Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06LIMA64
2006-01-09 13:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Lima
Cable title:  

FOREIGN MINISTER ON PERU'S "ISOLATION," BOLIVIA,

Tags:  PREL PGOV PE BL 
pdf how-to read a cable
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FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7947
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 2804
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 8848
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JAN QUITO 9877
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0029
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6404
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 4061
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 000064 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PE BL
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER ON PERU'S "ISOLATION," BOLIVIA,
CHILE, ARTICLE 98

REF: LIMA 30

Classified By: Political Counselor Alexander Margulies.
Reason: 1.4(b/d).

----------
SUMMARY
----------

C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 000064

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PE BL
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER ON PERU'S "ISOLATION," BOLIVIA,
CHILE, ARTICLE 98

REF: LIMA 30

Classified By: Political Counselor Alexander Margulies.
Reason: 1.4(b/d).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Foreign Minister Oscar Maurtua, in a breakfast
hosted by the Ambassador on 1/4, said that Peru, as a
pro-U.S. and pro-free trade advocate, sees itself as
increasingly isolated in a South America moving leftwards,
with only Colombia for company. Maurtua pushed for signals
of USG support: a Toledo meeting with POTUS, rapid signing
of the Free Trade Agreement and increased aid. He expressed
concern over Evo Morales' election in Bolivia, indicated that
the GOP has given little thought to the practical
consequences this may have for Peru, and conveyed President
Alejandro Toledo's assurances that the USG will have Peru's
full support if things go badly wrong in Bolivia and we need
to stage an evacuation. With respect to Chile, Maurtua only
focused on its arms purchases and on the "nightmare" that the
GOC might reach an accord with Morales on an exchange of gas
for a Bolivian outlet to the sea. On Article 98, Maurtua
said that he wanted to move forward on an agreement meeting
our International Criminal Court concerns through the 1952
Bilateral Military Assistance Agreement, while his assistant,
Alfredo Chuquihuara, added that he would soon have a response
to the proposal made in December by Arms Control A/S Stephen
Rademaker. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) The Ambassador, accompanied by DCM and Polcouns,
hosted a breakfast on 1/4 for Foreign Minister Maurtua, who
was accompanied by his Cabinet Chief Chuquihuara and Under
Secretary for the Americas Amb. Pablo Portugal. The

SIPDIS
conversation was wide-ranging over two-plus hours, focusing
on Peru's sense of isolation in the region, the Bolivian
election, perceived threats posed by Chile, Article 98
negotiations, and ultra-nationalist presidential candidate
Ollanta Humala's 1/3 appearance at Hugo Chavez/Evo Morales
event in Caracas (this latter issue was covered in Reftel).

--------------
ALONE IN A HOSTILE NEIGHBORHOOD
--------------


3. (C) Maurtua said that the Toledo Administration, which

defines itself as pro-U.S. and pro-free trade, is feeling
increasingly isolated in a South America heading left. He
explained that it only feels close to Uribe's Colombia, has
comfortable relations with Lula's Brazil, problematic ties
with Kirchner's Argentina, is marching to a different drummer
than Duarte's Paraguay and Vasquez' Uruguay, has impossible
relations with Chavez' Venezuela, fears that Evo Morales'
Bolivia will be a proto-Chavez force on its southern border,
and has no/no expectation that Ecuador will be restored to
stability. While this is our characterization rather than
Maurtua's, he is preoccupied that old problems with Chile
deriving from the War of the Pacific could blow up in his
face during this electoral year, meaning that for him it is a
relationship fraught with risk rather than opportunity.


4. (C) The Foreign Minister gave no/no indication that the
GOP had reached any conclusions as to how it should cope with
this situation other than to turn to the U.S. for signals
that we recognize and appreciate Peru's efforts.
Specifically, Maurtua again raised the request for a
Toledo-POTUS meeting, urged prompt signing of the Free Trade
Agreement (and was delighted to learn from the Ambassador
that USTR intended to provide the requisite three-months
congressional notification over the coming week),and pleaded
for increased assistance. With respect to aid, Maurtua said
that Peru had the impression that the U.S., like Europe, was
focusing too much on Africa: "You need to pay more attention
to us, we are only five hours from Miami." He also lamented
that Peru will lose USD 50 million in assistance this year
because its regional governments have not been able to
develop fundable projects with adequate safeguards.


5. (C) The Ambassador agreed that the latter issue was a
problem, pointing out that USAID was working with regional
and local governments to improve their capabilities to design
and carry out projects. He offered to increase communication

between the Embassy and the Foreign Ministry's international
cooperation agency APSI, to improve coordination on the
provision of this training; an offer the Foreign Minister
gladly accepted.

--------------
THE ELECTION OF EVO MORALES
--------------


6. (C) Maurtua said that President Toledo would attend
Morales' inauguration, as Peruvian presidents historically
have participated in the inauguration of their Bolivian
counterparts. While Toledo had briefly met Morales in
Bolivia and invited the latter to visit him in Peru, Maurtua
confided, Morales had not/not taken Toledo up on this offer,
traveling through Lima with a low profile on several
occasions. The Foreign Minister added that he would advise
Toledo to carefully prepare his public and private remarks at
this event, to echo the President's previous advice to Chavez
that it is not enough to be elected democratically, one must
also govern democratically.


