Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06LONDON5371
2006-07-20 16:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy London
Cable title:
IRAQ: HMG EXPRESSES HOPE FOR IRAQ COMPACT AND
how-toVZCZCXRO6566 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK DE RUEHLO #5371/01 2011630 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 201630Z JUL 06 FM AMEMBASSY LONDON TO RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7601 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 005371
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR PM, NEA, NEA/I, EUR/UBI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2016
TAGS: PREL MOPS UK IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ: HMG EXPRESSES HOPE FOR IRAQ COMPACT AND
REQUESTS COORDINATION ON UNSCR MANDATE
Classified By: Acting PolCouns Rick Bell, reasons 1.4, b/d.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 005371
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR PM, NEA, NEA/I, EUR/UBI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2016
TAGS: PREL MOPS UK IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ: HMG EXPRESSES HOPE FOR IRAQ COMPACT AND
REQUESTS COORDINATION ON UNSCR MANDATE
Classified By: Acting PolCouns Rick Bell, reasons 1.4, b/d.
1. (C) Summary: In a July 18 meeting in London, FCO and MOD
officials told Assistant Secretary of State for Political
Military Affairs John Hillen they were disappointed in the
deteriorating security situation in Iraq and that they
supported using the Iraq Compact as a mechanism for obtaining
expanded international commitment to Iraq,
although they doubted additional military contributions were
possible while the UK and U.S. were drawing down troop
levels. British officials also requested further discussions
"during the summer" on how to handle the extension of the
UNSC mandate in the autumn, given the legal difficulties HMG
would face if the UNSC mandate was scaled down. End Summary.
2. (C) Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military
Affairs John Hillen met with Nigel Casey, FCO's Acting Iraq
Director, and Dr. Richard Vincent of MOD's Iraq Commitments
Team July 18 along with a couple members of
their staffs. Casey lamented the deterioration in the
situation since he had arrived in his current position six
months previously, during which time the weekly attack
figures had more than doubled. He believed the violence
was a result of the loss of credibility from PM Maliki's
having taken so long to form a government. Casey
speculated that if Maliki failed to deliver a reconciliation
plan as well as security plans for Baghdad
and Basrah, he would lose all credibility and the situation
would worsen. Casey criticized Maliki for supporting
counter insurgency operations in various areas and then
complaining when key figures were detained, indicating a
lack of will in reining in the various militias.
3. (C) Casey said HMG shared the concern that transition in
certain areas of Iraq would allow some members of the
Coalition an excuse to leave. HMG came to the conclusion
that the Iraq Compact could be used as a means of
reinvigorating the coalition and possibly retooling which
types of assistance were needed. In the meantime, HMG was
trying to develop a picture of what the future of Iraq might
look like so partners will know how they can
contribute. Casey believed that attracting new partners in
the coalition would be virtually impossible as the UK and
U.S. were trying to draw down.
4. (C) Hillen said the USG was looking to expand
international commitment to the future of Iraq, possibly by
attracting partners with niche capabilities. The U.S. was no
longer measuring contributions through the metric of
"boots on the ground" but rather through outcomes, although
international assistance would obviously have a military
flavor for a while, and he asserted that the Coalition needed
to do the same. Casey said international commitment
to NTM-I was quite popular, as was protection for the UN. He
believed additional support might be obtained through
those two mechanisms. In addition, the Jordan International
Police Training Center (JIPTC) was a good vehicle for
contributors who do not want to go into Iraq. Unfortunately
HMG had not seen very many JIPTC graduates emerge in useful
roles in Iraq. Given that and HMG's urgent need for people
in Basrah, Casey hoped the U.S. could find someone to replace
the British JIPTC contribution. Vincent said MOD was
skeptical of expanding any assistance before determining that
the current plan was on the right track.
5. (C) Casey expressed hope that the Iraq Compact would also
contain a Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR
program) for militias, which the Iraqis did not seem focused
on, but which was necessary and would inevitably be very
expensive. He hoped some "deep pockets in the Gulf" might be
able to assist in that effort, but noted the Gulf states have
been reluctant to support Maliki until they determine he can
deliver. In addition, HMG hoped the Compact would produce
more contributions for ministries such as agriculture and
justice.
6. (C) Casey expressed concern about rumors that the Iraqis
did not want to extend the UNSCR mandate in Iraq and urged a
UK-U.S. agreement on the way forward. While the Iraqis would
like to show that they are fully sovereign, the UK legal
system allows HMG to detain people in Iraq based on the UNSC.
If that function were removed from the
UNSCR, the UK would have no legal basis for detention and its
force protection would fall apart. Casey opined that
if some of the smaller partners had to negotiate status of
forces agreements to obtain immunities for their forces,
they might just leave Iraq, rather than bother with it. In
LONDON 00005371 002 OF 002
order to make it easy for partners to maintain their
contributions, we should make it easy for them and extend the
UNSCR. Casey noted that U.S.-UK agreement this summer
on how to handle this problem was essential before the issue
came up in the autumn.
