Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06LUANDA673
2006-06-30 13:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Luanda
Cable title:  

ANGOLA - GRA READY TO SIGN PEACE ACCORD IN CABINDA

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM PTER AO 
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VZCZCXRO6152
OO RUEHMR
DE RUEHLU #0673/01 1811326
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 301326Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY LUANDA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3014
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LUANDA 000673 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PTER AO
SUBJECT: ANGOLA - GRA READY TO SIGN PEACE ACCORD IN CABINDA

REF: A. LUANDA 00096

B. LUANDA 00196

C. LUANDA 00683

D. 05 STATE 171983

Classified By: AMBASSADOR CYNTHIA EFIRD FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LUANDA 000673

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PTER AO
SUBJECT: ANGOLA - GRA READY TO SIGN PEACE ACCORD IN CABINDA

REF: A. LUANDA 00096

B. LUANDA 00196

C. LUANDA 00683

D. 05 STATE 171983

Classified By: AMBASSADOR CYNTHIA EFIRD FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: Negotiations for a peace agreement between
the GRA and the Cabindan Forum for Dialogue (FCD) are set to
conclude on June 30, 2006. The agreement recognizes Cabinda
as a part of Angola, grants special economic status and local
governance powers to Cabinda, and condemns further acts of
terrorism and political subversion. The FCD, currently under
the leadership of Antonio Bento Bembe, has split into two
camps ) those that support Bembe and the accord and those
who do not. Representatives from Mplabanda and the
anti-accord faction of the FCD are lobbying for the USG not
to support the accord, saying it lacks the support of the
Cabindan people. In the Embassy's view, this accord, while
obviously not satisfying all factions, is the best deal the
FCD could have hoped to negotiate and offers a chance for a
lasting peace in Cabinda. It also satisfies the
long-standing U.S. policy objective of a political settlement
to the Cabinda dispute based on talks, not violence. End
Summary.

--------------
GRA and FCD at the End of Negotiations
--------------


2. (U) The office of the President of the GRA issued a press
release indicating that on June 30, 2006, in Massabi,
Cabinda, the GRA and the Cabindan Forum for Dialogue (FCD)
will hold conclusive talks leading to a memorandum of
understanding between the two parties. The release stated
that the GRA delegation was led by Presidential Advisor,
General Helder Vieira Dias &Kopelipa.8 Antonio Bento Bembe
led the FCD negotiation.


3. (U) The release affirms that the FCD recognizes the
validity of the Constitution and all current Angolan law,
reiterating their &unequivocal acceptance of the Republic of
Angola as a united and indivisible state.8 The document
further states that both the GRA and FCD reject any attempt
to disrupt the political or constitutional law of Angola, and

condemn, without reservation, all acts of political
subversion or terrorism. The GRA has agreed to give Cabinda
special economic status and increased involvement in
provincial and local governance.

--------------
Splintered FCD Taking Separate Positions
--------------


4. (C) The FCD has splintered into two groups - those that
support Bembe and those who believe that Bembe does not
represent the Cabindan people. In a June 30, 2006 meeting at
the Embassy requested by Agostinho Chicaia and Raul Danda,
the President of Mplabanda and spokesperson for the FCD
respectively, they lobbied that the USG not support the peace
accord on grounds that the negotiation process was opaque and
the accord lacked the support of the Cabindan people. Both
noted that they had turned down Vice-Ministerial positions
offered by the GRA in exchange for supporting the accord.
They alleged that Bembe was closer to the GRA than the FCD,
noting that he had been offered a position as the Vice-Chief
of Staff of the Angolan Army and had been traveling on an
Angolan diplomatic passport. They were adamant that this
accord was not supported by the true leadership of the FLEC
nor Mplabanda and therefore was unlikely to be meaningful in
the long-term.

--------------
Comment ) Peace Accord is a Done Deal
--------------


5. (C) As suggested Ref A, Bento Bembe has been the key
interlocutor between the FCD and the GRA. Bembe and his
faction grasped the reality of the FCD,s weak position
vis-a-vis the GRA following the GRA's disruption of external
support to Cabindan separatists and moved quickly after his
arrest in Holland to bring the negotiations to a close.
After the accord is signed, those unwilling to support the
final outcome will likely face heavy GRA political pressure,
and possible military action, to come in line with the
agreement. The final Memorandum of Understanding should be
published either this weekend or next week. According to
Danda, the official signing of a Peace Accord will take place
in South Africa and the GRA may ask the USG, the EU, and the
UN to serve as official observers. These details have not
been confirmed.


6. (SBU) Comment continued: Movement in the Cabindan peace

LUANDA 00000673 002 OF 002


process has been evident over the last several months as
reported Refs A and B. The GRA has stepped up offers of
economic development projects, encouraged meetings on civil
society build and election training, and succeeded in having
the Roman Catholic bishop seated in his Cathedral in Cabinda
(Ref C). The GRA has detained local Cabindan separatist
leaders for several hours following demonstrations or
episodes of civil disobedience, but none remain in custody.
The Angolan NGO Association for Justice, Peace, and Democracy
(AJPD) has held human rights training for police in Cabinda
and expects to move into training Angolan soldiers as well.


7. (C) Comment continued: Embassy requests talking points in
the event that we are asked about our position on the accord.
We recommend reiterating the long-standing USG policy of
supporting a political solution that preserves the
territorial integrity of Angola, encourages democratic
processes and respect for human rights, and is the result of
negotiation rather than violence. If asked about the status
of Bembe himself, we will use previous guidance (Ref D).


8. (C) Comment continued: Due to the significant level of
investment by U.S. companies in Cabinda. We recommend that we
brief that major companies' local representatives
immediately. End Comment.
EFIRD