Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06LOME800
2006-08-22 18:22:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Lome
Cable title:  

TOGO: FINAL NEGOTIATIONS OF THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM TO KDEM 
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RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPC #0800/01 2341822
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 221822Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY LOME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7318
INFO RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 1975
RUEHCO/AMEMBASSY COTONOU 3882
RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU 8834
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0483
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
C O N F I D E N T I A L LOME 000800 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/W (DBANKS)
PARIS FOR D'ELIA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM TO KDEM
SUBJECT: TOGO: FINAL NEGOTIATIONS OF THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE
PRODUCE AN ENCOURAGING ACCORD

REF: A. LOME 798


B. LOME 737

Classified By: Poloff Rona Rathod for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L LOME 000800

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/W (DBANKS)
PARIS FOR D'ELIA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM TO KDEM
SUBJECT: TOGO: FINAL NEGOTIATIONS OF THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE
PRODUCE AN ENCOURAGING ACCORD

REF: A. LOME 798


B. LOME 737

Classified By: Poloff Rona Rathod for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) Summary. This cable continues reporting from ref

A. Although talks in Ouagadougou were difficult, the
Togolese ruling party made significant concessions, and
Blaise Compaore proved a worthy facilitator. Provisions of
the comprehensive poltical agreement that emerged in
Ouagadougou attempt to guarantee free and fair legislative
elections, which are viewed widely as crucial for future
progress toward ending Togo's long political crisis. All
constitutional reforms are left to a future government, to be
formed after the legislative elections in late 2007. In the
interim, the agreement establishes a government of national
union that will oversee reforms in a number of key areas. The
new accord provides for a permanent body to discuss national
issues and a follow-up committee to monitor implementation,
chaired by Compaore, who also will serve as final arbitrator.
The agreement also formulates a mechanism to help repatriate
refugees. Although the accord lacks details, most notably
about selecting a new prime minister, it has heralded a new
esprit in Togo. End summary.

--------------
ARDUOUS BUT FRUITFUL TALKS
--------------


2. (C) By all accounts, the definitive phase of
negotiations proved as difficult as the initial stages.
Pervasive mistrust between the opposition and ruling RPT
(Rally of the Togolese People) resurfaced during the
negotiations in Ouagadougou and continues to linger even
after the signing of the accord. Party representatives
admitted that the decision to move the talks to Ouagadougou
and place them under the aegis of someone without a vested
interest in Togolese politics was one of the principal
reasons that all parties signed the comprehensive political
agreement (Accord Politique Global). The fact that a
non-Togolese oversaw the process provided enough assurances
to each side that no party to the talks could later claim it

did not fully grasp a certain provision and ask that it be
amended or ignore it altogether, as has occurred in the past.
Despite the hesitation of some opposition leaders, notably
from the UFC (United Forces of Change),over the appointment
of Burkina Faso president Blaise Compaore as the facilitator,
the respect that he commanded among the Togolese parties
ultimately assured a fairly quick resolution to the
negotiations.


3. (C) Probably at Togolese president Faure Gnassingbe's
insistence, the RPT approached the Ouagadougou talks with a
greater spirit of compromise than existed in the initial,
Togolese only, negotiating round. RPT members made real
concessions, acquiescing to the inclusion of points certain
to disrupt the status quo and resisting pushing for their
most controversial ideas. At one point during the talks,
RPT representatives became very nervous about the process as
a result of statements made by UFC special advisor Eric
Amerding about the UFC's power to make the RPT concede
certain difficult points. Regardless of Amerding's perceived
hubris, it was, in fact, the UFC's resilient lobbying that
ensured that opposition ideas, specifically about forming a
government of national unity, appeared in the final text.
(Comment. The presence of Amerding and UFC president
Gilchrist Olympio Amerding's brother-in-law),who both reside
in France, at the talks in Ouagadougou suggests that Olympio
did not have complete confidence in the local leadership to
make the right decisions. End Comment.)

--------------
ANALYSIS OF THE AGREEMENT
--------------


4. (U) Many of the elements included in the comprehensive
accord remain unchanged from reporting in reftels.
Therefore, the following discusses previously controversial
points.


5. (C) Elections. One of the most beneficial provisions
for the opposition concerns the quashing of existing
constitutional amendments regarding eligibility to stand as a
candidate in national elections. These amendments, imposed
by former president Gnassingbe Eyadema to deny certain

opposition members the opportunity to run for national public
office, required residing in Togo for a specified period of
time and officially renouncing any claims of citizenship
outside of Togo. These provisions will not be applied to
candidates in the upcoming national elections, paving the way
for many opposition members with dual citizenship or who are
living in self-imposed exile to throw their hats in the ring.



