OAS SENIOR POLITICAL ENVOY READS THE RIOT ACT TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MANAGUA 000220

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/USOAS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2016
TAGS: KDEM NU PGOV PINR PREL KCOR
SUBJECT: OAS SENIOR POLITICAL ENVOY READS THE RIOT ACT TO
NICARAGUAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION

REF: A. MANAGUA 00212


B. 2005 MANAGUA 02746

Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D).


1. (C) Summary: OAS senior political envoy John Biehl has
placed stringent conditions on the Supreme Electoral Council
(CSE) to enable the OAS to participate in Nicaragua's March
and November elections. In his recent visit to Managua,
Biehl clarified that CSE's invitation for OAS observation of
Nicaragua's elections is incomplete. Biehl believes that the
OAS can work with IFES, possibly the UNDP, and others to
cover all necessary ground. He is playing the legitimacy
card, citing to Sandinistas the example of the successful
Bolivian elections to convince them to play clean. CSE
magistrates are playing high-stakes poker: the prizes are the
presidency and the control of the National Assembly. The
cards up their sleeves include stalling on external scrutiny;
possibly disqualifying FSLN dissident Lewites from running
and/or releasing PLC leader Arnoldo Aleman to divide the
Liberal vote; and, a "royal flush" of fraudulent tactics
favoring Sandinista voters. Only sustained and robust civil
society and internatational scrutiny stand in their way. End
Summary.

Play Nice -- or No Dice
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2. (C) OAS Director of Democratic and Political Affairs John
Biehl traveled to Managua January 24-29 to lay the groundwork
for OAS observation of Nicaragua's March regional and
November national elections. The OAS exploratory mission
responds to President Bolanos' recent request to OAS
Secretary General Insulza. After concluding a full day of

SIPDIS
back-to-back meetings on January 26 with the Supreme
Electoral Council (CSE),political party leaders, civil
society, UN representatives, and EU ambassadors, Biehl shared
with us the gist of his meetings, his message, and his
general outlook on the electoral process.


3. (C) Biehl explained he had clarified to the CSE that his
visit was in response to President Bolanos' invitation, not
the CSE's. Moreover, the OAS does not consider the CSE's
recent letter inviting the OAS to observe the elections an
official invitation because the CSE lacked a quorum when
extending the invitation and the notification was not
transmitted, as it must, via the MFA. (Note: For the last
few months, three PLC magistrates on the seven member board
of the CSE have abstained from participation. Five votes are
required for a quorum, which means that the legality of any
recent CSE decisions, including the invitation to the OAS
observers, could be questioned.)


4. (U) Biehl outlined the OAS' terms for assisting in
elections observation, noting that the CSE must agree in
writing to a clear, detailed, and transparent work plan.
Components of the work plan must cover and resolve problems
concerning the following areas:

--Provide equal cedula access: Determine why the CSE is not
issuing cedulas in a timely fashion to some applicants,
whether - as alleged by some political party and civil
society leaders - there is partisan-directed issuance of
cedulas (some allege that Sandinista sympathizers are
receiving their cedulas, while other Nicaraguans are not;
others claim that both the FSLN and PLC-controlled CSE
ensures that militants of these two parties get their cedulas
while the applications of other Nicaraguans are sidelined.)
Resolve these inequities so all Nicaraguans receive their
cedulas (required to register to vote).

--Partially purge the voter registry (padron): Biehl
remarked that a complete audit and purge of the voter
registry (padron) would be ideal but unrealistic at this
point, not only because of time restrictions, which are
considerable, but also because of the political fallout
a full purge could generate. The new government, he
asserted, must assume this task after it first undertakes a
massive recedulation of all Nicaraguans soon after it is
elected. Nonetheless, the CSE must scrub the padron and find
ways to prevent the deceased on the padron from voting.

--Stem Raton Loco ("Crazy Mouse"): Determine the scope and
reason the CSE moves thousands of Nicaraguans to new voting
stations (JRVs) at great distances from their places of
residence. On Election Day, many Nicaraguans cannot vote

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because when they arrive at their customary JRV, they find
they have been moved to another JRV, sometimes even in
another department or region. (Note: This is a tactic
employed to reduce the votes of certain political streams to
benefit a competitor). Resolve these irregularities to give
fair and equal access to all Nicaraguan voters.

--Quash unneeded for JRV Relocation: Determine the scope and
reason the CSE is moving some JRVs to more remote areas,
which confuses and restricts voter access on Election Day.

--Verify voter registry lists/JRV locations: Ensure the
accuracy of the JRVs for all registered voters. Mount a
robust month-long awareness campaign via radio, megaphone,
informing citizens of their rights and responsibilities.
Allow citizens to verify their registration and voting
location.

