Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06LIMA2625
2006-07-03 21:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Lima
Cable title:  

HUMALA HAS NO COATTAILS IN LORETO

Tags:  PGOV PINR PHUM PE 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0004
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPE #2625/01 1842139
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 032139Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1285
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 3629
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6877
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 9653
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JUL QUITO 0514
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0713
RUMIAAA/CDR USCINCSO MIAMI FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 002625 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR PHUM PE
SUBJECT: HUMALA HAS NO COATTAILS IN LORETO

REF: A. 05 LIMA 4197


B. 05 LIMA 3415

C. 05 LIMA 3414

D. LIMA 1220

E. LIMA 1765

Classified By: A/Polcouns David C. Brooks for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

Corrected Copy, Added Classified By.

--------
Summary:
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 002625

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR PHUM PE
SUBJECT: HUMALA HAS NO COATTAILS IN LORETO

REF: A. 05 LIMA 4197


B. 05 LIMA 3415

C. 05 LIMA 3414

D. LIMA 1220

E. LIMA 1765

Classified By: A/Polcouns David C. Brooks for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

Corrected Copy, Added Classified By.

--------------
Summary:
--------------


1. (C) Ex-Union por el Peru (UPP) and Peruvian Nationalist
Party (PNP) presidential candidate Ollanta Humala carried the
Loreto Region in Peru's 6/4 second-round presidential race.
Despite that, Loreto remains up for grabs in November's
regional and municipal elections because Humala's party has
no infrastructure there. The Evangelical-based political
party Restauracion Nacional (RN) is making a strong push in
Loreto and other jungle areas. Because RN competes directly
with Humala's base among poor Peruvians (the so-called C, D
and E groups),the new party could become a stumbling block
to Humala's efforts to elect his own candidates in regions he
carried on 6/4. To stop Humala, however, RN may have to ally
with other parties, something that could be difficult for a
group with an overtly moral message and a desire to
distinguish itself from traditional politics. End Summary.


2. (U) Poloff traveled to Iquitos, the capital of the Loreto
Region, June 20-23, and interviewed a variety of local
leaders on the political situation, including: Regional
President Robinson Rivadeneyra, Mayor Juan Carlos de Aguila
(APRA),Congressman-elect Jose Vargas Fernandez (APRA),
Archbishop Julian Garcia Centeno, Director of the Local
Teachers College Ludolfo Ojeda, Restauracion Nacional
national strategist Fernando Bellido, and Director of Human
Rights for the Prefecture's Office (a branch of the Ministry
of Interior) Jaime Soplin Perea.

--------------
Humala Has No Coattails/No Organization
--------------


3. (C) Despite Humala's victory in Loreto in the 6/4
presidential race (Humala beat APRA Party President-elect
Alan Garcia 53-47 percent in Loreto),the former UPP/PNP
candidate has no/no strong organization in the region. The
two parties that supported him maintain separate headquarters
and reportedly have tense relations with one another. A

variety of local observers stated that Loreto's voters
supported Humala because he was an available protest vehicle,
not out of conviction. Archbishop Julian Garcia Centeno
underscored the similarity between Humala's success in Loreto
and that of President Toledo four years earlier. Toledo
carried Loreto with 70 percent of the vote in 2001, but his
popularity locally plunged to ten percent just one year
later, according to Garcia Centeno, when he had not come
through with his campaign promises. Humala's only chance to
elect candidates, observers agreed, would be to ally with one
of the local Loreto "defense fronts," one of which, the
United for Loreto movement (UNIPOL),now controls the
regional presidency.

--------------
Evangelical Party Follows "Jungle Strategy"
--------------


4. (C) Peru's upstart Evangelical-led political party,
Restauracion Nacional (RN),which proved a surprise in the
recent 4/9 first-round elections, is working hard in Iquitos
(Refs A-E). According to RN national strategist Fernando
Bellido, RN is following a "jungle strategy," pushing solid
candidates in jungle regions (Loreto, Ucayali, Amazonas)
where conversion to Evangelical Protestantism as well as
poverty rates are relatively high. (In Loreto, 20-25 percent
of the population is Evangelical, according to both
Protestant and Catholic leaders.) RN maintains an impressive
office in Iquitos where volunteers are working well into the
night analyzing electoral statistics from Loreto's smallest
settlements. RN's people are concentrating on organizing in
areas where null votes constituted a significant percentage
of ballots cast. Overall, in Loreto about 30 percent of
voters cast null votes during Peru's 6/4 presidential race.

5. (C) While Bellido saw the jungle areas as RN's natural
territory, he maintained the party could compete in other
areas, even in places where Humala ran up big victory margins
in the south. He mentioned Arequipa as one area where
Evangelicals had been "awakened" by RN candidate Humberto
Lay's relatively strong showing in the 4/9 first-round
presidential elections. He also noted that RN was weighing
possible alignments with other parties to elect good
candidates. During the visit, APRA Congress
representative-elect Juan Vargas said that RN should ally
with APRA in the coming regional elections. RN's highly
disciplined vote, observers emphasized, would be an ideal
supplement to any established political party and would
likely guarantee a win for such a coalition.

--------------
Comment: Lessons in Loreto?
--------------


6. (C) Loreto is, in one sense, an unusual area. The region
is physically isolated from the rest of Peru and local
sympathies in favor of autonomy run high. That said, the
factors at play here -- political fragmentation at the local
level and the absence of any strong organization for Humala
-- are likely not unique. Humala's goal is to capture a
number of regional governments in the areas he carried in the
election -- the jungle regions and the sierras and the south
-- and create a solid bloc opposed to Garcia. If conditions
in Loreto are any indication, however, this strategy may be
difficult to implement. Humala could take Loreto by lining
up with a regional defense front like UNIPOL, but such a
move, while it could give him victory, would also tie him to
notoriously independent local leaders with their own agendas.



7. (C) RN's effort in Loreto bears watching. Party members'
experience in church outreach appears to transfer to
politics. RN may have to cross the Rubicon and form
electoral alliances, however, if it wants to win: something
that may be difficult for a party that defines itself as
different from its more traditional competitors. The key may
be in how these alliances are defined. Bellido told Poloff
that RN would be disposed to support good candidates in
conjunction with other parties, but would not engage in
traditional electoral "pacts" that involved binding long-term
obligations. End Comment.


8. (C) Embassy plans to send reps into other pro-Humala
regions in the coming weeks to take the measure of Humala's
organizational depth in these areas with an eye toward
November's regional and municipal elections.
STRUBLE