Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MANAGUA1977
2006-09-08 17:37:00
SECRET
Embassy Managua
Cable title:  

MONTEALEGRE: BEST SCENARIO IS RIZO/ALVARADO

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINR KDEM NU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #1977/01 2511737
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 081737Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7504
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T MANAGUA 001977 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/USOAS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KDEM NU
SUBJECT: MONTEALEGRE: BEST SCENARIO IS RIZO/ALVARADO
WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL RACE


Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D).

S E C R E T MANAGUA 001977

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/USOAS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KDEM NU
SUBJECT: MONTEALEGRE: BEST SCENARIO IS RIZO/ALVARADO
WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL RACE


Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D).


1. (S) SUMMARY: In his recent meeting with presidential
candidate Eduardo Montealegre, the Ambassador touched on the
crucial elements required to consolidate the campaign: convey
a clear, concise, and consistent message; ensure financial
and moral support to his campaigners throughout the country;
listen to his professional campaign advisors'
recommendations; and, put to rest the CENIs (debt bonds)
issue. Montealegre agreed with the Ambassador's assessment,
remarking that the media firm supporting his campaign is not
yet successfully conveying his messages to the Nicaraguan
people. Montealegre attributed the lack of tangible support
for his campaign outside Managua to insufficient campaign
funds, noting that Nicaragua's private sector continues to
dole out its support in dribs and drabs and does not appear
sufficiently alarmed over the specter of an Ortega victory.
Opining that at this juncture a broad Liberal alliance is
untenable, Montealegre remarked that the ideal scenario would
be PLC candidate Rizo's withdrawal from the race. Ambassador
shared our efforts to achieve this goal. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) On September 6, presidential candidate Eduardo
Montealegre and ALN campaign chief Adolfo Arguello met with
Ambassador, DCM, and polcouns to discuss the status of his
campaign and our perceptions regarding the crucial elements
at play. Rushing in from his three-hour walk-a-thon through
a number of poor Managua barrios, Montealegre appeared
determined, but preoccupied, with the status of his campaign.
He opined that walk-a-thons are more effective than massive
campaign rallies in reaching out to voters, even though the
ALN's August 27 rally had been a "resounding success" and
demonstrated that the ALN indeed possesses party structure.
Montealegre calculated that close to 100,000 supporters
attended his rally (1,500 busses with an average of 60 each,
plus Managua walk-ins) while according to police contacts
present at Rizo's rally in Sebaco earlier in August, only

45,000-60,000 attended - as opposed to the 300,000 claimed by
the PLC. (Comment: Likely both sides are exaggerating the
turnout.)


3. (C) The ALN's rally was a success, better than expected,
despite attempts by the PLC to derail it, continued
Montealegre, who asserted that PLC campaign fundraiser
Gilberto Wong had blocked a Taiwanese-run company's
production of 50,000 shirts and caps with ALN logo shirts for
the rally. Instead, 2,000 all-white shirts, many with holes,
and pink caps were delivered to ALN headquarters the day
before the rally. Arguello reported that the ALN scrambled
overnight and procured red and white t-shirts, sans logo, for
the event.


4. (S) The Ambassador recommended the following steps that
would help the ALN improve its campaign:

--Convey a clear, concise, and consistent message;

--Provide financial and moral support to ALN candidates and
others campaigning in departments and districts;

--Heed the professional campaign advisors' recommendations;
and,

--Put to rest the CENIs (debt bonds) issue.


5. (C) Montealegre, who agreed with the Ambassador's
assessment, remarked that the media firm supporting his
campaign is failing thus far to effectively convey his
messages to the Nicaraguan people. He attributed the lack of
tangible support to his campaign outside Managua in large
part to insufficient campaign funds, remarking that
Nicaragua's private sector continues to dole out its support
in dribs and drabs and does not appear sufficiently alarmed
over the specter of an Ortega victory. Montealegre added
that to help ALN National Assembly candidates effectively
campaign, he has arranged personal loans of USD 15,000 each
for 30 of his candidates. He also acknowledged that public
confusion over whether or not he will rejoin the PLC had
harmed his efforts to consolidate the support of Nicaragua's
largely anti FSLN-PLC pact independents.

6. (C) Regarding the CENIs charges, Montealegre reiterated
that this is a joint PLC-FSLN cabal to discredit him and
remove him from the race (Reftel),sharing that he had told
the press just that (El Nuevo Diario picked up his comments
in its September 7 edition). He sought our help in
dissuading the CENIs "truth commission" cabal, led by Carlos
Ulvert, Francisco Mayorga, Gilberto Wong, and Francisco

Aguirre Sacasa to halt their smear campaign against him.
(NOTE: We have evidence of their collusion through a
disgruntled PLC member who was involved in the plan and who
has drafted a statement denouncing them.)


7. (C) On the subject of Liberal unity, Montealegre
discarded a PLC-ALN alliance as an option this late in the
game. Aleman's continuing control of the PLC and Rizo's
double speak -- on the one hand calling for Liberal unity,
and on the other, conspiring to smear Montealegre -- had
killed any efforts to unite. At this point, the best
scenario would be for Rizo to admit that the CENIs campaign
against Montealegre is a scam and for Rizo and VP candidate
Jose Antonio Alvarado to resign and step off the political
stage. Ambassador said he conveyed a message to Rizo via one
of his confidantes that Rizo should take the heroic step by
withdrawing his candidacy, or else be held accountable if
Ortega wins the election, and offered to talk, if necessary,
to Ulvert and others engaged in maligning Montealegre.

COMMENT
- - - - -


8. (S) President Bolanos' senior political adviser Frank
Arana has told us that some members of the Nicaragua's
business elite, as well as the Taiwanese, may be prepared to
offer Rizo an "incentive" to "sweeten" his departure.
Regarding Alvarado, the Bolanos government possesses
incriminating evidence that demonstrates Alvarado personally
benefited from over half a million dollars in government
funds when he served as FISE (Emergency Fund for Social
Investment) director.
TRIVELLI