Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06LONDON7036
2006-09-29 16:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy London
Cable title:  

(C) SUDAN: FCO THOUGHTS ON INCENTIVES AND

Tags:  PREL MARR EAID ETTC SU UK 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 007036 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/SPG, AF/SE, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR EAID ETTC SU UK
SUBJECT: (C) SUDAN: FCO THOUGHTS ON INCENTIVES AND
DISINCENTIVES FOR BASHIR

Classified By: PolCouns Richard Mills; reason 1.4 (b, d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 007036

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/SPG, AF/SE, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR EAID ETTC SU UK
SUBJECT: (C) SUDAN: FCO THOUGHTS ON INCENTIVES AND
DISINCENTIVES FOR BASHIR

Classified By: PolCouns Richard Mills; reason 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) In keeping with the Secretary's speech of September
27, the UK is thinking about possible incentives if the
Government of Sudan does the right thing on Darfur, and
possible disincentives if it does not. FCO-DFID Sudan Unit
Deputy Head James Thornton shared UK thoughts with Poloff
September 29, stressing that no decision has been taken
within HMG. The idea, Thornton said, would be to put it to
President Bashir that he faces a strategic choice: either
cooperate and gain advantages, or - after a limited window of
opportunity - face negative consequences for failing to
cooperate. Thornton cited four areas where the GOS's
cooperation is needed:

- stop the offensive in Darfur;

- accept the transition from AMIS to the UN and allow AMIS to
be bolstered in the interim;

- engage more positively with the non-signatories to the
Darfur Peace Agreement; and

- allow humanitarian access.


2. (C) INCENTIVES: The potential incentives Thornton said
are under consideration are (in no particular order):

- ICC: Assurances that regime figures will not be arrested
and put on trial. This is controversial within Whitehall,
but it is possible per Article 16 of the Rome Statute for the
UNSC to decide to suspend the ICC's investigation for one
year.

- Debt relief: The U.S. Treasury is key, and has been
reluctant, Thornton said.

- USG bilateral steps: Lifting trade sanctions, removing
Sudan from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and
upgrading diplomatic relations to ambassador level. Thornton
mentioned his understanding that the mood in Congress might
not be conducive to such steps now.

- Reconstruction: Thornton was not sure the GOS cares about
this (for instance, the technical assessment team currently
in Sudan cannot get to all the places it needs to in Darfur,
so the donors conference planned for October will probably
need to be delayed). He also lamented that "the West" has
not delivered on all its promises regarding the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement, notably in regard to debt relief.

- Invitations: Bashir could be invited to make high-status
visits to Washington, London and perhaps other capitals.

- African Union Presidency: Bashir thinks he has that in the
bag already.


3. (C) DISINCENTIVES: Thornton made clear that the UK's
thinking on disincentives is even less advanced, but he
mentioned the following:

- African Union Presidency: If African states could be
persuaded to threaten to deny Bashir the presidency of the
AU, he might care deeply.

- UN Arms Embargo: This could be extended from Darfur to the
entire country.

- UNSCR 1591: Sanctions could be imposed on more
individuals. Thornton mentioned that the US Department of
Justice requires substantial evidence of personal involvement
in order to list an individual.

- Blanket bans: The entire Sudanese regime leadership could
be subjected to travel ban and/or asset freeze.
Alternatively, such blanket bans could be applied only to
those regime figures that opposed the desired cooperation (to
get the SPLM off the hook).


4. (C) Post stands ready to facilitate discussion with FCO
of these or other ideas as the Department may direct.


Visit London's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/london/index. cfm
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