Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MANAGUA370
2006-02-15 23:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Managua
Cable title:  

MUCH ADO ABOUT EVERYTHING: ALVARADO CONTINUES TO

Tags:  KDEM NU PGOV PINR PREL 
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PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #0370/01 0462306
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 152306Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5300
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000370 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2016
TAGS: KDEM NU PGOV PINR PREL
SUBJECT: MUCH ADO ABOUT EVERYTHING: ALVARADO CONTINUES TO
VACILATE OVER MONTEALEGRE ALLIANCE


Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000370

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2016
TAGS: KDEM NU PGOV PINR PREL
SUBJECT: MUCH ADO ABOUT EVERYTHING: ALVARADO CONTINUES TO
VACILATE OVER MONTEALEGRE ALLIANCE


Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Presidential-hopeful Jose Antonio Alvarado
wants to have his cake and eat it too, continuing to waffle
between allying with Eduardo Montealegre and entering into
Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC)-initiated primaries.
Ambassador noted in his recent meeting with Alvarado and his
advisers that time is running short, urging Alvarado to steer
clear of a path that PLC leader/convicted prisoner Arnoldo
Aleman controls. Alvarado admits that the PLC primary
proposal is likely a "set-up," but he intends to respond and
seek clarification on a number of points. Alvarado was
partially receptive to our suggestion that he and possible
running mate Eduardo Montealegre present a joint counter
offer, commenting that they are making progress towards
forging an alliance; however, he prefers that they each
present similar counter proposals. Clarifying that he is
working on two parallel tracks -- one to form an alliance
with Montealegre, and the other, to draw the PLC into a
broader Liberal coalition -- Alvarado argues that these
efforts are not contradictory. He believes that only by
exhausting all options can he -- and Montealegre -- reach out
to Liberal voters in good conscience and expect their votes.
END SUMMARY.

Primaries - or Bust
- - - - - - - - - -


2. (C) In Ambassador's two-hour session on February 14 with
presidential-hopeful Jose Antonio Alvarado and two advisers,
Eduardo Urcuyo and Ariel Granera, Alvarado insisted that,
while the PLC primary proposal (see below) is likely a
"set-up," he will respond in writing and seek clarification
on a number of points. Alvarado asserted that he will either
compete in free and fair primaries or he will not compete at
all, claiming he will neither run on a PLC ticket, nor
separately with Montealegre without them. He remarked that
the PLC had asked him to serve as Jose Rizo's running mate,
an offer he declined because he will not accept Aleman's
"dedazo."


3. (C) Alvarado was partially receptive to our suggestion

that he and possible running mate Eduardo Montealegre present
a joint counter proposal to hold primaries in May, suggesting
instead that they each present similar counter offers. He
shared that he had dined the night before with Montealegre,
observing that they are making progress towards reaching an
alliance. Clarifying that he is working on two parallel
tracks -- one to form an alliance with Montealegre, and the
other, to draw the PLC into a broader Liberal coalition --
Alvarado argued that these efforts are not contradictory.
Only by exhausting all options can he -- and Montealegre --
reach out to Liberal voters in good conscience and expect
their votes. While Montealegre is leveraging his position
vis a vis the PLC by competing in the March 5 Atlantic Coast
elections, he is exhausting all options to bring aboard the
PLC and to reduce Aleman's hold on the party, explained
Alvarado.


4. (SBU) (Note: Montealegre may be in for a disappointment.
According to preliminary results of IRI's poll on the
Atlantic Coast political process, Montealegre will fare
poorly in the March 5 election. A combination of
FSLN-generated fraud (backdating of DOBs on 1,000s of birth
certificates plus the relocation and cedulation of 1,000s of
other Sandinista supporters) and confusion are likely to give
the FSLN a massive win in the North Atlantic Autonomous Zone
(RAAN) and a more modest PLC majority in the South Atlantic
Autonomous Zone (RAAS). According to the poll, many voters
who support Montealegre are confused and intend to check box
1 on the ballot (PLC) because they still associate
Montealegre with the PLC.)

Background: Primaries According to the PLC
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


5. (U) By way of background, on Feb. 9, the PLC invited
dissident Liberal candidates Alvarado and Montealegre to
participate jointly with the PLC presidential pre-candidates
in one round of primaries. The basic points of the PLC
proposal follow:

- Montealegre and Alvarado may participate in one round of
primaries with the other six PLC pre-candidates.

- They may register party officials from their alliance
parties by Feb. 28, a process which would presumably result

in a field of 250,000 alliance party officials who would be
eligible to vote in the primaries.

- They must reply to the PLC proposal by Feb. 23.

- The proposal does not mention using the primaries to select
National Assembly or Parlacen deputies (and probably does not
include them).


6. (U) Several points in the PLC proposal require further
clarification, including:

--Change of the PLC statutes to allow selection by primaries
VS convention.

--The exact composition of the voting list, which would need
to include all of Montealegre's and Alvarado's alliance
officials;

--Which deputy positions, if any, would also be decided by
the primaries;

--How the other deputy positions would be selected;

--The need to modify all alliance party statutes to recognize
the winner(s) of the primaries;

-- Whether other democratic pre-candidates would be eligible
to compete (e.g. Francisco Fiallos of APRE); and,

--The selection method of the vice presidential candidate.

