cuban television stations can be
received in the department (perhaps via a cable system),
reportedly transmitting a constant stream of propaganda for
Castro, Chavez, and Ortega. However, numerous observers also
described the FSLN elite in Madriz as the "new rich" who live
off properties and businesses confiscated during the 1980s,
and opined that the party lacked any strong, visible
departmental leader. Daniel Ortega was actually in the
capital of Somoto on March 8 and reportedly held a poorly
attended rally; emboffs saw no evidence of any large public
FSLN activity. Despite the specific FSLN advantages listed
above, everyone described the party as eminently beatable in
Madriz in November.

PLC REPRESENTATIVES LARGELY PRAGMATIC AND CALL FOR BROAD
LIBERAL ALLIANCE
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6. (C) PLC representatives in Madriz were among the most
pragmatic PLC politicians emboffs have met thus far. Carlos
Rafael Olivas, the PLC Vice Mayor of Totogalpa, one of the
two Madriz municipalities to remain in PLC hands after the
debacle of 2004, shared with emboffs that he and other local
party activists favor a broad Liberal alliance including Jose
Antonio Alvarado and Eduardo Montealegre. He argued that
because the PLC is the largest Liberal political force,
Alvarado and Montealegre must approach the PLC. Olivas
admitted that the PLC had made mistakes and driven away
people and groups that should be its allies, but he insisted
that the PLC convention in April will be democratic and not
simply a rubber stamp for Aleman. He named Jose Rizo, Ramiro
Sacasa, and Francisco Aguirre Sacasa as the best PLC
"pre-candidates." Olivas suggested that the USG should
convene all the Liberal political leaders in Managua and
pressure them to join forces. He ventured that authentic,
inclusive primaries would be a good way to resolve
differences and select leaders.


7. (C) Emboffs met the PLC department head for Madriz,
Indalecio Gonzalez, at his residence for a private meeting.
Gonzalez is relatively young and new in his party office, as
his two most recent predecessors both died in the last two
years. Perhaps reflecting his newness in his job and the
fact that he had no PLC audience to play to, Gonzalez was
more open with emboffs than his counterparts have been in
other departments visited so far. He complained about GON
and media attacks on the PLC, but proclaimed a desire to work
closely with the USG and admitted that the Aleman-Ortega pact
had done severe damage to his party. While other PLC
officials usually loudly deny that Aleman ever stole a cent
from the Nicaraguan state, Gonzalez remained silent when
emboffs stated that the evidence of Aleman's guilt was
overwhelming. At the end of the meeting Gonzalez even
admitted that he had nothing against Montealegre's ALN, but
had aligned with the PLC because he believes his chances of
being elected to the National Assembly are better with it
than with Montealegre.

ALN HAS SOLID STRUCTURE, HAS MADE INROADS, AND BELIEVES IT
COULD WIN MADRIZ ALONE IF NECESSARY
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


8. (C) The ALN department head for Madriz, obstetrician
Jose Armando Herrera, told emboffs that he formerly held the
same post for the PLC until he was sacked by Arnoldo Aleman
for protesting Aleman's corruption and pact with Daniel
Ortega. Herrera stated that when he left the PLC, he took
the bulk of the party's departmental structure with him and
that eighty percent of the PLC's experienced departmental
leaders are now with the ALN. Herrera insisted that
Montealegre is unquestionably the most popular candidate in
Madriz, enjoying widespread support amongst Nicaraguans
living across the Honduran border who will return to the
department to vote on election day. Herrera described Madriz
as one of Montealegre's strongest departments and stated that
his polling numbers will be much higher in Madriz than their
(already fairly high) national average.


9. (C) Herrera shared that liberal voters in impoverished
Madriz are outraged with Aleman's theft of tens of millions
of dollars from the state treasury, and they will not vote
PLC as long as Aleman remains in charge of the party.
Herrera urged the USG to "twist Aleman's arm" to remove him
from politics and make possible Liberal unity, but he
asserted that the ALN could win alone in Madriz if it were
ultimately forced to run alone. As long as Aleman remains a
factor, Herrera does not believe that the PLC will ever
participate in real primaries. With the exception of the
PLC, everyone else we spoke to agreed that Montealegre has
campaigned more actively in Madriz than any other candidate
and seems to have established himself as a viable third
option in the department.

APRE PROPPED UP BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS; SUPPORT FOR ALVARADO
QUESTIONABLE
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


10. (C) Unlike in most departments that emboffs have
visited, the departmental heads of APRE and "Amigos de
Alvarado" are not one and the same in Madriz. Emboffs met
APRE head Ramona Centeno in her Somoto government office
where she works for the Directorate of Taxation. Centeno
claimed that APRE enjoys a solid departmental structure, but
she admitted that it received virtually no guidance or
financial support from Managua. She argued that Alvarado
attracts the support of teachers and medical workers in
Madriz because of his previous ministerial career. However,
Centeno also largely conformed to the stereotype of the
government bureaucrat supporting APRE purely in an effort to
protect and advance her government career, as virtually every
comment she made about APRE or Alvarado somehow linked back
to her personal interests and activities.


