Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06LISBON1137
2006-06-12 16:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Lisbon
Cable title:
PORTUGAL: AN INTEL VIEW OF EAST TIMOR
VZCZCXRO5965 PP RUEHDT DE RUEHLI #1137/01 1631601 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 121601Z JUN 06 FM AMEMBASSY LISBON TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4863 INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0523 RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI PRIORITY RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR PRIORITY 0028 RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0125 RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1437 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0591 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0529 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LISBON 001137
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV TT PO
SUBJECT: PORTUGAL: AN INTEL VIEW OF EAST TIMOR
REF: A. CANBERRA 849
B. DILI 301
Classified By: Cari Enav, Pol/Econ Officer, State. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and
(d)
Summary
-----------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LISBON 001137
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV TT PO
SUBJECT: PORTUGAL: AN INTEL VIEW OF EAST TIMOR
REF: A. CANBERRA 849
B. DILI 301
Classified By: Cari Enav, Pol/Econ Officer, State. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and
(d)
Summary
--------------
1. (C/NF) In a discussion on East Timor, the Chief of Staff
for the Republic of Portugal's Intelligence Services (SIRP)
underscored the need to recognize the Fretilin Party's
popularity and the important role Prime Minister Alkatiri
played in it. He was critical of Australia's past role in
East Timor but was confident that coordination problems
between Portuguese and Australian forces on the ground would
be worked out.
Alkatiri Still Influential
--------------
2. (C/NF) During a chance encounter on June 8, Pol/Econ
DepCouns had the opportunity to solicit Chief of Staff for
the Republic of Portugal's Intelligence Services (SIRP) Jorge
Carvalho's viewpoint on the situation in East Timor. With
regard to the political situation, Carvalho underscored the
need to recognize the political reality in East Timor without
favoring either President Gusmao or Prime Minister Alkatiri.
He commented that although Alkatiri had undertaken
questionable actions and was tainted with the mark of
Communist affiliation, the fact remained that the Fretilin
Party would win if elections were held today and Alkatari
would remain in a position of power. Any plans to resolve
the conflict would need to take his influence into account.
Questioning Australia's Role
--------------
3. (C/NF) Carvalho commented that Australia had not played a
productive role in East Timor, underscoring that Australia's
motives were driven by geopolitical and commercial (e.g. oil)
interests while Portugal's main interest was to maintain
stability. He noted that Portugal had minimal, if any,
economic ties. He explained that SIRP followed the situation
on the ground very closely, stating "we even know what type
of shoes the rioters wear and where they buy them," and
implied that Australia had previously fomented unrest for its
benefit. He cited two instances - demarcation negotiations
of the maritime border between East Timor and Australia and
demarcation negotiations of oil exploration boundaries off
the shore of East Timor - where Australia had fomented unrest
to put the pressure on the Government of East Timor.
Confident Coordination Problem would be Resolved
--------------
4. (C/NF) Carvalho was confident that coordination problems
between the Portuguese paramilitary Republican National Guard
(GNR) and the Australian forces would be resolved and
downplayed any conflicts on the ground. Reftels and
subsequent press reports highlight a June 8 accord in which
the GNR will operate exclusively in the Comoro neighborhood
until command and control issues had been resolved.
Comment
--------------
5. (C/NF) Carvalho, the equivalent of DNI John Negroponte's
Chief of Cabinet, is an important pro-American Embassy
contact who is not only knowledgeable in intelligence matters
but well connected to political parties across the spectrum.
His analysis of the situation in East Timor was dispassionate
- even his criticism of Australia was delivered in a
matter-of-fact manner. Though Carvalho emphasized Portugal's
more altruistic side for sending GNR to East Timor, there is
a genuine fondness for its former colony and a sense of
responsibility for its welfare. It is clear that
intelligence reporting informs Portugal's official position
regarding the political way forward, as reflected by MFA
interlocutors' reluctance to comment on particular East
Timorese leaders and to instead emphasize the importance of
the East Timorese themselves devising a solution to their
difficult political problems.
LISBON 00001137 002 OF 002
Hoffman
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV TT PO
SUBJECT: PORTUGAL: AN INTEL VIEW OF EAST TIMOR
REF: A. CANBERRA 849
B. DILI 301
Classified By: Cari Enav, Pol/Econ Officer, State. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and
(d)
Summary
--------------
1. (C/NF) In a discussion on East Timor, the Chief of Staff
for the Republic of Portugal's Intelligence Services (SIRP)
underscored the need to recognize the Fretilin Party's
popularity and the important role Prime Minister Alkatiri
played in it. He was critical of Australia's past role in
East Timor but was confident that coordination problems
between Portuguese and Australian forces on the ground would
be worked out.
Alkatiri Still Influential
--------------
2. (C/NF) During a chance encounter on June 8, Pol/Econ
DepCouns had the opportunity to solicit Chief of Staff for
the Republic of Portugal's Intelligence Services (SIRP) Jorge
Carvalho's viewpoint on the situation in East Timor. With
regard to the political situation, Carvalho underscored the
need to recognize the political reality in East Timor without
favoring either President Gusmao or Prime Minister Alkatiri.
He commented that although Alkatiri had undertaken
questionable actions and was tainted with the mark of
Communist affiliation, the fact remained that the Fretilin
Party would win if elections were held today and Alkatari
would remain in a position of power. Any plans to resolve
the conflict would need to take his influence into account.
Questioning Australia's Role
--------------
3. (C/NF) Carvalho commented that Australia had not played a
productive role in East Timor, underscoring that Australia's
motives were driven by geopolitical and commercial (e.g. oil)
interests while Portugal's main interest was to maintain
stability. He noted that Portugal had minimal, if any,
economic ties. He explained that SIRP followed the situation
on the ground very closely, stating "we even know what type
of shoes the rioters wear and where they buy them," and
implied that Australia had previously fomented unrest for its
benefit. He cited two instances - demarcation negotiations
of the maritime border between East Timor and Australia and
demarcation negotiations of oil exploration boundaries off
the shore of East Timor - where Australia had fomented unrest
to put the pressure on the Government of East Timor.
Confident Coordination Problem would be Resolved
--------------
4. (C/NF) Carvalho was confident that coordination problems
between the Portuguese paramilitary Republican National Guard
(GNR) and the Australian forces would be resolved and
downplayed any conflicts on the ground. Reftels and
subsequent press reports highlight a June 8 accord in which
the GNR will operate exclusively in the Comoro neighborhood
until command and control issues had been resolved.
Comment
--------------
5. (C/NF) Carvalho, the equivalent of DNI John Negroponte's
Chief of Cabinet, is an important pro-American Embassy
contact who is not only knowledgeable in intelligence matters
but well connected to political parties across the spectrum.
His analysis of the situation in East Timor was dispassionate
- even his criticism of Australia was delivered in a
matter-of-fact manner. Though Carvalho emphasized Portugal's
more altruistic side for sending GNR to East Timor, there is
a genuine fondness for its former colony and a sense of
responsibility for its welfare. It is clear that
intelligence reporting informs Portugal's official position
regarding the political way forward, as reflected by MFA
interlocutors' reluctance to comment on particular East
Timorese leaders and to instead emphasize the importance of
the East Timorese themselves devising a solution to their
difficult political problems.
LISBON 00001137 002 OF 002
Hoffman