Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MADRID2996
2006-12-05 08:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
Cable title:
WESTERN SAHARA: SPAIN WARY OF UNILATERAL MOROCCAN
how-toVZCZCXRO6275 PP RUEHLA DE RUEHMD #2996/01 3390812 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 050812Z DEC 06 FM AMEMBASSY MADRID TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1410 INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 3905 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0792 RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 1123 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1212 RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 5981 RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA PRIORITY 2272 RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA PRIORITY 1528 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0272
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 002996
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC WI SP
SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA: SPAIN WARY OF UNILATERAL MOROCCAN
PLAN
REF: STATE 191558
Classified By: DCM Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 002996
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC WI SP
SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA: SPAIN WARY OF UNILATERAL MOROCCAN
PLAN
REF: STATE 191558
Classified By: DCM Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Poloff discussed Western Sahara with Spanish
Subdirector General for North Africa Manuel Gomez-Acebo and
Assistant Subdirector General Javier Garcia-Larrache on
December 1. Poloff thanked Spain for their white paper on
Western Sahara and emphasized that the U.S. wished to put the
onus on Morocco to move the process forward by creating a
credible autonomy plan for Western Sahara, reviewing reftel
demarche point by point.
2. (C) Gomez-Acebo thanked Poloff and noted that the MFA
had received much the same message from its Embassy in
Nouakchott. He expressed Spain's understanding for the U.S.
position, but he asked whether Washington would consider
pushing Morocco to take a more multilateral approach in
crafting its autonomy plan. He was worried by the prospect
that Morocco would debut its plan by tabling it at the UN in
April, immediately prior to the Minurso renewal and without
prior consultation with Algeria and the Polisario Front (PF).
He asked whether there is a role for Spain, the United
States and the United Kingdom to play in the meantime to
influence both the substance of any such autonomy proposal
and the level of acceptance it would receive from Algiers and
the PF. "What should the Group of Friends do until April?"
he asked. He proposed a structured dialogue to help move an
autonomy plan forward. However, he acknowledged that Morocco
would release the plan at the time and place of its choosing
regardless of the international community's prodding.
3. (C) Gomez-Acebo expressed his pleasure with the U.S.
call for direct talks between the parties and rapprochement
between Algeria and Morocco - the centerpiece of the Spanish
non-paper. He said he was happy to see that Spain and the
U.S. are of the same mind. He noted that Spain has been
trying to mend fences between Algeria and Morocco over the
past year, with several high-level visits across the
Mediterranean including trips by King Juan Carlos to each
country.
4. (C) Garcia-Larrache took note of the U.S. call for
Morocco to open discussions with "all Sahrawi people,
including the Polisario," and emphasized that any
negotiations must be primarily between Morocco and the PF.
Both he and Gomez-Acebo cautioned that using the Royal
Council for Sahrawi Affairs (CORCAS) to provide legitimacy
for a Moroccan plan would not work and would satisfy neither
Algiers nor the PF.
5. (C) On the substance of a Moroccan plan, Gomez-Acebo
reviewed Spain's position that the plan must create a
credible and mutually accepted plan for autonomy with the
possibility of self-determination. Gomez-Acebo underlined
that "self-determination" and "independence" are not
synonymous, and he said that Morocco must be disabused of
this belief through active diplomacy. He pointed to
Morocco's control over the timing and substance of a
self-determination referendum as ways in which it could
influence the final outcome. A mutually-accepted referendum
that is many years off would provide time for autonomy to
take hold and possibly dull nationalist tendencies in Western
Sahara.
6. (C) Poloff pointed to Spain's own experience with
autonomous communities and asked whether Spain had offered
Morocco any advice or technical expertise on this topic.
Gomez-Acebo said that Morocco had not asked for any
assistance, but he noted that many academics and policy
makers in Rabat are quite familiar with the Spanish system
and its structure.
7. (C) Poloff asked whether Spain had noted any increased
inclination to violence on the part of the PF, and
Gomez-Acebo replied that they had not seen any increased
activity in the region, other than a recent incident along a
phosphate conveyor line. He said that signs of Moroccan
restraint, such as allowing the return of a noted Sahrawi
human rights activist and resuming family visitation travel,
are encouraging. He took the occasion, however, to repeat
Spain's support for Minurso. He acknowledged the UN force's
cost and noted that its mandate has not been fulfilled, but
he emphasized its important role both as a deterrent and as
MADRID 00002996 002 OF 002
an independent observer in the region. He said Minurso's
removal would create both an intelligence vacuum and a
security vacuum.