7. (C) After waxing on Peru's historical ties to Bolivia,
dating back to the Inca Empire, through the Viceroyalty and
the early republican period when the two countries were one,
the Foreign Minister proceeded to demonstrate limited direct
information of present-day events, saying that he sought
advice and counsel on developments there from Peru's
Ambassador to Brazil, who previously served in La Paz. After
observing that he knew Vice President-elect Alvaro Garcia
Linera and found him to be a "brilliant mathematician,"
Maurtua acknowledged that he was also hopelessly ultra-left.
He followed this up with the suggestion that it might be
advisable to encourage Jaime Paz Zamora's return to active
politicking, as Paz Zamora was a "clever fellow" who knew how
to handle the Aymaras and Quechuas, then recalled that Paz
Zamora had had his visa revoked by the U.S. on
narcotics-related grounds. He concluded by expressing
pessimism on the prospects for carrying out the agreement on
joint development of gas resources signed by Toledo and
former President Carlos Mesa, observing that under a Morales
government it is unlikely that there will be any development
of gas resources in Bolivia.


8. (C) The Ambassador explained the USG's position on the
election of Evo Morales, stressing that we recognized his
democratic election and would judge his government on its
actions, particularly those that affect our interests, such
as coca eradication. He noted that while we did not have
contact with Morales before the vote, Ambassador David
Greenlee did meet with him on 1/2.

--------------
THE CHILEAN "THREAT"
--------------


9. (C) Chile, as seen through the Foreign Ministers eyes,
is a threatening presence for Peru. President Ricardo Lagos
was "very prudent" regarding Morales election, Maurtua
commented, sending him congratulations. Peru's "nightmare,"
he added, would be if the GOC were to reach an agreement with
Morales on exchanging Bolivian gas for access to the sea. In
addition to affecting Peru's maritime claims, he mused, this
could complicate Peru's development of its own gas resources.


10. (C) Maurtua also complained at length about Chilean
arms purchases, observing that under Lagos the GOC has bought
USD 2.8 billion in arms. These purchases, he said, along
with Venezuela's ongoing arms build-up, are destabilizing
factors in the region and have led GOP officials to propose
increasing the amount of funds Peru will dedicate to
upgrading its weaponry as well as create a permanent
mining/gas revenue set-aside to ensure continued military
equipment funding as Chile has done with its copper revenue.


11. (C) The Ambassador replied that the GOC has gradually
sought to whittle away at the privileges and protections
granted to the military by the Pinochet Government,
eliminating the offices of lifetime senators and asserting
presidential authority over the appointment of military
service commanders. The copper revenue set-aside will be the
toughest nut to crack, he acknowledged, adding that the
danger of creating an institutionalized set-aside in Peru is
that it will be difficult to revise or eliminate it should

national requirements change.

--------------
ARTICLE 98
--------------


12. (C) With respect to arms purchases, Maurtua said that
Peru should move away from buying "scrap" ("chatarra") from
Russia and former Soviet-bloc countries and purchase its
replacement weaponry from the U.S. He also expressed
interest in increased training. The Ambassador replied that
the absence of an Article 98 agreement was an obstacle to
both objectives. Maurtua inquired as to the status and
substance of an initiative in the U.S. Congress to revise
American Servicemembers Protection Act restrictions. The
Ambassador explained that this initiative could affect IMET,
but would not deal with the ESF or FMS programs.


13. (C) Maurtua stated that he wanted to move forward
quickly on an agreement meeting the USG's concerns regarding
the International Criminal Court (ICC) through an
amplification of the 1952 Bilateral Military Assistance
Agreement. Chuquihuara said that he would soon have a
response to the proposal made in December by Arms Control A/S
Stephen Rademaker. He added that Peru was seeking to
harmonize its preference for expanding the scope of "notice"
with the USG's preference for expanding the fixed scope of
"coverage" so that the USG's bottom-line that no Americans
would be extradited by Peru to the ICC would be effected as a
practical matter. Both Maurtua and Chuquihuara emphasized
that they were taking personal political and legal risks in
promoting this solution.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


14. (C) Maurtua is keenly aware that he represents a
lame-duck government with a seven month life-span. His main
goals are to advance relations with the U.S. while avoiding
regional and domestic political train wrecks. In looking
around the neighborhood, he sees problems, not opportunities,
and seems at a loss how to approach these difficulties, much
less resolve them. It is particularly interesting how little
focus the GOP in general, and the Foreign Ministry in
particular, has given to Bolivia, given the two countries'
shared border and historical ties. By his own admission,
when it comes to Bolivia Maurtua is depending on the counsel
of his trusted friend, Peru's Ambassador to Brazil, who
formerly served in La Paz, rather than Peru's own Embassy
there. In discussing Peru's options regarding Bolivian
developments, he appeared to be primarily concerned to ensure
that Peru not/not take steps that would upset the USG.


15. (C) The Foreign Minister seems to view Chile solely
through the problematic legacy of the War of the Pacific.
Thus, he does not consider Chile's potential value as a
regional ally in promoting free-trade and a free market
economy. Perhaps this is due to the pressures of domestic
politics, where the GOP's initiatives to renegotiate the two
countries' maritime boundary and to unilaterally proclaim its
maritime baselines have proven as popular at home as they
have engendered unease in Santiago. Whatever the cause,
Maurtua's narrow treatment of Peru's southern neighbor is
quite different from the broad vision of his predecessor
Manuel Rodriguez. The latter, a native of Cuzco, recognized
that the development of southern Peru required an integrated
approach by Peru, Chile and Bolivia. END COMMENT.
STRUBLE