Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MANAGUA2611
2006-12-01 16:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Managua
Cable title:  

ELECTION OUTCOME -- THE WAY FORWARD

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINR KDEM NU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0037
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #2611/01 3351602
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011602Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8322
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0834
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 002611 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KDEM NU
SUBJECT: ELECTION OUTCOME -- THE WAY FORWARD

REF: A. MANAGUA 02518

B. MANAGUA 02521

Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 002611

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KDEM NU
SUBJECT: ELECTION OUTCOME -- THE WAY FORWARD

REF: A. MANAGUA 02518

B. MANAGUA 02521

Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D).


1. (C) INTRODUCTION/SUMMARY: Sandinista Liberation Front
(FSLN) President-elect Daniel Ortega realizes that our
recognition of his minority government is critical to the
continuation of our assistance programs, much-needed foreign
investment, and to some degree, the policies of the
international financial institutions (IFIs) and their
instruments vis a vis Nicaragua. Clearly, Ortega needs us
much more than we need him, but he also faces the
expectations of his populist base and his authoritarian
allies, who will press him to lead Nicaragua in their
direction. How Ortega juggles these contradicting demands
and fulfills his promises to the Nicaraguan people will
largely determine his success or failure. In his comments to
the press, via domestic and foreign intermediaries, and in
his recent meetings with other Central American presidents
and with Assistant Secretary Thomas Shannon, Ortega has
signaled his desire to work with us.


2. (C) Assistant Secretary Shannon's November 27-28 visit to
Managua allowed him to convey to President-elect Ortega from
the start that our government will speak with one voice and
adhere to one policy. A/S Shannon's and the Ambassador's
joint meetings with Ortega, President Bolanos, opposition
political leaders, and civil society leaders, and the
Assistant Secretary's remarks to the press, allayed fears
that the U.S. will somehow abandon Nicaragua's democracy and
its people. Indeed, our bilateral interests remain
unchanged: keeping Nicaragua on the democratic path, ending
the Ortega-Aleman pact's control of the political, electoral,
and judicial systems; ensuring cooperation in combating
corruption and terrorism and narcotics, arms, and people
trafficking; resolving outstanding property claims cases;
and, implementing fiscally responsible, free market policies
-- including cooperation on advancing CAFTA. This cable
outlines these interests, our leverage via programs and other
resources, and the markers and red lines to monitor and

assess the bilateral relationship. Ambassador met with FSLN
International Relations Secretary Samuel Santos on November
30 to follow up on our plans, and outline our programs and
their parameters to members of Ortega's transition team in
December. END INTRODUCTION/SUMMARY.

USING OUR LEVERAGE
- - - - - - - - - -


3. (C) Our bilateral relations and assistance programs are
largely governed by a series of laws, agreements or
requirements -- U.S. legislation including the annual Section
527 property waiver; Title III of the Libertad Act; the
annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP),Human Rights, Religious
Freedom, and counter-terrorism and counter narcotics (INSCR)
reports/related legislation; Temporary Protected Status (TPS)
extensions; the text of CAFTA-DR; and our Millennium
Challenge Compact (MCC) indices. Thus, our continued
assistance should reflect the degree to which the Ortega
government remains within these parameters.

OVERRIDING MARKERS AND RED LINES
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


4. (C) Our mission's first objective is protecting U.S.
citizens in country and the foreign nationals who work for
us. Any systematic legal/administrative harassment of our
diplomatic mission, its operation and its employees or of
U.S. citizens residing in Nicaragua would be unacceptable,
and potential grounds to take action vis-a-vis our assistance
programs and overall bilateral relationship. Similarly,
while we expect Ortega will maintain close ties with leftist
allies like Muammar Khadaffi, Fidel Castro, Hugo Chavez, who
will press him to lead Nicaragua along a populist,
authoritarian path, we must impress upon him that if he
places Libyan, Venezuelan or Cuban officials in strategically
sensitive government ministries, as advisers to the police or
military, or as educators or public health workers whose main
objective is to indoctrinate Nicaraguans against the United
States and democracy, we will deem these actions hurtful to
our interests and our assistance programs.