The Situation According to Montealegre
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


7. (C) Local IRI Director Gilberto Valdez reported on
February 13 that Montealegre may announce at a February 16
press conference his decision not to participate in the
primaries as proposed by the PLC. Rather, Montealegre
intends to seek an agreement with Alvarado, ideally before
his Thursday press conference. According to Montealegre,
Conservative Party (PC) leader Mario Rapacciolli has agreed
to modify the PC's deal with Montealegre's ALN and relinquish
the vice presidential position to Alvarado if the two
candidates reach an agreement. (Note: Rapacciolli has not
yet discussed this decision with other PC leaders.) Valdez
also confirmed that Aleman allowed the PLC to offer
Montealegre and Alvarado to participate in one-step primaries
to derail promising negotiations between the two. He added
that some Alvarado advisers are still working to persuade
Alvarado to abandon talks with Montealegre and join the PLC
primaries.

APRE's Perspective
- - - - - - - - - -


8. (C) Alianza por la Republica (APRE) President/Assembly
Deputy Miguel Lopez Baldizon offered a third perspective on
the PLC proposal, asserting to polcouns on February 14 that
the PLC offer should have been institutional, to APRE, not
Alvarado, who he termed an APRE "free-lancer." Lopez also
agreed that APRE and Montealegre's ALN should submit a joint
counter offer to the PLC; he intends to broach the subject
with Montealegre. APRE will also seek OAS technical advice
in its February 15 meeting with the visiting OAS team
regarding the primary process, explained Lopez. (Note:
According to Valdez, the PLC deliberately invited Alvarado,
not APRE, in an attempt to separate Alvarado from the APRE.)


9. (C) On the subject of presidential candidates and the
ongoing impasse among different Liberal factions, Lopez
argued that President Bolanos holds the key to the solution;
he must make up his mind and instruct his "troops." He
downplayed the recent falling out he had with Bolanos,
alleging it had been engineered by Bolanos' senior political
adviser Frank Arana, and had since been resolved.

It's PLC's Institutional Edge, Stupid
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


10. (C) Alvarado and his advisers agreed with Ambassador
that the PLC has lost much of its political machinery and
considerable popular support. However, Granera insisted that
the PLC continues to enjoy an institutional advantage over
Alvarado and Montealegre because along with the FSLN, the PLC
controls the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE),the courts, and
the Fiscalia -- the entities involved in the electoral

process and "controlling" the outcome. Urcuyo commented that
when the PLC controlled the majority of Nicaragua's
municipalities, the PLC, as the FSLN is doing nowadays, would
backdate birth dates to allow 14 and 15-year olds to vote.
"We did this for the sake of democracy," explained a
straight-faced Urcuyo. (Comment: In other words, an ALN-PC
campaign independent of the PLC could be disadvantaged by
fraud committed by both the FSLN and the PLC.)

Avoiding a Four-Way Race at All Costs
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


11. (C) Granera was adamant that a four-way race best serves
Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega's interests, arguing that if
the ultimate objective is to defeat Ortega, the this option
must be avoided at all costs. Any of these Liberal
candidates -- Alvarado, Montealegre, Jose Rizo, Francisco
Aguirre Sacasa, or Ramiro Sacasa -- are honorable and would
be a better option than Ortega, he reasoned. (Comment:
Conservative Ariel Granera, who in his spare time serves as a
senior-level MFA official, is likely one of the advisers
recommending that Alvarado explore "options" with the PLC and
avoid an alliance with Montealegre, at least for now.
Urcuyo, on the other hand, admitted that Aleman's game plan
may be to allow an Ortega victory in exchange for his
freedom. If this is the case, and a number of other
interlocutors have shared the same assessment with us,
Montealegre's allying with the PLC would be tantamount to
political suicide. End Comment.)

Comment
- - - -


12. (C) The PLC's about-face came shortly after Montealegre
and Alvarado appeared to be moving closer to forging a
combined "Third Way" alliance and when polls and other
indicators suggest a PLC defeat in the March 5 Atlantic Coast
elections. The new proposal may reflect both the initiative
of some PLC'ers who sincerely desire a sound and legitimate
unification of Liberal forces and yet another ploy by Aleman
to recapture the lost strength of the PLC while maintaining
his control of the party. Without the inclusion of deputy
positions in the primary process, Aleman will again be able
to select sycophants personally loyal to him and perpetuate
his control of the party. Even if Montealegre were to win
the presidency with the support of the PLC, he would be
hamstrung -- "a la Bolanos" -- by a legislative bloc
controlled by the caudillo.


13. (C) Comment continued. Alvarado, who wants to have his
cake and eat it too, continues to flirt with the PLC, while
Montealegre maintains his position not to associate with the
PLC so long as Aleman controls it. Alvarado's argument that
to win a Liberal alliance must include the PLC, because the
PLC has institutional presence that can affect the outcome of
the March and November elections, is only partially valid.
Clearly, Daniel Ortega, who controls Aleman's destiny through
the courts, has the upper hand in the Ortega-Aleman pact.
The Sandinista majority in the CSE has led to virtually total
Sandinista control of the CSE's operations.

TRIVELLI
1
TRIVELLI