11. (C) Dagoberto Bermudez, the Madriz head of "Amigos de
Alvarado" is another government official, working as the
Ministry of Health's departmental hospitals director.
However, he was much more candid than Centeno. Bermudez
admitted that APRE is a weak vehicle for Alvarado because it
is widely seen as a "government party" that forced GON
employees to support it. However, Bermudez insisted that
Alvarado enjoys more popularity than his party vehicle.
Bermudez argued that the "radical" PLC bases will never vote
for Montealegre, but they would vote for Alvarado, and
claimed that Alvarado could even take some votes from the
FSLN. Bermudez opined that Jose Rizo, Montealegre, and
Alvarado must unify their forces immediately for the sake of
Nicaragua. Other than Alvarado's supporters, no one emboffs
met in Madriz reported that Alvarado has campaigned seriously
in Madriz or has any structure other than government
officials supporting him or his party. ALN representative
Herrera claimed that most of the nominal APRE members in
Madriz really support Montealegre and the ALN.

HERTY WIDELY DISTRUSTED IN MADRIZ AND POPULAR SUPPORT
QUESTIONABLE
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


12. (C) Emboffs met a half-dozen supporters of Herty Lewites
in the candidate's Somoto campaign office, which had the
words "Siempre Sandinista" (Always Sandinista) painted in
large letters on the walls outside. Despite the need to use
such rhetoric to maintain his credentials with left-leaning
voters, Lewites' supporters insisted that their candidate
will never return to the "Danielista" FSLN. They dismissed
the poor showing of Lewites' alliance in the Atlantic Coast
elections (reftel),attributing it to the fact that the
movement only had two months to organize there. They also
noted that during the Atlantic Coast campaign, the FSLN
focused most of its attacks on Herty, rather than on the PLC.
The Lewites followers claimed he enjoys a solid organization
and urban and rural support throughout Madriz. They
recounted that spreading knowledge about the Aleman-Ortega
pact is one of their most effective campaign tools.


13. (C) In a mirror image of the fears that are usually
expressed on the right (and that emboffs heard throughout
Madriz) about Lewites going back to the FSLN, Lewites'
supporters in Madriz fear that Montealegre and Alvarado might
rejoin Aleman's PLC, possibly under pressure from the USG.
Most people on the right in Madriz claimed that the entire
Herty campaign is a ruse designed to make the right think
that it can safely enter the elections divided since the left
is divided as well. Even those who did not regard the Herty
campaign as a trap doubted whether he would have much impact
on the FSLN vote in Madriz and feared that in a four way
presidential race, Daniel Ortega could win in the first round.

PLC OFFICIAL IN CHARGE OF LOCAL CSE OFFICE IS ASLEEP AT THE
WHEEL AND FSLN IS REALLY RUNNING THINGS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

14. (C) The departmental head of the CSE, Rodolfo Jose
Alfaro Garcia, is a PLC appointee, but all interlocutors
described him to emboffs as a "weak" administrator and stated
that FSLN bureaucrats working under him really run the CSE
departmental office, employing all the familiar Sandinista
tactics to prevent non-FSLN voters from obtaining voter
identification documents (cedulas) and casting their ballots
on election day. Everyone, including the PLC departmental
head and the PLC Vice Mayor of Totogalpa, stated that they
had no confidence whatsoever in Alfaro and feared that the
FSLN might try every tactic in the book to steal the vote in
November.


15. (C) When emboffs met Alfaro in his office, he lived up
to his reputation, turning on a baseball game and rarely
taking his eyes off the television while emboffs tried to
discuss the local electoral process with him. Alfaro offered
nothing more than vague statements that the CSE is "doing its
job" in Madriz, and that while the voting register is filled
with dead people and some citizens in rural areas have
trouble obtaining cedulas, everything will "somehow work out"
on election day. Unfortunately, Movimiento Por Nicaragua,
which might be able to apply pressure on the local CSE office
and assist citizens in obtaining cedulas, appears to have
little or no presence in Madriz. No one emboffs met was
aware of any Movimiento activity in the department and Juan
Carlos Espinoza, the group's nominal organizer in Madriz,
failed to show up for a meeting he had previously confirmed.

MADRIZ: DEMOGRAPHICS AND VOTING PROFILE
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


16. (U)

Total Population (2003 est.): 133,974
Total Urban Population: 37,898
Total Rural Population: 96,076

Votes Received by Party, 2004 Municipal Elections

PLC: 25,490
FSLN: 29,571
APRE: 1,196
CCN: 196
PLI: 91
AC: 211
PLN: 80
PRN: 1,067
MSL: 100

COMMENT: LIBERAL CAMP SHOULD WIN IN MADRIZ, BUT NOTHING IS
CERTAIN AS LONG AS DIVISIONS REMAIN
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


17. (C) Madriz is a department that the Liberal camp should
win in November, whether because the ALN succeeds in
co-opting enough of the PLC structure and base or because
leaders in Managua see reason and form a broad alliance.
Given their fears of the FSLN returning to power, non-FSLN
voters in Madriz are likely to gravitate to whatever force
seems most likely to defeat the Sandinistas. However, while
the ALN might be able to win alone if enough voters flock to
it, a continuing Liberal division clearly creates
opportunities for the FSLN that it will not have if the
Liberal camp is unified. Unfortunately, local political
leaders seem unwilling or unable to convey this message to
Managua, and they continue to abdicate responsibility for
marginalizing Arnoldo Aleman and bringing about Liberal unity
to the USG.
TRIVELLI