Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MANAGUA1220
2006-06-06 22:32:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Managua
Cable title:  

MARTINEZ CUENCA: ORTEGA MUST GO -- QUESTION IS HOW

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR KDEM NU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #1220/01 1572232
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 062232Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6500
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0702
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 001220 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN TPIERCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KDEM NU
SUBJECT: MARTINEZ CUENCA: ORTEGA MUST GO -- QUESTION IS HOW
AND WHEN

REF: MANAGUA 1210

Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 001220

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN TPIERCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KDEM NU
SUBJECT: MARTINEZ CUENCA: ORTEGA MUST GO -- QUESTION IS HOW
AND WHEN

REF: MANAGUA 1210

Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D).


1. (C) Alejandro Martinez Cuenca shared with Ambassador,
DCM, and polcouns on June 6 his decision to continue his
efforts to reform the Sandinista party (FSLN) and to
challenge the FSLN "messianic" caudillo Daniel Ortega from
within the party. According to Martinez Cuenca, Ortega has
deluded himself, most of the FSLN, and the media into
believing that he is the party and the party is Ortega,
thereby blocking any possible party reform. He warned that
Ortega enjoys the backing of much of the Catholic Church
leadership, although not Archbishop Brenes' -- not only
because of Cardinal Obando y Bravo's open endorsement -- but
also due to the material support FSLN mayors have provided
their local Catholic parishes. Additionally, elaborated
Martinez Cuenca, Ortega is banking on FSLN control of the
Supreme Electoral Commission (CSE),high voter abstention
among Nicaragua's majority anti-Ortega population,
"palatable" Liberal dissident running mate Jaime Morales
Carazo, Nicaragua's fractured Right, and the disciplined
Sandinista vote.


2. (C) Martinez Cuenca, who was bounced from the FSLN's May
28 Convention (for daring to challenge Ortega's candidacy and
calling for primaries),told us that unless Ortega shows true
signs of reform, which is highly unlikely, he will confront
Ortega's candidacy again before October 8, when the CSE must
send the November 5 ballots to print and parties cannot make
further changes. Martinez Cuenca reasoned that if by then
Ortega is faring poorly in the polls, or if Ortega loses the
election on the first round, the FSLN may press Ortega to
withdraw his candidacy and then select him or another
candidate to replace Ortega. He explained that according to
Nicaraguan law, in the event a presidential or vice
presidential candidate resigns, the party may appoint a
replacement. (NOTE: According to Nicaragua's electoral law,
in the case of the resignation of a presidential or
vice-presidential candidate during the electoral process, the
political party/alliance will choose a replacement. The same
process applies in
the event of a presidential or vice-presidential candidate's
resignation after the election and before a runoff. END
NOTE.)


3. (C) Martinez Cuenca acknowledged that Ortega continues to
enjoy popularity among Sandinistas, in part because he has
been able to control tensions among competing streams in the
party and thereby limit their "belligerent" inclinations.
Nonetheless, he claimed that discontent is growing among
Sandinista rank and file, who are disaffected with Ortega's
non-democratic control of the party. Martinez Cuenca
ventured that the combined Sandinista support for him and
Herty Lewites easily totals 11% of the traditionally
Sandinista vote -- possibly enough to prevent Ortega from
winning on the first round (he estimated that Lewites draws
5% - 7% of the hard Sandinista vote, while he attracts an
additional 4% - 6%).


4. (C) Recounting how Lewites had offered him the vice
presidency (Reftel),Martinez Cuenca explained that he had
declined Lewites' offer because he believes he can achieve
more by remaining in the FSLN -- and possibly replacing
Ortega as the FSLN's candidate. Further, Lewites is
disadvantaged by his lack of political machinery required to
campaign and to defend his vote at the polls. Remarking that
the risk of fraud is greatest at the polling station level
(JRVs),Martinez Cuenca argued that party election monitors
(fiscales) are crucial. He ventured that without enough
fiscales, Lewites and the other two new political contenders
Eduardo Montealegre and Eden Pastora will be unable to defend
their votes.

COMMENT
- - - -


5. (C) We will explore further Martinez Cuenca's assertions
that Ortega enjoys substantial Catholic Church backing. In
addition to Ortega's advantages of CSE support, partial
Catholic Church endorsement (which could sway even some
undecided voters to his favor),ample campaign funds, a
palatable, Liberal dissident running mate, and divided
competitors, he virtually controls PLC caudillo/convicted
money launderer Arnoldo Aleman's freedom, or lack thereof.
Some Embassy contacts claim that Aleman has already

relinquished his party's bid for the presidency in exchange
for a guaranteed number of Assembly seats for Aleman
loyalists and his eventual freedom. Martinez Cuenca's
quixotic quest may not succeed, but even if he can whittle a
few percentage points from Ortega on November 5, his efforts
could help prevent an Ortega victory on the first round --
and even many Danielistas agree that Ortega is unlikely to
win a runoff.
TRIVELLI