Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06LJUBLJANA14
2006-01-06 07:51:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ljubljana
Cable title:  

SLOVENIA: POL-MIL OUTLOOK FOR 2006

Tags:  MARR MOPS PGOV PINR SI NATO 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L LJUBLJANA 000014 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2016
TAGS: MARR MOPS PGOV PINR SI NATO
SUBJECT: SLOVENIA: POL-MIL OUTLOOK FOR 2006

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Maryruth Coleman for Reasons 1.4 (b, d
).

C O N F I D E N T I A L LJUBLJANA 000014

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2016
TAGS: MARR MOPS PGOV PINR SI NATO
SUBJECT: SLOVENIA: POL-MIL OUTLOOK FOR 2006

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Maryruth Coleman for Reasons 1.4 (b, d
).


1. (C) SUMMARY. In 2006, a new leadership team will
consolidate its power within the Ministry of Defense (MOD)
and the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF) will continue the
process of transformation to meet NATO's standards and
prepare for the challenges of the future. Slovenia's defense
and security planners will likely focus on the areas of
highest strategic concern to Slovenia: Kosovo and Bosnia. In
deploying assets to operations further afield, such as
Afghanistan and Iraq, the GOS is looking for ways to cement
good ties with the U.S. and NATO while trying not to
overstretch its resources. In the area of defense reform,
Slovenia will gradually restructure its top-heavy military by
bringing in new NCOs and officers while easing out those at
the middle and top levels; it will focus on building a
professional esprit de corps based more on expeditionary
capability and less on territorial defense; and it will look
to procure assets that help Slovenia integrate more fully
into NATO. END SUMMARY.

--------------
New MOD Leadership Team: Focus is on Loyalty
--------------


2. (SBU) The year 2005 saw many changes in the MOD's top
leadership. Three of the "big guns" reporting directly to
the Minister of Defense and the State Secretary (Deputy
Minister equivalent) were replaced in 2005. Thus, Tadej
Burgar replaced longtime Embassy contact Uros Krek as
Director of Defense Policy; Igor Logar replaced Igor Nered as
Director of Defense Affairs; and Damijan Dolinar replaced
Joze Lacko as acting Director for Logistics. Additionally,
the Director of the MOD's Intelligence and Security Service
(OVS),Zoran Justin, was replaced by Damir Crncec, and the
MOD Secretary General, Franc Javornik, was replaced by Albin
Coce. In almost all of these cases, the new personnel were
promoted from the middle ranks of the existing defense
establishment.


3. (C) Numerous Embassy contacts have told us that the
leadership shuffle is a result of Erjavec's lack of
experience with defense policy as well as his own personal

insecurity, which has led him to seek out new advisors who
will be more loyal to him personally. With the number two
position in the MOD held by Franci Znidarsic, a longtime ally
and childhood friend of Prime Minister Janez Jansa (see Bio
Note in paragraph 22),it is also clear that the personnel
changes are at some level politically motivated and reflect
both Znidarsic's and Jansa's personal preferences. Outgoing
UK Defense Attache (protect) and some others have speculated
that the appointment of weak, second-tier officials to
replace the more seasoned professionals dismissed by Erjavec
has been used by Jansa and Znidarsic to facilitate their
micro-management of the ministry.

-------------- --------------
Priority Number One: Stability in the Western Balkans
-------------- --------------


4. (SBU) In 2006, Slovenia plans to continue to concentrate
its out-of-country deployments in the Western Balkans to
promote political stability and secure its own economic and
security interests in the region. Slovenia has also
announced that the Western Balkans will be one of its chief
priorities during its EU presidency in 2008. The reasons for
this are clear. With the constant threat of political
instability, terrorism, and organized criminal networks
operating immediately to its south, Slovenia has a clear
national interest in promoting the region's peaceful
development and integration into Euro-Atlantic structures.
Slovenia's extensive trade with the countries of the former
Yugoslavia and its cultural, economic, and political
experience and insight also give it unique leverage in the
Western Balkans.


5. (C) In 2005, Slovenia almost tripled the number of troops
in Kosovo (KFOR) from 32 to 92. In 2006, it plans to
continue to increase its participation in KFOR by deploying
an additional transport company, bringing the total number of
Slovenian personnel to between 300-400. In 2007, the SAF
plans to increase its contribution to KFOR still further by
deploying a motorized battalion, bringing its end strength in
Kosovo to approximately 800 personnel. Speaking to PolMiloff
at a December 12 reception, MOD Director for Defense Policy
Tadej Burgar confided that Kosovo provides an excellent
testing ground for the SAF's expeditionary capabilities,

noting that Slovenian troops are presently neither adequately
trained nor properly equipped for the high intensity
operations taking place in "hot spots" like Afghanistan or
Iraq.


