Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MANAGUA2617
2006-12-01 22:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Managua
Cable title:  

BOLANOS TO A/S SHANNON: "WE HAVE TO CORRAL ORTEGA"

Tags:  ECON KDEM NU PGOV 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0011
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #2617/01 3352224
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 012224Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8335
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 002617 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR WHA A/S SHANNON, WHA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2016
TAGS: ECON KDEM NU PGOV
SUBJECT: BOLANOS TO A/S SHANNON: "WE HAVE TO CORRAL ORTEGA"

Classified By: classified by Ambassador Paul Trivelli for reasons 1.4 b
, d

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 002617

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR WHA A/S SHANNON, WHA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2016
TAGS: ECON KDEM NU PGOV
SUBJECT: BOLANOS TO A/S SHANNON: "WE HAVE TO CORRAL ORTEGA"

Classified By: classified by Ambassador Paul Trivelli for reasons 1.4 b
, d


1. (C) SUMMARY: During a November 28 lunch hosted for
Assistant Secretary Thomas Shannon, President Bolanos and his
advisors shared their insights and concerns about an Ortega
presidency and outlined the key points of a liberal
opposition strategy. President Bolanos opined that Ortega
has little room to maneuver and that paying his "social debt"
will be very difficult without collapsing the economy.
Political advisor Frank Arana acknowledged that Ortega, thus
far, has delivered all the right messages, but he remains
leery of Ortega,s true commitment. Concerned about Ortega's
dictatorial ambitions, Bolanos and his advisors stressed the
need to "control" Ortega through a unified opposition party
in the National Assembly, greater empowerment of civil
society, and a strong performance in the 2008 municipal
elections. They admitted, however, that the challenge is
daunting because the liberals have no experience as an
opposition party. END SUMMARY.

Ortega Can Talk the Talk, but Can he Walk the Walk?
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2. (C) In a November 28 lunch meeting hosted by President
Bolanos for A/S Tom Shannon, President Bolanos opined that it
would be impossible for Ortega to pay his "social debt" --
the promises he made during the campaign -- while maintaining
economic growth. According to Bolanos, if Ortega fails to
deliver on these promises, he will lose the core of his
party,s supporters -- but delivering on them will cause the
economy to collapse. He added that the FSLN, while adept at
activism and organizing, does not know how to administer.
Further, Political Advisor Frank Arana quipped that Ortega,s
presidency may be "legal", but it is not "legitimate" because
he was elected with only 38 percent of the vote. As a
result, there will be more pressure on Ortega to perform and
less room for error.


3. (C) Arana also conceded that Ortega,s initial
conversations with the economic sector, the banking
community, and the other Central American presidents have

been very positive. He noted that Ortega is hitting all the
right points, talking about CAFTA, the Millennium Challenge
Account, closer cooperation among Central American countries,
and improving relations with the United States. However,
Arana warned, Ortega is highly skilled at telling people what
they want to hear.

Liberals Fear Ortega Dynasty
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4. (C) Bolanos, Arana, and Foreign Minister Norman Caldera
conveyed their concerns that Ortega will not relinquish power
at the end of his term and will do what he can to establish
himself as "dictator". Bolanos pointed out that Ortega
controls many of the State,s critical institutions including
the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE),Supreme Court (CSJ),and
the offices of the Attorney General and Comptroller. Bolanos
lamented that controlling Ortega without a functioning system
of State checks and balances will be difficult, declaring
that, "all hangs in the balance between democracy and
dictatorship."


5. (C) Also referencing the FSLN,s institutional control,
Lindolfo Monjarretz, spokesperson for the presidency,
cautioned that the FSLN is well-prepared and could use its
control to impede reforms. He also admitted that former
President Arnoldo Aleman, who continues to control the
Liberal Constitutionalist Party,s (PLC),is a complicating
factor (in the liberal opposition's ability to control
Ortega). According to Monjarretz, everyone knows Aleman is a
problem, but no one knows what to do about him.


6. (C) Ambassador Trivelli proffered that the liberal
opposition must convince Ortega that working with Aleman is
no longer essential or even advantageous, and that the
Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN),as the acknowledged second
political force in Nicaragua, is the key to the future.

Strong Opposition is Key, but Liberals Have Little Experience
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7. (C) Bolanos and Arana emphasized that the opposition,s
strategy must be to build a "corral" around Ortega in order
to restrain his actions, reduce the influence of negative
outside forces, and to force him to work within the existing
system of democratic institutions. All agreed that a strong
unified opposition is necessary to implement this strategy.
Arana urged immediate consolidation of the liberal forces as
a first step in order to provoke and promote reforms in civil
society and in the National Assembly.


