(C) A/S FRAZER DISCUSSES SUDAN AND SOMALIA WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 008106

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF, AF/SE, AF/SPG, AF/E

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/22/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR UNSC SU SO ER ET KE UK
SUBJECT: (C) A/S FRAZER DISCUSSES SUDAN AND SOMALIA WITH
FCO, DFID

REF: LONDON 8066

Classified By: DCM David T. Johnson; reason 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In meetings with FCO Minister for Africa
Lord Triesman November 21 and Secretary of State for
International Development Hilary Benn the next day, AF A/S
Frazer stressed the need to adopt a UNSCR on Somalia flexible
enough that frontline states could play a positive role. She
also floated the suggestion of a UK-Norway initiative to
break the deadlock in the Eritrea/Ethiopia boundary dispute.
On Darfur, she emphasized the importance of holding onto
UNSCR 1706; Triesman assured her PM Blair considers 1706 "the
foundation stone." END SUMMARY.


2. (U) AF A/S Jendayi Frazer met in London November 21 with
FCO Minister for Africa Lord Triesman and Africa Director
Andrew Lloyd. DCM and Poloff (notetaker) sat in, as did FCO
East Africa and Horn Section Head Ben Lyon and a
representative of Secretary of State for International
Development Hilary Benn. On November 22, A/S Frazer met with
Benn; the same others sat in, along with Benn's Africa
Director Dave Fish.

(U) SUDAN
--------------


3. (C) Triesman began by observing that he had spent "the
gloomiest seven hours in a very long time" in the House of
Lords the previous day, defending UK foreign policy from
opposition claims that it is subservient to Washington.
Lloyd interjected that Sudan is an exception: Conservative
Party leader David Cameron just visited Darfur and is "very
supportive on Sudan." Triesman and Lloyd both stressed the
need to build on the Addis Ababa talks and "seal the deal"
for a joint UN-African Union (AU) force in Darfur "within the
next week," lest the situation deteriorate. Lloyd was
particularly concerned that things could get much worse in
Chad and the Central African Republic. Dr. Frazer emphasized
that we must hold onto UNSCR 1706, "the only mandate we have
to protect civilians." She warned that Sudanese President
Bashir is determined to eliminate 1706 along with UNSCRs 1591
and 1593; he opposes any UN peacekeeping operation in Darfur
and is exploiting wishful thinking in the international
community. His true intentions can be seen in the fact that
the GOS has not issued a single visa to the UN for the "light
package" of support to AMIS. Triesman agreed on the
importance of 1706, saying Prime Minister Blair considers it
"the foundation stone" for international action in Darfur.


4. (C) A/S Frazer said the USG believes we need a strong UN
force in eastern Chad in order to have a deterrent, a
humanitarian haven and a base for action if the Darfur
situation worsens. Triesman agreed that without action soon,
there would be more civilians displaced, fewer fed, and more
refugees in Chad. Dr. Frazer informed him that the USG can
fund one more battalion base camp for AMIS and sustain the
AMIS camps through March 2007, and we expect to start
building camps for the "light package" by December 1. The UN
wants us to sustain the camps for an entire year before UN
assessed contributions kick in; that will require additional
funding from OMB. Lloyd interjected that the UK should soon
contribute an addition USD 18 million on top of the USD 80
million it has already provided.


5. (C) Benn assessed the Addis meeting as better than
expected: the Chinese were helpful, UNSYG Annan operated
"skillfully" and AU Commission Chair Konare was "excellent,"
acknowledging that the challenges of Darfur are beyond the
AU's capability to manage. Benn thought the Government of
Sudan (GOS) understood that it could not expect the UN to pay
a billion dollars per year with no role, and that UNDPKO
might have to look outside Africa for troops. He thought
President Bashir "knows we won't invade." Rejecting the GOS
claim that 1706 had been buried, Benn said that on the
contrary, the Addis framework was a way to implement 1706.
Dr. Frazer said Embassy Khartoum had told her flatly that the
GOS is opposed to the Addis framework.


