PORTUGAL: CONCERNED ABOUT IRAN AND NORTH KOREA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LISBON 002407

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2016
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL PO
SUBJECT: PORTUGAL: CONCERNED ABOUT IRAN AND NORTH KOREA

REF: LISBON 1921

Classified By: Deputy Pol/Econ Couns Cari Enav for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d)

Summary
--------------

1. (SBU) During a separate meeting in Lisbon on security and
non-proliferation on the margins of the 21st Bilateral
Commission, Portugal underscored the importance of a
coordinated EU and US approach in the face of Iranian and
North Korean efforts to upset the stability of the current
worldwide nuclear regime. Towards this end, Portuguese
officials indicated that they planned to consult with the
U.S. on a regular basis on these issues during Portugal's
upcoming EU Presidency in the latter half of 2007. MFA
officials indicated that they were pessimistic that talks
with Iran to halt uranium enrichment will succeed, inquired
into China,s efforts to deal with North Korea, and expressed
concerned that U.S.-Indian civil nuclear cooperation will
push Pakistan farther into the China camp. The U.S.
expressed disappointment at Iranian attempts to politicize
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Both sides
agreed that early ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT) would give the agreement teeth.


2. (U) On October 3, International Security and
Non-Proliferation Regional Affairs Director Robert Witajewski
and MFA Director for Security and Non-Proliferation Joao
Corte-Real met on the margins of the 21st Bilateral
Commission between the U.S. and Portugal. Deputy Pol/Econ
Counselor Cari Enav and MFA officials Pedro Sousa Abreu and
Philippe Rhamelier also attended.

Iranian Nuclear Program
--------------

3. (C) Corte Real underscored the importance of a unified
approach in dealing with the Iranian and North Korean nuclear
threats and stressed the need for regular bilateral
consultations with the U.S. when Portugal assumes the EU
Presidency in the latter half of 2007. He noted that some EU
member states like Portugal wanted to take a tough approach
with Iran while others like France and Germany favored
further negotiations. Corte Real agreed with Witajewski that
the EU-3 package was Iran,s best option and "exit strategy"
out of the current impasse. Corte Real commented that
Portugal had reiterated this stance with its Iranian
counterparts every month for the past six months, urging Iran
to comply with all relevant UNSC resolutions and its IAEA
commitments. Most recently at the September UNGA meetings in
NYC, Corte Real reported that FM Amado had told the Iranian
FM that "there was a time for everything, and that now was
the time for compliance." Sousa Abreu commented that despite
these and other international efforts, Portugal did not
believe talks with Iran would agree to halt its uranium
enrichment and that the imposition of sanctions was a likely
outcome.

DPRK Nuclear Program
--------------

4. (SBU) Corte Real inquired into China,s role in dealing
with the Democratic People,s Republic of Korea (DPRK).
Witajewski reviewed the Chinese perspective on North Korea,
highlighting probable Chinese concerns that North Korean
actions could alter the strategic dynamics in the region to
China's detriment. He also explained to the Portuguese that
it was likely that the DPRK would conduct a nuclear test with
very little advance warning, despite Chinese efforts to use
their relationship with North Korea to dissuade North Korean
Leader Kim Jong-Il from pursuing its nuclear weapons program.
Witajewski also stressed the importance of strong
enforcement of any sanctions regime and urged Portuguese
officials to assist in preventing the export or transit of
suspect or dual-use material to the DPRK. He also requested
that the MFA keep the Embassy advised of any Portuguese
contacts with the North Koreans. Corte Real agreed to do so.

U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement
-------------- --------------

5. (SBU) Corte Real inquired into the status of the
U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. He noted that
Portugal, among others, wanted a moratorium on fissile
material and asked if the agreement would address India's
membership in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and CTBT.
Witajewski commented that it was our current best estimate
that the U.S. Congress would likely pass the proposed
legislation when it reconvened after elections. In reviewing
the advantages of the proposed program, he underscored that
India was the world's largest democracy, had a stable
political system, had an excellent non-proliferation record,
and could not be compared with either Iran or North Korea.
Implementing the U.S.-India agreement would, he stressed, be

LISBON 00002407 002 OF 002


a net plus for non-proliferation efforts.


6. (SBU) Witajewski told the Portuguese that the U.S. was
encouraging New Delhi to send high level officials to the
October Nuclear Suppliers Group meeting to explain the
benefits of the Initiative, including placing India's civil
entities under IAEA supervision. Witajewski expressed hope
that the Indian delegation when they briefed in Vienna would
be able to address many of Portugal,s concerns, including
India,s willingness to abide by the NPT although not
formally a member. He stressed that the United States would
not amend the NPT, would continue to uphold our NPT
commitments, and not recognize India as a nuclear weapons
state.


7. (C) Corte Real responded that Portugal had concerns about
Indian diversion of uranium to undeclared plants and feared
that the U.S.-India Agreement would push Pakistan closer to
China on both civilian and military nuclear cooperation.. He
urged that pressure be placed on both India and Pakistan to
end their nuclear weapons programs. Witajewski agreed that
mutual de-nuclearization would be a desirable end state, but
commented that that this would be difficult to achieve absent
a prior resolution of political disputes between the two
countries including Kashmir and Afghanistan. He argued that
resolution of these other issues notwithstanding, support for
the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear initiative was an important
first step down this road.

IAEA Consultations
--------------

8. (SBU) Witajewski, who had just come from IAEA
consultations in Vienna, noted that it was important to
recruit good technical experts to staff the agency and to
improve the Agency's monitoring detection capabilities. He
commented that in an era of budget constraints the agency
needed to direct its focus on areas of concern and expressed
disappointment that the Iranians had tried to politicize
recent IAEA elections. Corte Real underscored Portugal's
support for IAEA efforts to strengthen security of materials,
adding that Portugal endorsed the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons efforts to promote national
legislation and early entry into force of the CTBT.

MTCR and Coast Guard Assessment
-------------- --

9. (SBU) Corte Real asked that the U.S. use its influence in
the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to weigh in with
Turkey to persuade it to accept Cyprus, the only EU member
not included in the regime. He also asked that the U.S.
provide Portuguese authorities with the latest Coast Guard
security assessment of Portuguese ports so that Portuguese
officials could act on any identified deficiencies.

Comment
--------------

10. (C) The Portuguese officials were clearly concerned with
the Iranian nuclear threat. FM Amado had declared that Iran
poses the greatest threat since WWII (reftel) in a discussion
with Ambassador Hoffman on September 8. Portugal considers
itself in the hard-line camp and will go along with
imposition of sanctions against Iran but is skeptical that
such a move would force the Iranians to back down. Corte
Real also reiterated several times the need to present a
united front and expressed the desire to coordinate closely
with the United States.


11. (U) This cable has been cleared by PM/International
Security and Non-Proliferation Regional Affairs Director
Robert Witajewski.
Hoffman