6. (C) In Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH),the number of
Slovenian troops deployed to EU Operation Althea is projected
to decrease slightly from the current level of 99 troops to
approximately 85 troops by the end of 2006. Despite the
gradual decrease in personnel, however, Slovenia continues to
see BiH as an important geostrategic area. In 2005, the SAF
reconfigured its personnel in BiH by withdrawing a motorized
company and replacing it with a company-sized unit of
approximately 60 HUMINT operators. Because of its more
intimate knowledge of the language, culture, and people,
Slovenia sees HUMINT as an area where it can make a
significant contribution to regional stability. In the
coming years, Slovenia will likely seek to increase its
HUMINT operations throughout the Western Balkans.

-------------- -
Supporting operations in Afghanistan and Iraq
-------------- -


7. (C) In Afghanistan, Slovenia is not likely to increase its
troop contributions in 2006 beyond current levels, according
to MOD Defense Policy Director Tadej Burgar. (NOTE: Slovenia
currently has 58 troops deployed to ISAF in Kabul and Herat).
In Iraq, the GOS is currently evaluating how to contribute
as many as four demining and/or Explosive Ordinance Disposal
(EOD) trainers to the NATO Training Mission (NTM-I). Thus
far, the GOS's contributions to Iraq include 5 million Euro
worth of light weapons (AK-47s) and ammunition donated to the
Iraqi Security Forces, 100,000 Euro donated to the NTM-I
Trust Fund, and five trainers deployed to train the Iraqi
police at the Jordan International Police Training Center.
At present, however, Slovenia does not have any "boots on the
ground" in Iraq.


8. (C) The decision whether to send demining/EOD trainers to
Iraq will test the GOS's commitment to NATO and the U.S.-led
war on terror at a time when the government's public
popularity has declined from the historically high levels it
achieved following the October 2004 elections (60 percent) to
a more normal level (40 percent). Prime Minister Jansa has
assured COM he wants to make a deployment to Iraq happen.
Echoing this point during a December 22 conversation with
PolMiloff, MFA Security Policy Director Stanislav Vidovic
claimed the question is not "whether" Slovenia will deploy
trainers to NTM-I, but rather "who and how." On January 6,
Prime Minister Jansa's Senior Advisor, Aleksander Lavrih,
told PolMiloff that a decision would be forthcoming within a
week.


9. (C) The decision to send demining/EOD trainers has been
mired in technical difficulties with finding billets for
these trainers at SHAPE. When the idea of sending
demining/EOD trainers from the International Trust Fund for
Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF) was originally
discussed with the GOS in October, the reaction was positive.
The GOS had (and continues to have) a strong preference for
deploying ITF civilian trainers for at least three reasons --
first, deploying civilians would be more palatable for
domestic public opinion; second, humanitarian demining fits
the image that Slovenia wants to sell to its own citizens as
well as to the international community; and finally, the ITF
is seen as one of Slovenia's "crown jewels" and the
utilization of its personnel would demonstrate the
organization's ability to go "out of area" at a time when its
mission in the Western Balkans is winding down. All of these
reasons led the GOS to provisionally endorse the bold new
step of deploying personnel to Iraq at a time when many other
countries were reducing their commitments.


10. (C) The difficulty in finding billets for civilian
demining/EOD trainers has led the GOS to explore the option
of sending military trainers. We have been assured that
Slovenia is capable of providing military demining/EOD
trainers and expect a decision to be announced in January,
pending full political support from all four parties in the
governing coalition. An op-ed placed by COM in the national
print daily "Vecer" on December 14 (on the eve of the Iraqi
elections) inaugurated Mission's public diplomacy campaign to
develop broader public support for such a deployment.
Initial reactions to the idea in the national press have been
largely positive.

--------------

Counter-Proliferation Activities
--------------


11. (SBU) In the area of counter-proliferation, Slovenia has
come to play a more active role and has endorsed new
initiatives that will enhance its ability to deter, detect,
interdict and investigate proliferation activities. Post has
worked with NP and DTRA to get Slovenia invited to
participate as an observer in ARIEX 06, a DOD/ICP-sponsored
WMD interdiction exercise in the Adriatic Sea scheduled for
March 27-31, 2006. Participants will include Croatia,
Albania, Macedonia, Poland, and the U.S., with observers from
Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro.
A planning meeting to be held in Split, Croatia between
January 25-27, 2006 will give the Slovenes an opportunity to
work with regional colleagues and develop valuable contacts
in this vital security area.


12. (C) After repeated encouragement from Post, Slovenia has
informally announced a bold new initiative to host a PSI
container security exercise in May 2007 in the Slovenian port
of Koper. Current plans are to invite Italy, Croatia, and
perhaps several additional countries to participate. MFA
Security Policy staffer Bostjan Jerman told PolMiloff that
the proposal had been tentatively approved by FoMin Rupel but
that government approval will be needed in order to
appropriate funds from the 2007 budget. Slovenia is likely
to ask for USG support/assistance in hosting this exercise.


13. (SBU) Following an April 2005 Agreement between the
Slovenian Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the U.S. Department
of Energy on implementation of the Second Line of Defense
program in Slovenia, construction is scheduled to begin in
February 2006 to install radiation detection systems
(portals) at the Slovenian port of Koper and the Obrezje
border crossing with Croatia. Installation of the portals is
currently scheduled to be completed by July 2006. The
installation of these portals will mark another important
step forward and the fulfillment of a top Mission priority.