--------------
Visit Embassy Madrid's Classified Website;
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/madrid/
--------------
AGUIRRE
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC WI SP
SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA: SPAIN WARY OF UNILATERAL MOROCCAN
PLAN
REF: STATE 191558
Classified By: DCM Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Poloff discussed Western Sahara with Spanish
Subdirector General for North Africa Manuel Gomez-Acebo and
Assistant Subdirector General Javier Garcia-Larrache on
December 1. Poloff thanked Spain for their white paper on
Western Sahara and emphasized that the U.S. wished to put the
onus on Morocco to move the process forward by creating a
credible autonomy plan for Western Sahara, reviewing reftel
demarche point by point.
2. (C) Gomez-Acebo thanked Poloff and noted that the MFA
had received much the same message from its Embassy in
Nouakchott. He expressed Spain's understanding for the U.S.
position, but he asked whether Washington would consider
pushing Morocco to take a more multilateral approach in
crafting its autonomy plan. He was worried by the prospect
that Morocco would debut its plan by tabling it at the UN in
April, immediately prior to the Minurso renewal and without
prior consultation with Algeria and the Polisario Front (PF).
He asked whether there is a role for Spain, the United
States and the United Kingdom to play in the meantime to
influence both the substance of any such autonomy proposal
and the level of acceptance it would receive from Algiers and
the PF. "What should the Group of Friends do until April?"
he asked. He proposed a structured dialogue to help move an
autonomy plan forward. However, he acknowledged that Morocco
would release the plan at the time and place of its choosing
regardless of the international community's prodding.
3. (C) Gomez-Acebo expressed his pleasure with the U.S.
call for direct talks between the parties and rapprochement
between Algeria and Morocco - the centerpiece of the Spanish
non-paper. He said he was happy to see that Spain and the
U.S. are of the same mind. He noted that Spain has been
trying to mend fences between Algeria and Morocco over the
past year, with several high-level visits across the
Mediterranean including trips by King Juan Carlos to each
country.
4. (C) Garcia-Larrache took note of the U.S. call for
Morocco to open discussions with "all Sahrawi people,
including the Polisario," and emphasized that any
negotiations must be primarily between Morocco and the PF.
Both he and Gomez-Acebo cautioned that using the Royal
Council for Sahrawi Affairs (CORCAS) to provide legitimacy
for a Moroccan plan would not work and would satisfy neither
Algiers nor the PF.
5. (C) On the substance of a Moroccan plan, Gomez-Acebo
reviewed Spain's position that the plan must create a
credible and mutually accepted plan for autonomy with the
possibility of self-determination. Gomez-Acebo underlined
that "self-determination" and "independence" are not
synonymous, and he said that Morocco must be disabused of
this belief through active diplomacy. He pointed to
Morocco's control over the timing and substance of a
self-determination referendum as ways in which it could
influence the final outcome. A mutually-accepted referendum
that is many years off would provide time for autonomy to
take hold and possibly dull nationalist tendencies in Western
Sahara.
6. (C) Poloff pointed to Spain's own experience with
autonomous communities and asked whether Spain had offered
Morocco any advice or technical expertise on this topic.
Gomez-Acebo said that Morocco had not asked for any
assistance, but he noted that many academics and policy
makers in Rabat are quite familiar with the Spanish system
and its structure.
7. (C) Poloff asked whether Spain had noted any increased
inclination to violence on the part of the PF, and
Gomez-Acebo replied that they had not seen any increased
activity in the region, other than a recent incident along a
phosphate conveyor line. He said that signs of Moroccan
restraint, such as allowing the return of a noted Sahrawi
human rights activist and resuming family visitation travel,
are encouraging. He took the occasion, however, to repeat
Spain's support for Minurso. He acknowledged the UN force's
cost and noted that its mandate has not been fulfilled, but
he emphasized its important role both as a deterrent and as
MADRID 00002996 002 OF 002
an independent observer in the region. He said Minurso's
removal would create both an intelligence vacuum and a
security vacuum.
--------------
Visit Embassy Madrid's Classified Website;
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/madrid/
--------------
AGUIRRE