FOREIGN POLICY CONCERNS
- - - - - - - - - - - -


5. (C) We can expect the Ortega government will shift
Nicaragua's foreign policy towards the left, e.g., not
support our positions on Cuba or Palestine, and probably
differ with us over Iraq, Iran and North Korea. The issue
will be more a matter of degree of differentiation and
activism on these fronts, and the FSLN government's
willingness to play a constructive, responsible role. Early
clarity on our red lines will be essential. If a moderate
Sandinista assumes the leadership of the Foreign Ministry
(MFA),we can expect more fluid engagement on these issues,
and in some cases, we may be able to persuade the MFA to
abstain in particularly contentious votes in international
fora.

KEEPING NICARAGUA ON THE DEMOCRATIC PATH
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


6. (C) Keeping Nicaragua on the democratic path includes
helping it strengthen and consolidate its democracy,
guaranteeing space for and strengthening of pro-democratic,
non-FSLN/Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC)-"Pact" parties
and civil society (NGOS like the Movimiento por Nicaragua
(MpN),Etica y Transparencia (ET),and IPADE; private sector,
and religious organizations, and academe); enacting electoral
reforms that depoliticize the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE)
and guarantee voter rights and cedulation/national identity
cards to all eligible Nicaraguan citizens; ensuring the
non-partisan defense of human rights -- including freedom of
expression and an independent media -- and in the exercise of
rule of law; and, depoliticizing and reducing the
Ortega-Aleman pact's control of Nicaragua's electoral and
judicial systems.

ERODING THE ALEMAN-ORTEGA PACT, PROMOTING GOOD GOVERNANCE
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


7. (C) We can expect that Ortega will attempt to maintain
the leverage he has gained from his pact with convicted money
launderer/PLC caudillo Arnoldo Aleman, while he will also
court Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN) leader Eduardo
Montealegre, who has gained a seat in the National Assembly.
With Ortega's victory, the FSLN will control every sector of
the government except the National Assembly, and even there,
its influence will predominate. While the FSLN will be
unable to pass constitutional reforms or other laws requiring
a 2/3 majority vote without the support of other parties, it
could combine its votes with either the PLC or the ALN to
surpass the 56-vote threshold required to legislate
constitutional reforms. (Note: According to the CSE's final
official results, the FSLN obtained 38 Assembly seats, the
PLC 25, the ALN 22 (plus Montealegre's and President Bolanos'
seats),and the MRS 5 seats. End Note.)

--Markers: Ortega/FSLN relationship with Aleman/PLC in their
parties' positions on legislation, prosecutorial/defense,
court cases, regulatory standards, CSE electoral policies,
and the appointment of new Supreme Court justices, the
Attorney General (Procurador General),Chief Public
Prosecutor (Fiscal General),and Controller General.

--Red Lines: Actions that further consolidate FSLN-PLC Pact
interests to the detriment of Nicaragua's democracy and its
people, e.g. a new Assembly board (junta) that reflects the
Pact rather than the Assembly's new pluralism; the
appointment of unqualified, biased, and/or corrupt judges or
other officials on the basis of partisan interests; passage
of legislation that erodes efforts to combat corruption,
including the release of Aleman or broad amnesty; and,
holding hostage legislation required by the IFIs to meet
Nicaragua's commitments to international instruments. These
actions would contradict the FSLN's campaign pledges to abide
by the rule of law and fight corruption.

COOPERATION IN COMBATTING CORRUPTION, TERRORISM, NARCOTICS,
ARMS, AND PEOPLE TRAFFICKING
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


8. (C) The new government's level of cooperation in
combating corruption and terrorism, and narcotics, arms, and
people trafficking, will be a crucial determinant in our
bilateral relations and the future of our programs.