14. (SBU) In the area of dual-use licensing, where the
Ministry of Economy (MOE) takes the lead, less progress has
been achieved. The Internal Control Program for dual-use
licensing and other bilateral programs for dual-use licensing
have continuously run into problems with the MOE. Post will
continue to engage the leadership of the MOE to get these
programs back on track.

--------------
Defense reform
--------------


15. (C) In the area of defense reform, we can expect the SAF
to continue to transform itself from a territorial defense
force into a more expeditionary force focused on global
threats. The SAF has made a priority of training and
equipping its NATO Reaction Force (NRF) assets, including the
18th Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Battalion and the
10th and 20th Motorized Battalions. However, our assessment
is that more will need to be done. Despite the forecasted
training and acquisitions, the NBC Battalion will still lack
a biological detection and decontamination capability by the
time it rotates into the NRF in July 2006 (for NRF rotation
7). Both the 10th and 20th Motorized Battalions currently
lack the combined training in high intensity operations that
would make them truly mission capable. Absent this training,
these units are not fully ready for the broad range of NATO
missions that may emerge in the future.


16. (C) Slovenia's other areas of focus will include its
Special Operations Forces (SOF),which were reorganized in
December 2005 as part of the SAF's new Intelligence and
Reconnaissance Battalion. In both special operations and
HUMINT, the Slovenes will seek additional training and will
need to devote significant resources to bring these units up
to Alliance standards.

--------------
Procurement and facilities
--------------


17. (C) In the area of procurement, Slovenia's priorities for
the new year include several acquisitions in the C4I area
(Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and
Intelligence),a MILES (Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement
System) combat simulation system, an IHITS software package
for battlefield reconstruction and analysis, the FATS
(firearms training simulator),TALON radios and IFF systems

for Bell helicopters, 8x8 armored vehicles, as well as HMMWV
spare parts. Longer term acquisitions for the 2006-2010
period include tactical airlift capability (C-27 or CASA
aircraft),TOW missile systems, and SHORAD air defense
systems.


18. (SBU) In terms of facilities, NATO Assistant Secretary
General for Defense Investments, Marshall Billingslea,
confirmed on November 16 that NATO would make an investment
of "several tens of millions of Euro" in the Cerklje airbase
to endow it with strategic lift capability. Cerklje is a key
priority for Slovenia since its upgrade would endow the
country with a military airbase and thus reduce reliance on
the Brnik International Airport as a hub for military
operations.

--------------
Air policing
--------------


19. (C) Air policing is also likely to emerge as an issue in

2006. Slovenia's Air Chief, Colonel Igor Zalokar complained
to DATT and PolMiloff recently that Italy has provided only
one air policing mission over Slovenian airspace to date: on
March 30, 2004, the day after Slovenia joined NATO. Italy's
failure to provide air policing is reportedly due to delays
in signing a Memorandum of Understanding between Italy and
Slovenia, and has caused considerable consternation within
the Slovenian General Staff. (COMMENT: DATT has brought the
issue to the attention of NATO Air Headquarters in Izmir,
Turkey. END COMMENT.)

--------------
Comment
--------------


20. (SBU) Slovenia has pledged to have 6 percent of its
forces deployed overseas by the end of 2006 and to spend 2
percent of its GDP on defense by 2008. In current overseas
operations and in planned counter-proliferation activities,
Slovenia is making a robust contribution and plans to do even
more in the future. These are all considerable achievements
for a small country of 2 million people that is in the midst
of a profound military transformation only 15 years after the
establishment of its Armed Forces.


21. (C) As a seasoned student of defense and security policy,
Prime Minister Jansa has demonstrated that he understands the
value of Slovenia's active membership in the NATO Alliance.
In light of recent, far-reaching personnel changes within
Slovenia's defense establishment, it appears that Jansa and
his team are tightening the reigns in order to push their
agenda forward. If Jansa can deliver the support of the
other parties in his governing coalition, we expect that he
will make good on his pledge to contribute to the NATO
Training Mission in Iraq. Post will continue to push
Slovenia to live up to its NATO commitments and address our
common security concerns.

--------------
Biographical Note
--------------


22. (SBU) BIO NOTE: Born in the same year (1958),Jansa and
Znidarsic grew up as childhood friends. Both received
degrees in defense studies from the Faculty of Social
Sciences in Ljubljana. After Jansa was named Minister of
Defense in 1990, he appointed Znidarsic as Director of Civil
Defense. After playing leading roles in Slovenia's
territorial defense during its ten-day war of independence in
1991, Jansa and Znidarsic set their sights on the
transformation of Slovenia's Territorial Defense Force into
an independent military. As Jansa's right-hand man,
Znidarsic also helped spearhead Slovenia's entry into NATO's
Partnership for Peace. In 1993, while still Defense
Minister, Jansa appointed Znidarsic as MOD State Secretary.
END BIO NOTE.
COLEMAN


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