--Clarify Electoral Law Article 41: Article 41 enables a
voter to vote in a JVR even if they are not on the list for
that particular JVR so long as the cedula shows he/she is a
resident of the area. The Sandinistas are trying to
eliminate this article.

--Guarantee CSE quorum, non-partisan professionalism: The
CSE must work as a professional, non-partisan electoral body,
not/not as a center of political negotiations (Biehl likened
the CSE as something out of the Al Capone era). Both FSLN
and PLC magistrates must work together to establish quorum
and ensure fair and credible elections. (Note: CSE
magistrates are totally beholden to their respective
political parties; three report to Aleman, three to Ortega,
and one -- Chief Magistrate Roberto Rivas -- reports to
Cardinal Obando, who recently swings for the Sandinista
interests.

--Publicize the CSE work plan: The CSE must make public its
detailed work plan to give the public confidence in the
process and to avoid previous "mistakes,' most recently those
occurring during the 2004 municipal elections.

--Extend an official invite to the OAS: The CSE must extend
an official invitation to the OAS, which requires a CSE
quorum and channeling the letter via the Foreign Ministry.

--Commit to clean elections: The CSE must ensure the
elections are clean or they will not be credible or
legitimate. The spirit of the OAS Democratic Charter, and
respect for human rights back this principle.

--Keep the courts out of politics -- disallow candidate
disqualifications (inhibiciones): The CSE will ensure that
no candidates are disqualified for political reasons. Biehl
was emphatic that disqualifications of candidates is a
non-starter and the elections will lose all credibility if
this occurs. He added that this commitment will require some
sort of outside guarantor (perhaps someone from the
Inter-American Human Rights Court) who will review any
candidate disqualification cases should they arise. (Note:
CSE chief magistrate Rivas has publicly stated that he will
respect court decisions relating to inhibiciones.)


5. (C) The CSE magistrates (Biehl met separately with the PLC
and Sandinista magistrates) were receptive to Biehl's
parameters, he said, assuring they would try to meet the next
day to vote on the OAS invitation. Biehl estimated that once
the CSE agrees to these terms, the OAS could deploy a
technical team within ten days. Biehl recommends a
bifurcated approach to OAS participation: technical
assistance on the one hand to be complemented by a group of
"notables," possibly including the chief of the Canadian
election commission, former IFES president Jose Waldenburgh,
and the director of IFE-Mexico. A smaller OAS team would
work on the Atlantic Coast elections and a larger, parallel
team would focus on the national elections, he said. Biehl
confirmed that Patricio Gajardo has already signed a contract
to work with the OAS on the Nicaraguan elections. To address
alleged FSLN concerns of "foreign intervention," (reportedly
the Sandinistas asked Biehl to monitor the U.S. Embassy, to
which he quipped that he
could also watch the Venezuelan Embassy) the OAS will include
two senior political analysts in its team of experts to
write about the political context.

Divvying up the Tasks via Cooperation Framework
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6. (C) Responding to Ambassador's concerns that the three
tasks at hand - observation, diagnosis of problems, solution
of these problems - are covered, Biehl explained that the OAS
has neither the mandate nor the resources to cover all areas.
He was sympathetic to the difficulties IFES has encountered
in getting the CSE's approval to start work on its technical
assistance program, noting that UNDP has also offered
technical assistance, but to date the CSE has not responded.
Biehl was receptive to working under a cooperation framework
in conjunction with IFES, possibly the UNDP, and others to
cover all election aspects. For example, the Canadians have
expert election auditors, he said.

Worst-Case Scenario: Lewites is Disqualified, Aleman Freed
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7. (C) Biehl opined that FSLN dissident Herty Lewites is the
most vulnerable candidate; the Danielistas are prepared to
disqualify him at the right moment. The unabashed
Sandinistas shared with Biehl that they could strike an
agreement with PLC leader/convicted criminal Arnoldo Aleman,
whereby Aleman would receive his freedom in exchange for the
PLC allowing the courts to disqualify Herty Lewites. Biehl
recounted how he had pushed back, by urging the Sandinistas
to follow the example of Morales and the Bolivian elections,
where Morales won a fair, transparent election.

