LUNCH WITH TOGO'S OPPOSITION THE DAY BEFORE THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LOME 000452

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR D'ELIA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM TOGO'>TO
SUBJECT: LUNCH WITH TOGO'S OPPOSITION THE DAY BEFORE THE
DIALOGUE

REF: LOME 447

Classified By: Ambassador David B. Dunn, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (U) Summary. On April 20, the day before the opening of
the long-awaited re-launch of the national dialogue, the
Ambassador held a luncheon meeting with four high-level
members of the three principal opposition parties. The guests
were wary but hopeful that the dialogue, based on an eight
point agenda that was released by the GoT on April 18, would
go well. Embassy agrees with their strongly-expressed view
that, after the failures of the 1992 and the 1999
negotiations with the GoT, follow-through on what will be
agreed in the dialogue will be essential for a long-term
resolution to TOGO's economic and governance crisis. End
Summary.


2. (U) On April 20, the day before the opening of the
long-awaited re-launch of the national dialogue, the
Ambassador held a luncheon meeting at the EMR with four
high-level members of the three principal opposition parties.
In attendance were Patrick Lawson, Vice President and Jean
Pierre Fabre, Secretary General of the Union des Forces de
Changement (UFC),Gahoun Hegbor, Vice President of the Comite
d'Action pour le Renouveau (CAR),and Martin Aduayom, Joint
Secretary General of the Convention Democratique des Peuples

SIPDIS
Africains (CDPA) along with the DCM. The four men are
well-acquainted and obviously at ease with each other.


3. (U) Background: The subject of the national dialogue has
been in the news for the last six months. The GoT is
motivated to check off the last two (national dialogue and
legislative elections) of the 22 commitments made to the
European Union in April 2004 in order for the development
money tap to be turned back on for TOGO. The opposition
parties have been playing hard to get (to the negotiating
table). The largest opposition party, the UFC, continues to
be hindered by its schizophrenic leadership arrangement in
which its charismatic leader Gilchrist Olympio is, for all
practical purposes, permanently absent from TOGO. The issues
of venue and need for a facilitator were batted about for
months. More recently, Blaise Campaore, president of Burkina
Faso, has begun to play a role in getting the parties to the
table. The final iteration will have the dialogue take place
in Lome without outside facilitation, at least the initial
stages. Note: The formula recommended by CAR National
President Yawovi Agboyibo, whereby the TOGOles parties will
attempt to resolve the issues by themselves but have recourse
to an outside facilitator if any items prove too thorny,
appears to have been tacitly adopted by all. End note.


4. (U) On April 18, a synopsis of proposals and observations
about the proposed dialogue re-launch was released by the
GoT, and published in a private newspaper. Curiously, it was
not published in the government-owned daily, "TOGO-Presse."
The synopsis names the participants, mentions format, lists
an agenda of eight objectives and suggests ten days of debate
to reach an agreement. The eight dialogue objectives follow:

1) Implementation of the 22 commitments and additional
proposals to improve such implementation.

2) Regulations, and institutional and legislative reforms to
allow free and democratic elections through revisions to the
electoral framework and the election-related committees.

3) Reinforcement of conditions leading to the repatriation
and social reintegration of refugees.

4) Reforms to the Army and security forces under the auspices
of foreign partners.

5) Modalities to fight impunity and possible indemnification
of all victims.

6) Resolving the electoral litigation remaining from the 2005
presidential election.

7) Installation of a follow-up mechanism which could become a
permanent framework for gathering and discussing subjects of
national interest.

8) Formation of a transitional government of national unity.


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5. (U) At the luncheon, the guests seemed to think that the
agenda items comprised a reasonable base from which to start
a dialogue. When asked about the ten-day time period, they
felt that ten days had to be a guideline rather than a period
with a hard and fast end point. All four were hopeful that
the dialogue would go well.


6. (C) Although the guests expressed hope that the dialogue
would go well, they seemed wary and skeptical about
facilitators and negotiations. They were, to a man, insistent
on the need for effective follow through. They noted that the
dialogues of 1992 and 1999 failed. UFC's Fabre recalled that,
in 1999, the EU paid for a facilitator from France. Fabre
contended that the facilitator was conveying information on
the UFC's negotiating position to the GoT via the Embassy of
France to the detriment of the UFC. UFC's Lawson said he was
left with a very bad taste in his mouth from the 1999
negotiation. In going through the list of facilitators who
were proposed for this dialogue, the group laughed when one
particular name was mentioned, since that person had, a few
years ago, gone to (former President) Eyadema's residence to
receive an award from the GoT. CAR's Hegbor recalled that the
dialogue of 1992 was also a failure for lack of follow
through on what was agreed.


7. (C) While hopeful that the international community will
help to resolve TOGO's long term crisis, they have little
confidence that much help will be forthcoming from overseas.
Fabre noted that when the UN report on the violence in April
and May 2005 was released, detailing the deaths of 500-600
people, no one did anything about it. Aduayom commented that
the international community, mainly ECOWAS, had a hand in
organizing last April's disastrous elections. Fabre pointed
out that it was a coup d'etat which put Faure Gnassingbe in
office the first time and then a constitutional coup d'etat
that put him in office the second time, and the international
community did nothing about it.


8. (C) The group seemed very wary of French government
policy. They recalled the overwhelming French cultural
component to their respective educations and to the virtual
total lack of instruction on TOGOlese and African history.
The recalled the close relationship between French President
Jacques Chirac and President Eyadema until Eyadema's death
last year. They felt the French Embassy had a hand in the
failure of the 1999 negotiations. They remain suspicious of
France's motives in TOGO vis-a-vis their hopes for a new day
for TOGO.


9. (C) Comment: The mood around the table vacillated between
resigned fatalism and guarded optimism. Each participant
indicated in his own way that he saw no way forward for TOGO
other than a successful outcome to the dialogue. Concern
regarding implementation of agreed actions was a preponderant
theme. To help keep our guests focused on the reality that
the burden of fixing TOGOlese problems rests squarely with
the TOGOlese themselves, we avoided taking the bait on the
question of the international community "abandoning" TOGO.
End Comment.






DUNN