LONDON 00008106 002 OF 003


(U) SOMALIA
--------------


6. (C) Triesman had met the previous day with Ugandan
President Museveni, who told him he intended to let Ethiopian
Prime Minister Meles deal with the threat posed by the Union
of Islamic Courts (UIC). That was cynical, in Triesman's
view: inevitably, we would be asked to denounce Ethiopia in
the UN. Dr. Frazer made clear that the USG had not given the
Ethiopians a green light to enter Somalia, but their
intervention had saved the Somali Transitional Federal
Government (TFG). She explained that we need a UNSCR on
Somalia now, to enable others to fulfill the role Ethiopia
now fills by default and to bolster ongoing initiatives. For
instance, Kenya has trained police for the TFG but cannot
equip the trained police unless the Security Council lifts
the arms embargo. Indecisiveness by the international
community now will only lead to a worsening of the situation:
the UIC is already expanding aggressively. Its modus
operandi is to infiltrate trainers and fighters, reach out to
local religious leaders, then call for spontaneous uprisings
inviting the UIC to come take over. This dynamic is already
happening in Puntland and Somaliland. The A/S said the USG
has interagency agreement to do more to support Somaliland
and Puntland. Lloyd commented that more cooperation is
needed in counter-terrorism, specifically against the
Al-Qaeda presence, to include training, information sharing,
and tracking of wanted men. Triesman said the UIC needs to
know that Somaliland is a "redline." Lloyd thought it was
interesting that the UIC wanted channels of communication
with the West: just the previous day, a UIC delegation had
met with FCO.


7. (C) Dr. Frazer said the U.S. and UK are about "five words
apart" on a draft UNSCR. It must not be worded so narrowly
that we have to come back to the Council in two months.
Triesman took her point but said Benn believed any frontline
state's involvement in Somalia would be "fatal," even though
the fact is that Ethiopia entered Somalia in reaction to the
UIC's expansion. In the subsequent meeting with Benn, Dr.
Frazer pushed back hard on Benn's demand that Operative
Paragraph 2 of the draft UNSCR include language excluding
troops from frontline states. She explained that the U.S.
counterproposal addresses Benn's concern that Somalis might
unite around the UIC in reaction against Ethiopia, while
preserving flexibility, and reflects the Secretary's
determination to back the regional initiative: in the
Preamble, the draft UNSCR would take note of sub-regional
organization IGAD's statement on keeping frontline states'
troops out of Somalia. She made clear that we have support
from other Council members and intend to move forward with
the Resolution. She also informed Benn that after seeing
Triesman, she had met with Museveni, who was now willing to
send troops to protect the TFG in Baidoa (reftel). Benn
acknowledged this reversal was positive but wished Museveni
would make up his mind.


8. (C) Triesman admitted he was pessimistic about the
Khartoum talks between the TFG and the UIC and worried about
Eritrea's role. Dr. Frazer said that if President Isaias
chooses not to play a constructive role, the USG would urge
the Eritrean diaspora to limit remittances on which their
homeland depends - and the diaspora is open to the USG's
message. As for the Khartoum talks, she said that if they
fail, a new venue will be needed; the USG is willing to
provide support to the IGAD Secretariat as a venue for real
dialogue.

(U) ETHIOPIA/ERITREA
--------------


9. (C) A/S Frazer expressed appreciation for Lord Triesman's
earlier offer of whatever support the UK might be able to
provide to facilitate resolution of the Eritrea/Ethiopia
boundary dispute, including use of the prestigious Lancaster
House where historic agreements have been concluded in the
past. She said the USG has tried to revive the Boundary
Commission process, but Isaias would not engage. Triesman
admitted he was not sure who could get Isaias to respond

LONDON 00008106 003 OF 003


positively, and Lloyd added "it's not clear we're the right
people," because Eritrea sees the UK as biased in favor of
Ethiopia. Triesman was open to Dr. Frazer's suggestion of a
possible co-chair arrangement involving the UK and Norway.
Both sides agreed that the Boundary Commission's intent to
proceed with "virtual demarcation" would do more harm than
good. The British indicated they were working indirectly to
nudge the Commissioners away from that course of action.


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