Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06LONDON8039
2006-11-21 17:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy London
Cable title:  

(C) AFGHANISTAN: DAS GASTRIGHT'S MEETING WITH FCO

Tags:  AF EAID MARR PREL SNAR UK 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 008039 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA, SCA/A, INL, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2016
TAGS: AF EAID MARR PREL SNAR UK
SUBJECT: (C) AFGHANISTAN: DAS GASTRIGHT'S MEETING WITH FCO
NOVEMBER 14

Classified By: PolCouns Richard Mills; reason 1.4 (b, d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 008039

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA, SCA/A, INL, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2016
TAGS: AF EAID MARR PREL SNAR UK
SUBJECT: (C) AFGHANISTAN: DAS GASTRIGHT'S MEETING WITH FCO
NOVEMBER 14

Classified By: PolCouns Richard Mills; reason 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: SCA DAS John Gastright discussed
Afghanistan November 14 with FCO, MOD and Cabinet Office
officials. On the upcoming NATO summit in Riga, the UK
argued that pressing for use of the term "counter-insurgency"
in the summit communiqu would invite unhelpful perceptions
of a split in the alliance, even though counter-insurgency is
the reality on the ground and the UK says so publicly. PM
Blair will be tough in private at Riga, but careful to
maintain the appearance of NATO unity in public.


2. (C) SUMMARY CON'T: DAS Gastright shared a draft "wedding
registry" of specific tasks the USG would like both countries
to use in pressing others to do more. He welcomed the EU's
intent to do more with the Afghan National Police (ANP) and
indicated the USG would increase its aid in order to build an
ANP that can win, even if it exceeds the GOA's ability to
support from its own budget. Sensing that Karzai is
"drifting," the British made the case for a senior civilian
international figure to support him; Gastright noted the
downside and argued that the process of identifying a new UN
envoy would have a negative impact. The UK urged creation of
a small, informal contact group in capitals to brainstorm,
beginning with a teleconference. The British side said that
PM Blair planned to visit Islamabad November 19 and Kabul
November 20.


3. (C) SUMMARY CON'T: On counter-narcotics (CN),the two
sides agreed to accelerate their discussions. The UK
reported President Karzai had said that day he would accept
ground-based spraying (GBS) provided it is implemented
throughout the country and he can say the international
community forced him into it. Gastright promised to share
the GBS environmental assessment with the UK as soon as it is
ready. END SUMMARY.


4. (U) PARTICIPANTS: DAS Gastright was accompanied by
Poloff (notetaker). The UK side was led by FCO Director for
South Asia and Afghanistan Adam Thomson, accompanied by

Jaspal Panesar and MOD's David Jelley (Directorate of Joint
Commitments),and joined over lunch by Margaret Aldred of the
Cabinet Office (deputy to Sir Nigel Sheinwald, the Prime
Minister's Foreign Policy Adviser). FCO Afghanistan Group
Head Richard Codrington, Afghanistan Counter-Narcotics Head
Peter Holland, and NATO Team Head Danae Meacockbashir
participated in the first part of the discussion.


5. (C) RIGA: The British took the DAS's point that how the
Afghanistan mission is defined has policy implications: the
goal of peacekeeping is to keep things quiet, whereas the
goal of counter-insurgency is to gain a loyal population.
Nonetheless, the British argued forcefully against pressing
for language in the Riga NATO summit communiqu to describe
Afghanistan operations as "counter-insurgency" vice
"peacekeeping," as that would invite unhelpful perceptions of
a split in the alliance. They agreed that counter-insurgency
is the reality on the ground, and noted that British
officials say so publicly. For the same reason (maintaining
a facade of NATO unity),they argued against pressing for the
term "civil-military cooperation," noting that France seems
amenable to the term "comprehensive approach," which
Codrington said "gives us ninety percent of what we want."
The UK is lobbying partners, especially Germany, France and
Spain, to contribute more in their national non-military
capacity. Thomson gave notice that Prime Minister Blair will
be tough in private at Riga but careful to maintain the
appearance of NATO unity in public. Gastright said that the
USG will remain adamant on the need to eliminate national
caveats, fulfill the Combined Joint Statement of
Requirements, embrace civil-military cooperation, and get
partners do more.


