ELECTION 2006: POSSIBLE SCENARIOS, RISKS, AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MANAGUA 000127

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/OAS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2016
TAGS: KDEM NU PGOV PINR
SUBJECT: ELECTION 2006: POSSIBLE SCENARIOS, RISKS, AND
POTENTIAL OUTCOMES


Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D).

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Summary/Introduction
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1. (C) Our election priorities in Nicaragua are twofold:
ensure Nicaragua holds clean, fair, credible, and inclusive
national elections and encourage Nicaraguans to vote for
presidential and legislative candidates who uphold democratic
principles. We will encourage an electoral process that will
help Nicaragua strengthen its democracy and democratic
institutions, create a truly representative balance among
Nicaragua's political powers, and reinforce a bialteral
productive working relationship to further economic and
security cooperation. Currently, a four-way presidential
race is the most likely scenario. However, there still is a
possibility this could be reduced to a three-way race by
summer and possibly even a two-way race thereafter. End
Summary/Introduction.

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Basic Premises
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2. (C) The following are some basic premises concerning
Nicaragua's current political landscape:

--Most Nicaraguans seek a change in their political
leadership and reject the current leadership of Nicaragua's
two dominant political parties, the Liberal Constitutional
Party (PLC) and the Sandinista Party (FSLN). Early polls peg
dissident PLC candidate Eduardo Montealegre (ALN-PC) and
dissident GSLN member Herty Lewites as the clear
front-runners.

--Anti-Sandinista does not necessarily mean democratic;
Aleman's caudillismo is not democratic. Further, a dissident
Sandinista, such as Lewites, could conceptually support
democratic governance.

--The PLC is unlikely to reform and move squarely into the
democratic, anti-caudillisto column in large part because
Aleman will not loosen his hold on the party apparatus and
the PLC leaders are too compromised to break away from him.

--To encourage Lewites to maintain his independence from
Ortega, Lewites needs to believe we will work with him/his
government if he wins in November.

--An Ortega victory in a clean election is possible, but not
probable. His negatives are very high and he has lost three
presidential bids in the past 15 years.

--Montealegre cannot affiliate with the PLC as long as the
PLC remains under Aleman's control. He would lose all of his
credibility and much of his support if he were to do so.

--A four-way presidential race offers Nicaraguans real
choices and the opportunity to strengthen their democracy -
but such a race is unpredictable as four roughly equal
political forces would vie for the prize.

-- Voter turnout and the votes of independents and the
undecided are pivotal. Low voter turnout is likely to favor
Ortega; high turnout is more likely to favor the
anti-Sandinista vote, and the anti-caudillo vote more
generally.

--Vigorous international monitoring starting NOW, combined
with robust Nicaraguan observation can minimize pact-driven
fraud. Without it, fraud at levels that will affect the
electoral outcome is likely.

--Voter education is key. Many Nicaraguans are illiterate
and recognize only party symbols; voters must be informed of
which candidates and parties correspond to the different
symbols and "casillas" (party registry numbers) on the
ballot.

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Four-Way Race
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3. (C) As it stands, a four-way presidential race is the
most likely scenario. If this holds, it would represent a

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new political phenomenon for Nicaragua, one that could offer
Nicaraguans a broader choice of candidates and platforms and
an opportunity to choose a leader who will focus on
strengthening Nicaragua's fragile democracy rather than
consolidating personal power or the party's control over
Nicaragua and its resources. Likely candidates in a four-way
race are the following:

-Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) candidate (TBD -
probably not until May). The party has two basic options: an
Alvarado/Rizo combination in a quest for a "respectable"
ticket, or the election of a more malleable Alemanista
candidate.

-Sandinista (FSLN) candidate Daniel Ortega

-FSLN dissident Herty Lewites

-PLC dissident Eduardo Montealegre (now ALN-PC)


4. (SBU) To win on the first round, a candidate must have at
least 35 percent of the votes and lead the closest competitor
by at least five points. Thus, in a four-way race, a run-off
may well be required. Lewites and Montealegre lead the
polls. If the elections are clean and inclusive, and if
Lewites and Montealegre are able to develop strong enough
organizations to transform their popular support into votes,
the duo could face each other in a runoff.


5. (C) A four-way race presents risks and it could suffer
setbacks, among them:

-Voter fraud could be easier to commit and more
prevalent due to non-traditional circumstances (the Supreme
Electoral Council (CSE) remains in the hands of the "pacted"
FSLN and PLC, while other parties currently have no
representation).