7. (C) Finally, Casey noted the British PRT in Basrah was up
and running, albeit without as much international
support as HMG had hoped for.
8. (U) This cable has been cleared by PM Assistant Secretary
John Hillen.
Visit London's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/london/index. cfm
Tuttle
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR PM, NEA, NEA/I, EUR/UBI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2016
TAGS: PREL MOPS UK IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ: HMG EXPRESSES HOPE FOR IRAQ COMPACT AND
REQUESTS COORDINATION ON UNSCR MANDATE
Classified By: Acting PolCouns Rick Bell, reasons 1.4, b/d.
1. (C) Summary: In a July 18 meeting in London, FCO and MOD
officials told Assistant Secretary of State for Political
Military Affairs John Hillen they were disappointed in the
deteriorating security situation in Iraq and that they
supported using the Iraq Compact as a mechanism for obtaining
expanded international commitment to Iraq,
although they doubted additional military contributions were
possible while the UK and U.S. were drawing down troop
levels. British officials also requested further discussions
"during the summer" on how to handle the extension of the
UNSC mandate in the autumn, given the legal difficulties HMG
would face if the UNSC mandate was scaled down. End Summary.
2. (C) Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military
Affairs John Hillen met with Nigel Casey, FCO's Acting Iraq
Director, and Dr. Richard Vincent of MOD's Iraq Commitments
Team July 18 along with a couple members of
their staffs. Casey lamented the deterioration in the
situation since he had arrived in his current position six
months previously, during which time the weekly attack
figures had more than doubled. He believed the violence
was a result of the loss of credibility from PM Maliki's
having taken so long to form a government. Casey
speculated that if Maliki failed to deliver a reconciliation
plan as well as security plans for Baghdad
and Basrah, he would lose all credibility and the situation
would worsen. Casey criticized Maliki for supporting
counter insurgency operations in various areas and then
complaining when key figures were detained, indicating a
lack of will in reining in the various militias.
3. (C) Casey said HMG shared the concern that transition in
certain areas of Iraq would allow some members of the
Coalition an excuse to leave. HMG came to the conclusion
that the Iraq Compact could be used as a means of
reinvigorating the coalition and possibly retooling which
types of assistance were needed. In the meantime, HMG was
trying to develop a picture of what the future of Iraq might
look like so partners will know how they can
contribute. Casey believed that attracting new partners in
the coalition would be virtually impossible as the UK and
U.S. were trying to draw down.
4. (C) Hillen said the USG was looking to expand
international commitment to the future of Iraq, possibly by
attracting partners with niche capabilities. The U.S. was no
longer measuring contributions through the metric of
"boots on the ground" but rather through outcomes, although
international assistance would obviously have a military
flavor for a while, and he asserted that the Coalition needed
to do the same. Casey said international commitment
to NTM-I was quite popular, as was protection for the UN. He
believed additional support might be obtained through
those two mechanisms. In addition, the Jordan International
Police Training Center (JIPTC) was a good vehicle for
contributors who do not want to go into Iraq. Unfortunately
HMG had not seen very many JIPTC graduates emerge in useful
roles in Iraq. Given that and HMG's urgent need for people
in Basrah, Casey hoped the U.S. could find someone to replace
the British JIPTC contribution. Vincent said MOD was
skeptical of expanding any assistance before determining that
the current plan was on the right track.
5. (C) Casey expressed hope that the Iraq Compact would also
contain a Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR
program) for militias, which the Iraqis did not seem focused
on, but which was necessary and would inevitably be very
expensive. He hoped some "deep pockets in the Gulf" might be
able to assist in that effort, but noted the Gulf states have
been reluctant to support Maliki until they determine he can
deliver. In addition, HMG hoped the Compact would produce
more contributions for ministries such as agriculture and
justice.
6. (C) Casey expressed concern about rumors that the Iraqis
did not want to extend the UNSCR mandate in Iraq and urged a
UK-U.S. agreement on the way forward. While the Iraqis would
like to show that they are fully sovereign, the UK legal
system allows HMG to detain people in Iraq based on the UNSC.
If that function were removed from the
UNSCR, the UK would have no legal basis for detention and its
force protection would fall apart. Casey opined that
if some of the smaller partners had to negotiate status of
forces agreements to obtain immunities for their forces,
they might just leave Iraq, rather than bother with it. In
LONDON 00005371 002 OF 002
order to make it easy for partners to maintain their
contributions, we should make it easy for them and extend the
UNSCR. Casey noted that U.S.-UK agreement this summer
on how to handle this problem was essential before the issue
came up in the autumn.
7. (C) Finally, Casey noted the British PRT in Basrah was up
and running, albeit without as much international
support as HMG had hoped for.
8. (U) This cable has been cleared by PM Assistant Secretary
John Hillen.
Visit London's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/london/index. cfm
Tuttle