6. (C) A reconstituted electoral commission will be
charged with organizing the elections with the support of the
government. This ostensibly independent body will be
composed of five members of the RPT, two from each of the
other five political parties participating in the dialogue,
one from each of the civil society groups involved in the
talks, and two non-voting members of the government. Though
this does not differ from the stipulations of the previous
interim agreement (ref B),this new agreement requires that
the commission make decisions by consensus rather than vote.
Apparently, the UFC insisted on this wording, as well as the
non-voting status of the government to counterbalance the
superior RPT presence on the commission.


7. (U) The electoral commission will no longer be involved
in resolving election disputes. Any challenges concerning
candidacy, voting procedures, and election results will be
heard by the Constitutional Court, which the accord asks be
reconstituted as a more professional, credible, and
independent body. This accord also accepts that national as
well international observers may monitor each stage of the
electoral process (the previous agreement only allowed for
international observers). The document also encourages
political parties and the government to consider increasing
the role of women in politics, but did not offer any
numerical guidelines or quotas.


8. (U) Security. Parties to the dialogue asked the
government to take all measure to ensure that security forces
refrain from interfering in politics and concomitantly, asked
that political parties refrain from provoking the security
forces. The concept of a "republican" army, i.e., ethnically
and regionally diverse, was spelled out in the agreement as a
necessary change, as was a separation of roles between the
army (national defense) and the police and gendarmes
(domestic order).


9. (U) Refugees. All parties have agreed to work quickly
to bring home refugees who fled after the contentious
presidential election of 2005. They will participate in an
ad hoc committee to assist the Togolese office charged with
repatriating refugees from Ghana and Benin by acting as
liaisons between the refugees and the government.


10. (U) Constitutional Reforms. The document leaves
constitutional reforms, such as the nomination and
responsibilities of the prime minister, conditions of
eligibility to run for president, limits on presidential
terms, the possibility of creating a Senate, and reform of
the Constitutional Court to the government that will take
shape after the next legislative election.


11. (C) Reconciliation Commission. The accord calls for
the creation of a reconciliation commission which could offer
pardons to past transgressors. The parties to the dialogue
appear to have recoiled from calling for judicial punishment
for prior bad acts and from specifying how far back in the
past the punishments would apply. Although not included in
the accord, it seems likely that a compensation mechanism, if
it can find donor support, will be put into effect for
property losses from violence surrounding political events in
recent years.


12. (U) Final Arrangements. As reported in ref A, the
parties to the dialogue have agreed to form a government of
national union (GNU). This GNU will conduct business
according to a roadmap laid out in Annex Two of the accord.
The GNU will mostly begin implementing the terms of the
comprehensive agreement. Accordingly, the GNU will revise
the electoral code in conformity with provisions of the
accord and formulate an election calendar specifying when the
electoral commission will come into being. It will also,
among other things, engage refugees and ensure that security
forces adhere to norms of a "republican and nationally
representative military."


13. (C) The GNU will also specify the mandate and
composition of a permanent dialogue body, to whom the accord
has assigned the task of reviewing subjects of national
interest. A follow-up committee, to include a representative
of each party to the dialogue, the European Union, and
ECOWAS, and presided over by the facilitator (President
Compaore) or his agent, will oversee the implementation of
the accord. Differing interpretations of the accord will be
put to the facilitator (Compaore) for final arbitration.
These mechanisms built into the accord to guarantee its
proper implementation are a feature that did not exist in
previous Togolese political agreements and were very likely
an important driving force behind global acceptance of the
document.

--------------
CONCLUSIONS
--------------


14. (C) The main weakness in this new accord, as in the
previous, interim version, is that it lacks details and
leaves much to the government to undertake -- even though
that government now will include all the opposition elements.
Constitutional and military reforms, arguably two of the
most contentious topics, have been left in the hands of the
GNU. Considering how much time and energy was spent on
formulating this accord within the constrained structure of
the national dialogue, these more controversial matters could
prove difficult to settle within a larger government,
particularly if the spirit of consensus that characterized
the dialogue falters.


15. (C) As has been the case throughout the national
dialogue, the question of who will receive the prime
ministership is on everyone's mind. It is fairly certain
that incumbent Edem Kodjo, appointed by Faure after last
year's flawed elections, will be asked to step down. The
names of CAR (Action Committee for Renewal) president and
dialogue chair Yawovi Agboyibo, UFC vice president Patrick
Lawson, Eric Amerding, and CDPA (Democratic Convention of
African Peoples) president Leopold Gnininvi are being
mentioned as possible candidates. The ultimate decision
rests with Faure, who will will be under pressure from his
hardline RPT backers. Enduring suspicion of the ruling party
has caused some opposition members to lament the hasty
signing of the accord without specificity on who the prime
minister will be.


16. (C) Despite the limitations of this accord, there is a
sense of a new era and new spirit in Togo. The fact that the
document, unlike similar agreements with the opposition in
years past, was made public two days after its signing
signals a change in mindset on the part of the authorities
and has given Togolese hope that politicians have turned over
a new leaf and are willing to be inclusive and transparent
and work towards fundamental improvements.
DUNN