WHY GARCIA WON AND HUMALA LOST

C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 002315

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR PE
SUBJECT: WHY GARCIA WON AND HUMALA LOST

REF: LIMA 348

Classified By: Polcouns Alexander Margulies. Reason: 1.4(d).

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SUMMARY
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1. (SBU) SUMMARY: As recently as April of this year, polls
showed that APRA's Alan Garcia had the highest negatives of
any politician in Peru. Garcia achieved his 52.6 percent
victory over Union por el Peru's (UPP) Ollanta Humala by
appealing to metropolitan voters' fears that Humala would be
a pawn of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, undermine
democratic institutions, and reverse the economic growth
trend established under President Alejandro Toledo. Humala
and Chavez did their bit to reinforce Garcia's strategy.
Humala radicalized his image during the second round through
authoritarian pronouncements, by hardening his opposition to
the Free Trade Agreement with the U.S. and by his refusal to
disown Chavez's intromissions in Peru's electoral processes.
Chavez showed that he did not have the self control to avoid
taking Garcia's bait--a lesson that candidates facing
Chavez-backed candidates in Nicaragua and Mexico would do
well to note. While Garcia's strategy was (just) successful
on a national level, it is unlikely to translate into a
winning formula for the upcoming regional/municipal
elections, where the Humalistas or other "outsider" parties
must be considered the favorites to win in most of the races.
END SUMMARY.

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A WIN BASED ON IDEOLOGICAL AND GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS
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2. (C) Alan Garcia, in a 1/17 meeting with visiting WHA
P/DAS Charles Shapiro (Reftel),previewed the 2006 election
campaign as both an ideological contest relatively equally
divided between Humala on the left, Unidad Nacional's Lourdes
Flores on the right and Garcia trying to position himself in
the center; and a similarly equally divided geographic one,
between Humala's base in the marginalized and rejectionist
south (which historically has sided with "outsider"
candidates like Fujimori and Toledo),APRA's "solid north,"
and Flores' Lima stronghold. His strategy, Garcia confided,
was to run in the first round against Flores, whom he
successfully tagged as the "candidate of the rich," and then
place his trust in the "common sense" of the electorate in
the run-off against the "irrational and non-programmatic"
Humala.


3. (U) The balloting results confirm the validity of
Garcia's analysis of voting patterns and his strategy for
taking advantage of them. APRA, which historically has been
weakest in southern Peru, dropped every department in that
region to Humala. Garcia won handily in Ica and on the
northern coast. The greater Lima metropolitan area, which
accounts for over 38 percent of registered voters, was the
deciding factor in determining Peru's next president. In the
first round Lima was, as Garcia predicted, Flores' territory;
she took a plurality of 30.5 percent there, well ahead of
Humala's 21.2 percent and Garcia's 19.5 percent. Her narrow
elimination from the race had the result of converting the
second round chiefly into a contest over who could best
appeal to her voters. That contest was won hands-down by
Garcia, who beat Humala by 62-38 percent in Lima, and by
68-32 percent in Callao.


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SO HOW DID HE DO IT?
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6. (SBU) Garcia achieved his decisive win in Lima/Callao by
effectively cultivating the fears of metropolitan residents
that Humala would be a pawn of Venezuela's Chavez, that "El
Comandante" represented a return to authoritarian and
military rule which would undermine democratic institutions
and respect for human rights, and that the UPP candidate's
economic policies would scare off foreign investment, lose
preferential access to the U.S. and other markets, and lead
to a reversal of the growth trend established by the Toledo
Administration. Garcia received strong support in these
efforts to demonize Humala from most major media
organizations, particularly publications like dailies
"Correo" and "Expreso" and the Frequencia Latina TV channel,
all of which were previously highly critical of APRA and its
leader.


7. (C) Humala and Chavez also played into Garcia's hand.
Instead of moving towards the center after the first round of
voting, Humala's discourse became even more radical and
authoritarian. His refusal to condemn Chavez's intromissions
in Peru's election (although his wife Nadine and his
spokesman Carlos Tapia did so) and his rejection of the Free
Trade Agreement ran counter to public opinion polling which
indicated that 70 percent of Peruvians rejected Chavez's
actions and 55 percent favored the FTA. Meanwhile, Chavez
consistently reacted to Garcia's constant prodding by issuing
statements in support of Humala and condemning the APRA
leader and Toledo. These interventions by the Venezuelan
played very poorly with the Peruvian electorate and enabled
Garcia to launch the campaign slogan, "Either for Chavez, or
for Peru!" (COMMENT: Chavez lowered his profile mid-way
through the second round--the result, we suspect, of advice
from the Humala team that he was hurting his favorite.
Garcia got Chavez back into the fray by throwing out goading
statements. Garcia recognized that Chavez is continuously on
the public stage and has a stream of consciousness speaking
style (for example, in the weekly, hours-long "Alo
Presidente" appearances),guaranteeing that the Venezuelan
leader would eventually respond. When he did, the Peruvian
press immediately jumped on it. Chavez' narcissism
overwhelmed both his self-control and self-interest. That is
a lesson that anti-Chavista candidates in Nicaragua and
Mexico might turn to their advantage. END COMMENT.)

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COMMENT: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
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8. (C) Garcia's strategy was sufficient to eke out a
victory on the national level. It is unlikely, however, to
prosper if applied to the upcoming regional/municipal
elections. Those races will draw on geographic prejudices,
which favor Humala (who took 15 of the 25 regions in the
second round of voting),and on the local electorate's demand
for large infrastructure projects and improved health,
education and public security services from the central
government. The fears of Greater Lima residents are not
shared by their provincial kin, while the persuasive power of
the mass media shrinks exponentially as one moves into the
interior. Furthermore, many of the media organizations that
favored Garcia when confronted by the specter of a Humala
presidency will now return to their habitual critical posture

vis-a-vis the President-elect. If the Humalistas and other
"outsiders" are to be defeated in the regional/municipal
balloting, it will have to be accomplished by meeting
residents' tangible needs. END COMMENT.
STRUBLE