--Markers: Continued cooperation between the U.S. military
and law enforcement with the Nicaraguan military and police;
GON/military/National Assembly action on MANPADS destruction;
GON/law enforcement/military/legislative/judicial and
executive branch support of
counter-narcotics/counterterrorism/TIP efforts including
support for the new counter-narcotics/anti-corruption vetted
unit and appropriate laws, regulations, and their
enforcement.

--Red Lines: No traction on further MANPADS destruction
and/or lack of proper security to maintain the stocks or
sales of stocks to unfriendly nations or agents; efforts to
derail vetted unit operations; ignoring obligations to take
actions against individuals and organizations that support
terrorism, decline in efforts to combat TIP (prevention,
protection of victims, prosecution of perpetrators, or
allowing the problem to grow; drop in counter-narcotics
cooperation, seizures, failure to jail, try, and sentence
traffickers; and considerable influence and involvement by
other military, intelligence or law enforcement forces
hostile to the United States.

PROGRESS ON PROPERTY CLAIMS RESOLUTION
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


9. (C) Adequate progress in the new government's resolution
of outstanding U.S. citizen property claims is another vital
marker. Indeed, much of our assistance is tied to the GON's
cooperation on this matter.

--Markers: Reasonable progress in resolving outstanding U.S.
citizen property claims, including those properties in the
hands of the Nicaraguan military; GON actions to
deter/penalize further confiscations; and, the selection of a
qualified, non-partisan property superintendent.

--Red Lines: Slippage in the number of cases resolved in 2007
527 waiver period as a result of the lack of government
cooperation, or the passage of legislation or implementation
of regulations that hinder progress; the failure of GON to
prevent/deal with new confiscations; or, signs that the FSLN
government starts to de-link its responsibility for the
actions or inactions of the new property superintendency and
the lack of resolutions by claiming it is an independent
entity. .

FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY, FREE MARKET POLICIES, CAFTA
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


10. (C) We will also monitor the Sandinista government's
adherence to fiscally responsible, sound macroeconomic, free
market policies -- including its cooperation, or lack
thereof, on advancing CAFTA.

--Markers: Continued reduction of the budget deficit through
rising revenues and fiscal prudence; policies designed to
keep inflation in check and a stable currency; positive net
foreign and U.S. investment on an annual basis; positive
trajectories for both imports from and exports to the United
States; excellent relations with international financial
institutions and donors; and continued support from the
executive and legislative branches of government for a
growing bilateral trade and investment relationship with the
United States.

--Red Lines: The appearance of serious trade and budget
imbalances as the result of bad policy; hiding/fabricating
economic date; a reluctance to publicize or be associated
with CAFTA successes, while emphasizing minor successes with
countries that publicly oppose the United States;
deteriorating relations with donors; scapegoating
international financial institutions, the WTO, or CAFTA for
economic problems that arise; or a request to renegotiate a
significant portion of CAFTA with the United States.

BOLSTERING CIVIL SOCIETY, THE OPPOSITION
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


11. (C) We believe that much of our assistance in the future
should be directed towards bolstering civil society,
including democratically committed NGOs and foundations like
Movimiento por Nicaragua (MpN),JUDENIC, Etica y
Transparencia (ET),IPADE, Pro Justicia, the IEEPP, Hagamos
Democracia, and the Permanent Human Rights Council (CPDH),
among others. In turn, these groups will help strengthen
Nicaragua's new democratic parties and perhaps encourage the
traditional FSLN and PLC parties to reform. (Note: Post will
submit ideas/proposals in this regard septel. End Note.

NEXT STEPS
- - - - -


12. (C) Ambassador met with FSLN International Relations
Secretary Samuel Santos on November 30 to follow up on our
plans and outline our programs and their parameters to
members of Ortega's transition team in December (septel).
TRIVELLI