8. (C) Lindolfo Monjarretz pointed out, however, that the
liberals have no history or experience as an opposition party
because the liberals have been in power, in one form or
another, for the past sixteen years. In contrast, the FSLN,
after losing the elections in 1990, retreated, retrenched,
and solidified power in key areas such as education and
justice. Thus, advised Monjarretz, the liberals must take a
step back and reflect before moving forward as an opposition
party.


9. (C) A/S Tom Shannon agreed that having a strong
opposition force will be important, but warned that it is not
easy to build. He commented that 16 years in power have made
the liberals good at administering the State, but have
degraded their ability to build grassroots constituencies and
express a long term vision for Nicaragua. Shannon further
stated that the liberals must develop messages that civil
society understands and continue to advance democracy to
ensure that civil society does not fragment under an Ortega
presidency.

Enabled Civil Society Will Act as Check on Ortega
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


10. (C) Bolanos echoed Arana,s emphasis on building and
re-enforcing civil society as a tactic to control Ortega.
Commenting that he will use his seat in the National Assembly
to vote on what he deemed the "10 percent of the legislation
that is important," Bolanos plans to focus his attention on
building Nicaragua,s first presidential library and a
political think tank in order to facilitate greater
participation of civil society. The "virtual" library will
include, in an electronic searchable format, contributions
from the Central Bank, Central American University (UCA),and
Ave Marie College as well as Bolanos, history as a public
servant and his brother's extensive collection of historical
documents. (NOTE: Bolanos' brother Alejandro, who passed
away earlier last year, was a renowned Nicaraguan historian
with an extensive collection. END NOTE.)

2008 Municipal Elections: Another Check on Ortega
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11. (C) Citing the close correlation between municipal-level
voting outcomes in the presidential election and party
control of municipal governments, Monjarretz suggested that
the liberal,s containment strategy must also focus on
winning in the 2008 municipal elections. He stressed that
the opposition should use the next two years to build the
mechanisms to enable victory in 2008 to position the party
for victory in the 2011 presidential elections. Arana
agreed, adding that the liberal opposition must find and
develop "acceptable" candidates because municipal elections
are often decided by only a few votes. (COMMENT: Arana,s
emphasis on "acceptable" is in likely reference to finding
candidates who can bridge the bitter divide between the ALN
and the PLC created during the elections to represent the
broader liberal opposition ideals. END COMMENT.)

Controlling the National Assembly
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12. (C) Monjarretz and Arana also highlighted that the
liberal opposition,s ability to consolidate power in the
National Assembly in order to wrest control for high level
appointments from Aleman and the PLC will be another way to
keep Ortega,s ambitions in check. Monjarretz specifically
mentioned the appointment of judges to the Supreme Court, a
key institution in the legal enforcement of future reforms.

Shannon - Praises Bolanos, Sees Room for Dialogue with Ortega
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13. (C) Shannon confirmed our commitment to Nicaragua and
recognized Bolanos for the accomplishments of his
administration including ratification of CAFTA, debt
reduction, and the Millennium Challenge Account. To
inquiries about his meeting with Ortega earlier in the day,
Shannon responded that now is the time to open dialog with
the President-elect. He reported that Ortega,s message was
disciplined, raising points in the meeting related to support
for CAFTA, democracy and positive relations with the United
States and the need to form a good basis for future dialog.
Shannon noted that we will go into a relationship with the
Sandinistas with our eyes wide open, adding that it will take
time to determine whether or not Ortega has changed.
However, Shannon stressed that there is no doubt that
Nicaragua has changed, and now has the political structures
and civil society to restrain Ortega and protect Nicaraguan
Democracy. Shannon re-iterated that Nicaragua is very
important to us and that "we will continue to work together."


14. (U) Participants

Nicaragua:
President Enrique Bolanos
Foreign Minister Norman Caldera
Chief of Staff Leonardo Somarriba
Political Advisor Frank Arana
Private Secretary Lincoln Escobar
Presidential Spokesman Lindolfo Monjarretz
Political Advisor Pedro Solorzono

U.S.:
Assistant Secretary Tom Shannon
Ambassador Paul Trivelli
DCM Peter Brennan
Political Counselor Victoria Alvarado
Poloff Eric Mehler (note-taker)
TRIVELLI