Flawed Atlantic Coast Election to Serve as Lessons Learned
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8. (C) Lamenting his prediction the March 5 Atlantic Coast
regional elections will be flawed, Biehl ventured that at
least the poor results will serve to exert pressure on the
CSE to correct its mistakes. The CSE will have time to
correct these irregularities for the November 5 national
election, opined Biehl. (Note: Accusations of CSE, especially
FSLN-committed fraud in the lead-up to the Atlantic Coast
election are rampant, including the CSE's according priority
to issuing and delivery cedulas to Sandinista sympathizers,
the issuance of cedulas to minors (voting age is 16 in
Nicaragua) through the use of fraudulent birth certificates.
NGOS are proposing a partial audit of the voter registry -
specifically the last 20,000 additions on the padron -- to
determine the scope and reason for the problem.) Montealegre
campaign manager in the North Atlantic Autonomous Region
(RAAN),Jaime Chow, reported to poloff (Ref. A) that 20,000
citizens in the vicinity of Waspam (half the population) are
without cedulas. Most are offspring of the Nicaraguan
anti-Sandinista resistance and would naturally vote
anti-Sandinista.)

Still No Quorum
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9. (C) Despite Biehl's "tough love" with the CSE and the CSE
magistrates' assuring Biehl they would meet January 27 to
vote on the OAS invitation, they did not. Biehl's reaction
was immediate and received prominent news coverage: the CSE
must free itself from any political pressure and warned the
CSE that it must immediately resolve the quorum impasse or
lose all credibility in its management of the Atlantic Coast
election. According to President Bolanos senior political
adviser, the PLC backed out on the excuse that CSE President
Rivas (appointed for his PLC affiliation, but now he reports
to Cardinal Obando and sides for the most part with the
Sandinistas) had insisted on a multi-point agenda, while the
PLC would only agree to vote on inviting the OAS. The PLC
magistrates accused the Sandinistas of trying to "ambush"
them to force a quorum so they could approve the legality of
Eduardo Montealegre's ALN-PC party and its party symbol.


10. (C) Bolanos' advisers, who met with Biehl just before our
meeting, also shared that Biehl will urge the Secretary
General Insulza to issue a strong statement next week on the
CSE crisis. DCM raised these concerns with the donor
elections working group on January 30. Following the release
of the OAS statement, Bolanos' aides will arrange a meeting
for President Bolanos with the diplomatic corps to encourage
them to issue a statement.

Renewed FSLN Saber Rattling against the OAS
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11. (C) Further complicating matters is the Sandinistas
latest saber rattling against the OAS, this time for its

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alleged failure to condemn President Bolanos for having
breached last fall's OAS-brokered Bolanos-Ortega governabilty
agreement. (Note: In Bolanos' annual address to the National
Assembly he proposed a referendum on the constitutional
changes that had reduced his executive powers. The
Bolanos-Ortega agreement included the passage of a framework
law (ley marco) that freezes the implementation of these
constitutional changes until January 2007.)

Comment
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12. (C) CSE magistrates are playing high-stakes poker: the
prizes are the presidency and the control of the National
Assembly. Their ultimate concern is not so much which
political ideology the winner will impose; rather, it's a
struggle for power and a matter of who gets to divide the
spoils. Either a FSLN or Aleman-controlled PLC election
victory would consolidate a caudillo "kleptocracy" in
Nicaragua and derail President Bolanos' well-intentioned
efforts to steer Nicaragua along a path of good governance
and public service. Notwithstanding the apparent friction
between Sandinista and Liberal CSE magistrates, the
Ortega-Aleman pact continues to thrive, although clearly the
Sandinistas have the upper hand. Some interlocutors and
political analysts assert that if Aleman cannot gain amnesty
via a National Assembly vote, he is willing to strike a deal
with Ortega "allowing" Ortega to win the election in exchange
for his freedom and ensuring that Aleman's rival Montealegre
loses. Under this line of reasonin
g, Aleman would prefer an Ortega win because he can deal with
an Ortega victory, while if Montealegre wins, Aleman's hold
over Nicaraguan Liberalism will recede.


13. (C) Certainly, releasing Aleman and disqualifying Lewites
would wreak further havoc in the Liberal camp and make a
broad Liberal alliance even more unlikely (although the
reaction and consequences of disqualifying Lewites could also
have negative repercussions in the Sandinista camp). Even if
a free Aleman would not run on the PLC ticket, his designate
certainly would, and with Lewites out of the picture, Ortega
would be running against two Liberal candidates. Further, an
unmonitored, unchecked, and Sandinista-dominated electoral
commission can employ cedula issuance and delivery, and the
relocation and redistribution of voters and JRVs to increase
the number of Sandinista sympathizers who can actually vote,
while restricting non-Sandinista voter access to the polls.
These combined tactics could conceivably suffice to turn the
March and November elections in Ortega's favor. Only robust
and sustained civil society and international scrutiny stand
in their way. The longer the CSE stalls on allowing external
scrutiny, the more the stakes play into the hands of the
Sandinistas.

TRIVELLI