PORTUGUESE VIEWS ON EAST TIMOR AND DEPLOYMENT PLANS

S E C R E T LISBON 001014

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2016
TAGS: PREL MOPS TT PO
SUBJECT: PORTUGUESE VIEWS ON EAST TIMOR AND DEPLOYMENT PLANS


Classified By: Political/Economic Counselor Matt Harrington for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Portuguese interlocutors from the Defense Ministry,
Foreign Ministry, and Republican National Guard (GNR) have
confirmed Portugal's plans to help East Timor stabilize,
although not under the auspices of the Australia-led Joint
Task Force. Both the Portuguese Defense Minister's Advisor
and the Australian Ambassador in Lisbon noted that Portugal
and Australia agree on remaining neutral in the conflict but
differ in their views regarding the appropriate response.
The Government of Portugal (GOP) seeks to support East Timor
by using bilateral channels and by providing personnel
directly under the control of the Timorese government pending
a UN mission. Once the UN mission is in place, the GOP
believes it should focus on institution building and conflict
resolution to avoid future violence. The GNR contingent's
arrival in Dili has been delayed, reportedly due to
Indonesia's denial of overflight clearance, but is expected
to depart Lisbon on June 2. End Summary.

Insistence on a Separate Command Structure
--------------


2. (C) MFA Deputy Foreign Minister Joao Gomes Cravinho told
the DCM on June 2 that the Portuguese GNR forces will work
directly under the East Timor command structure due to a
standing protocol with East Timor which precludes Portugal
from operating under another nation's command. He added that
operational commanders are likely to come to an agreement
once the GNR forces are on the ground, but noted that the
GNR's mission of reestablishing civil order differs
significantly from the Australian-led Task Force's military
mission.


3. (C) In a separate conversation, Director of Asia and
Oceanic Affairs Jorge Silva Lopes told Pol/Econ Officer that
the GNR are going to report through a Portuguese Commander
directly to the Timorese President and Prime Minister once
they arrived, in accordance with a May 25 MOU between
Portugal and East Timor. When asked about potential
coordination problems arising from the dual President and PM
command structure, Lopes claimed he did not foresee any
problems of conflicting requests from the offices. He
similarly downplayed questions about coordination with the
Australian-controlled forces. While the Portuguese
government respects the Australian role, it has no plans to
put the GNR under Australia's command, according to Lopes.


4. (C) In a June 1 phone call with the Ambassador,
Australia's Ambassador in Lisbon, Greg Polson, said
coordination arrangements for the GNR company headed to Dili
are still being discussed between Canberra and Lisbon. He
thought the situation would work out fine on the ground where
it was a question of agreeing which foreign contingents would
have responsibility for which areas. He added that the GNR
would have mostly a police role, responsible primarily for
crowd control, which was different from that played by the
military contingents deployed by Australia, Malaysia, and New
Zealand. He offered his view that, ultimately, the GOP would
insist that the GNR operate autonomously, but that practical
considerations on the ground would lead them to close
coordination with the Australian and other forces.

GNR's Deployment and Mission Plans
--------------


5. (S) After a brief delay in the GNR's departure due to lack
of Indonesian overflight approval, the 120-man force is
slated to leave on June 2, 2100 local time for Dili on two
rented aircraft. Once there, the GNR plans to have its force
in East Timor for at least one year, rotating troops every
four months. In contradiction to the dual President/PM
command structure Lopes outlined on June 1, the GNR Deputy
Chief of Staff told DAO Officer on June 2 that their
Detachment Commander will receive orders directly from
President Gusmao. Only in his absence, they will take orders
from Prime Minister Alkatiri and will be responsible to the
Portuguese Ambassador.


6. (S) The first phase of the deployment will be focused on
establishing peace and order in and around Dili, or in an
area designated by President Gusmao, and the second phase of
their mission will focus on training the local police force.
The Portuguese GNR has had an advance team in Timor for some
time and has already developed a plan for the Portuguese
mission. The GNR Commander will present this plan to Gusmao
for final authorization.

After the Storm - Rebuilding East Timor
--------------


7. (C) The Defense Minister's diplomatic advisor, Paulo
Lourenco, outlined his perspective on the need for a
long-term solution in East Timor to the DCM in a June 1
conversation but noted that his Ministry did not have the
lead role in determining policy on this issue. Lourenco
insisted that the problem is far greater than PM Alkatiri.
The country's ethnic tensions have never been addressed, he
said, and the UN drawdown occurred too soon and too quickly,
so East Timor and the international community are now paying
the price for past shortsightedness. It is essential that an
international force under UN mandate be deployed for the
foreseeable future. In the meantime, the GNR would liaise
with local security forces in protecting public order.
President Gusmao, according to Lourenco, is a strong leader
fully capable of managing the current crisis.


8. (C) Lourenco expressed his view that Australia's
motivation in intervening in East Timor is to preserve
regional stability and to demonstrate its influence in that
part of the world. He also thought Australia was concerned
that the radical Muslim community in Indonesia might have an
unhelpful influence on the Timorese population (Comment:
which struck us as odd, since we believe an overwhelming
majority of East Timor's population is Roman Catholic. End
Comment).


9. (C) Deputy FM Cravinho echoed Lourenco's concerns about
rebuilding and reported to the DCM that, although Portugal
believes the immediate crisis will end soon, the more
important mission will be responding to the ongoing societal
rift. He believes that the UN should rethink its mission in
East Timor and begin to address the conflict and support
institution-building efforts. To that end, he mentioned that
commissions that focused on strengthening societal entities
would help more than continued security missions.

Australian View from Lisbon
--------------


10. (C) Ambassador Hoffman asked Australian Ambassador Polson
whether the Portuguese were backing Prime Minister Alkatiri
and whether the GOP was at odds with Canberra. "I wouldn't
say at odds," Polson replied. Portugal and Australia, he
said, approach East Timor from two very different
perspectives. Portugal's approach is shaped by emotional,
historical, and linguistic connections, while Australia's
policy is grounded in geo-strategic concerns, such as a
desire to avoid instability and consequent refugee flows in
the region. Some of the Portuguese leadership, Polson
continued, very clearly supports Alkatiri. The GOP, Polson
believes, wants all three senior E. Timorese leaders -- the
President, Prime Minister, and Foreign Minister -- to stay,
but he wagered that no one in the GOP would be willing to
call for Alkatiri to step down.

Comment
--------------


11. (C) We have heard a consistent message from all of our
Portuguese interlocutors that the GOP has no intention of
placing the GNR contingent under Australian command and
control, due partly, we suspect, to historical bad blood
between the two countries in East Timor, and to a conviction
that they know the ground better given their longstanding
historical connections to the country. That said, both our
Portuguese contacts and the Australian Ambassador in Lisbon
were confident that this arrangement would not pose major
problems, both because military commanders on the ground
would coordinate effectively, and because the Portuguese
forces would have a very different mission (maintenance of
public order, primarily) from the other international
contingents.


12. (C) We have heard no indication from our GOP contacts
that Portugal has taken or intends to take sides in the
internal power struggle in East Timor. Our interlocutors at
all levels, from the Prime Minister down, have rigorously
pushed for a new UN mandate as soon as possible. A new and
sustained UN effort is critical, from the GOP perspective, to
conducting the kind of long-term institution-building that
will, inter alia, reduce the possibility of continued
political factionalism.
Hoffman