6. (C) INCREASING ASSISTANCE: DAS Gastright shared an
informal draft "wedding registry" of specific tasks that
specific countries should take on. He hoped something like
it could serve as a basis for coordinated U.S.-UK pressure on
other countries to do more. The British welcomed the idea
but worried that countries could misuse the "adopt a
province" concept as a rationale for not expanding beyond
their current area of operations.



7. (C) POLICE: Both sides agreed on the importance of
increasing assistance to the Afghan National Police (ANP).
DAS Gastright made clear that the goal has changed from
creating a sustainable force to creating a force that can
win, even if that exceeds the GOA's capacity to sustain it
from its own budget. He said he was hopeful the USG would
soon announce a major increase in support, and welcomed the
EU's intent to do more with the ANP, noting the particular
need for mentors.


8. (C) COUNTER-NARCOTICS: The British reported that
President Karzai had said that day he was willing to approve
ground-based spraying (GBS) provided (i) that it was the
agreed international position, (ii) the program was
implemented throughout the country, and (iii) he could say
the international community forced it on him. As there is no
capacity to conduct full GBS in all provinces this coming
season, it was not clear whether Karzai was trying to set an
impossible condition or merely saying that the GBS should be
seen to be applied fairly; Kabul embassies would be asked to
seek clarification. The DAS recommended focusing on Helmand
and Badakshan provinces for GBS, pointing out that the two-
to three-month gap between the starts of the growing season
in those two provinces would give the GBS campaign more time.
Gastright promised to share the environmental assessment as
soon as it is ready. Recognizing that decisions need to be
taken very soon, the two sides agreed to accelerate their
discussion on Afghanistan CN. They also agreed that buying
the opium crop is a bad idea and a non-starter. (Note:
Embassy Kabul later reported that President Karzai's comments
on GBS were intended to signal a positive willingness to
carry out eradication operations in Helmand province, as well
as another province. End Note.)


9. (C) KARZAI: The British sensed "drift" on the part of
Karzai, and made the case for the international community to
name a "substantial international civilian figure, not a High
Representative or Proconsul" to support him. The DAS noted
the downside and argued that this process diverted attention
from pressing business.


10. (C) MUSA QALA: Thomson saw the Musa Qala experiment as
"attractive," even if "not necessarily replicable" and a
propaganda coup for the Taliban: "killing Afghan farmer
boys, as the UK and Canada have done, antagonizes the
population." He agreed the experiment must be judged by its
effectiveness, which Gastright said would be tested soon.
Thomson said Karzai was prepared to talk to Nawzad elders
about a similar arrangement with a stronger assertion of GOA
authority.


11. (C) PAKISTAN: Thomson praised the USG's "excellent
efforts" to bring Karzai and Pakistan's President Musharraf
together. He called Quetta the Taliban's "hinge" of
coordination between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Gastright
stressed the need to continue to work closely with the GOP,
including pressing it to do more to facilitate trade with
Afghanistan. Thomson confided that Prime Minister Blair
plans to visit Islamabad November 19 and Kabul November 20.


12. (C) CONTACT GROUP IN CAPITALS: The UK argued for
creation of a small, informal contact group in capitals - not
to handle day-to-day issues which must remain in Kabul, but
to take a longer view and brainstorm. Gastright agreed to
give it a try through an initial teleconference at the level
of A/S or DAS dealing directly with Afghanistan, but resisted
involving officials who would need to be briefed in
preparation for the discussions.


13. (U) DAS Gastright has cleared this message.

Visit London's Classified Website:
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