-Either or both of the dissident candidates are
disqualified on trumped-up legal charges;

-Lewites rejoins the Ortega FSLN fold and drops out of
the election;

-One or both of the dissident candidates fail to
develop an organization capable of transforming popular
support into sufficient votes and defending the vote against
fraud perpetrated by the majority parties; or,

-Lewites takes more votes from Montealegre than from
Ortega, and Lewites and Ortega end up being the top two
vote-getters in the first round. (Note: this scenario is
highly unlikely because of the sizeable anti-Sandinista bloc
(over 50 %) and Herty Lewite's weakness in the countryside.)


6. (C) If PLC Liberals, including rural voters who tend to
vote Liberal, rally around Montealegre in a second round, he
would be the favorite.

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Three-Way Races
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7. (C) The three-way race scenario presents two
possibilities:

-Ortega, Lewites, and a Liberal Alliance candidate
(likely Montealegre),or

-Ortega, a PLC candidate (likely selected by Arnoldo
Aleman),and Montealegre.

Although these scenarios appear unlikely at this time, they
could arise later in the year (as the election date nears and
campaign time diminishes). Lewites could eventually decide
to run as Ortega's VP, or be "disqualified," or a
PLC-Montealegre alliance could conceivably materialize.


8. (C) Risks of a three-way scenario:

-If Montealegre were to form an alliance with a PLC
still under Aleman's control, this could subtract, not add,
votes for Montealegre and the Liberal, anti-FSLN cause.
Montealegre could be perceived to have sacrificed his
democratic principles to win Aleman's benediction, and more
of the undecided and independent voters could gravitate to

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Lewites rather than Montealegre.

-An Ortega-Lewites alliance would increase the
likelihood of a Sandinista win, especially if the Liberals
remain divided. However, Lewites would also lose a large
number of interdependent voters if he associated with Ortega.

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Two-Way Race
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9. (C) A two-way race, pitting an Ortega-Lewites Sandinista
alliance against a PLC-Montealegre Liberal alliance, is
unlikely but could emerge in reaction to an Ortega-Lewites or
a PLC-Montealegre alliance.

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Polls - What We Need to Know
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10. (SBU) Although the polls tell us much, gaps remain in the
information available, specifically in the following areas:

-More details on the breakdown of Nicaraguans according
to party affiliation and strength/depth of that party
affiliation (PLC, FLSN, Conservatives, minor parties, none,
independent, undecided, refuse to reveal).

-Breakdown of Nicaraguan voters according to
ideological rather than political affiliations (Liberal,
Sandinista, Conservative, independent, none, other, refuse to
reveal) --and what these ideological/philosophical difference
represent and/or are perceived to be.

-Intention to vote (yes/no, candidate preference VS
party VS ideological preference VS platform/program
offerings (which preference will carry more weight on
Election Day); preference or not for political change.

-Information on regional preferences to improve message
targeting.


11. (SBU) In addition to traditional polling, focus groups
would provide a more complete picture of voter interests
(e.g., top three concerns),and preferences. We will draw on
this information to hone and better target our messages to
different audiences.

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Our Message
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12. (U) Clear, concise, and consistent messages conveying our
policy will minimize distortion:

-The Nicaraguan people have shown they want fresh, truly
representative leadership that cares about their needs, not
personal or partisan interests. We too care about these
needs - this is what true democracy is about.

-We and other donors hold a stake in seeing that the
democratic wishes of the Nicaraguan people are fulfilled.

-We have contributed hundreds of millions of dollars
over the past decade to help give Nicaraguans a fair shake -
to hold well paying jobs, put food on the table, and educate
their children. We cannot allow these efforts to go to waste
or to permit Aleman or Ortega to steal the hopes of the
Nicaraguan people to better their lives.

-We make no apologies for defending the rights of the
Nicaraguan people to live in dignity and prosperity.

-It is up to the Nicaraguan people to determine the
direction their country will take and to choose their new
leaders.

-Every vote counts and every voter should have a chance
to vote.

-We encourage Nicaraguans to select leadership that best
represents their aspirations.

-Our interest is helping to ensure the elections are
free fair, credible, and inclusive.


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-We endorse principles and ideas, not candidates, and
representative leadership, separation of powers, honest,
public service, and selection by merit.

-We can work with a candidate who is elected in a fair
and transparent process and who will strengthen Nicaragua's
democracy, govern under the rule of law, and partner with us
on economic and security matters.

-The CSE is responsible for ensuring that all eligible
Nicaraguan voters obtain their cedulas, cast their ballots
unencumbered, and have their votes counted.

-We will work with the CSE, domestic observers and
Nicaragua's donor partners to make that possible.
TRIVELLI