Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06LIMA1809
2006-05-10 16:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Lima
Cable title:  

COBALT-60 STORY FROM THE LIMA END

Tags:  SNAR PREL KSAF TRGY ENRG TSPL ASEC KNNP VE PE 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPE #1809/01 1301607
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 101607Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0367
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 3367
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 6726
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 2382
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 9422
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAY 3321
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 0318
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY 0502
RUEAHLC/DHS WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 001809 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA AA/S SHAPIRO
ALSO FOR WHA/AND, WHA/EPSC, EB/ESC, INL/LP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2016
TAGS: SNAR PREL KSAF TRGY ENRG TSPL ASEC KNNP VE PE
SUBJECT: COBALT-60 STORY FROM THE LIMA END

REF: A. CARACAS 1234

B. CARACAS 1233

Classified By: Ambassador J. Curtis Struble; Reason 1.4 (B,D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 001809

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA AA/S SHAPIRO
ALSO FOR WHA/AND, WHA/EPSC, EB/ESC, INL/LP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2016
TAGS: SNAR PREL KSAF TRGY ENRG TSPL ASEC KNNP VE PE
SUBJECT: COBALT-60 STORY FROM THE LIMA END

REF: A. CARACAS 1234

B. CARACAS 1233

Classified By: Ambassador J. Curtis Struble; Reason 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary: On May 8, NAS Director and DepEconCouns met
with Alfonso Paredes, manager of Caddin, operator of
Rapiscan's GaRDS system in Peru. Paredes described an
accidental transfer, by a Caddin engineer (supposedly trained
by Rapiscan),of the Cobalt-60 capsule from its storage
canister to a non-shielded part of the GaRDS vehicle; it
remains a mystery why a trained engineer would do such an
unsafe act. At Post's urging, Caddin notified the GOP's
nuclear regulatory agency IPEN. Emboff spoke with IPEN
investigator on May 9; IPEN is just beginning its
investigation and has not asked for USG assistance. The
number of Peruvians exposed to radiation is not known but may
be a small number. No U.S. personnel were exposed or
involved in operation of the GaRDS here. End Summary.

IMPROPER CAPSULE REMOVAL
--------------

2. (C) On May 8, NAS Director, DepEconCouns and NAS Police
Advisor met with Alfonso Paredes, owner/manager of Caddin
Security Firm in Lima. Paredes said that Caddin imported the
Gamma Ray Detection Device (GaRDS) as a demonstrator model
from, and under contract with Rapiscan. Caddin had permits
for import, operation and export, Paredes said, from the
GOP's regulator, the Institute for Nuclear Energy (IPEN).
(Note: NAS Lima leased the GaRDS system, with Caddin
operators, for road interdiction operations between May and
December 2005. We understand that the GOP leased the system
prior to NAS. End Note.) Caddin operated the GaRDS system
in Peru and subsequently exported the system to Venezuela.
Paredes confirmed that his electrical engineer, Ricardo Depuy
(certified by Rapiscan) mistakenly removed the GaRDS system
Cobalt-60 (Co-60) radioactive capsule from its lead storage

canister at the Caddin warehouse in the Chorillos section of
Lima. The engineer put the capsule in the GaRDS vehicle as
part of preparation for shipping, reportedly (and
inexplicably) thinking that at that time it belonged in the
vehicle. Paredes said he had had no knowledge of an issue
with whereabouts of the Co-60 capsule until receiving a call
from Rapiscan on May 6.


3. (C) Paredes told us at the time of our 3 p.m. meeting that
he had not notified IPEN, nor any other GOP agency, of the
unshielded Co-60 and the possible exposure of personnel. He
said he learned of the improper removal only on Saturday, May
6, after speaking with Rapsican's engineer Cesar Rodriguez.
Rodriguez told Paredes that the Co-60 capsule may have been
in the vehicle. Paredes said that this was not possible, as
the lead storage/shipping canister with enclosed Co-60
capsule was in the Caddin warehouse, awaiting shipment.
Paredes took digital photographs (which he showed to Emboffs)
of the canister and emailed them to Rapiscan. Rodriguez then
noticed in the photographs the small cylindrical hole in the
center of the canister where the capsule is inserted or
removed, missing the cover. Paredes then confirmed to
Rapiscan headquarters in California that the capsule was
indeed missing from the canister.


4. (C) Repeatedly pressed for details, Paredes would not tell
us even approximate dates for when the Co-60 capsule was
removed from the lead canister, nor when he drove the vehicle
to the port. (Emboffs noted documents relating to the
situation on his desk, but Paredes was unwilling to give us
copies.) Paredes said that he wanted to get the facts right
before giving out partial information. He said he was
working on a prepared chronology with attached supporting
documents that he would try to get to us on May 9. Paredes
was visibly anxious; he expressed concern about his company
that he had operated for over 20 years. He expressed
increasing concern about his health in the course of our
meeting; he still had not sought medical consultation.


5. (C) Paredes said that after his initial telephone
conversations with Rapiscan engineer Cesar Rodriguez on May
6, Rapiscan has not returned Paredes' phone calls. Rodriguez
did not indicate to Paredes if Rapiscan would send personnel
to Lima to investigate. Post has so far not attempted to
contact Rapiscan.

THE NAGGING QUESTION
--------------

6. (C) Emboffs never received a straight answer as to how a
trained engineer could remove a radioactive capsule from its
shielding and put it into an unshielded box. Caddin employs
two engineers and a technician for work with the GaRDS
system. Although trained as an engineer, Paredes said that
he was the firm's administrator and was not knowledgeable
about the details of handling the system. Paredes showed us
what appeared to be original certifications by Rapiscan for
nuclear device training, and certification by IPEN for
nuclear handling for the two Caddin engineers, Norki
Faraciolo and Ricardo Depuy.


7. (C) Paredes did not want us to talk to the engineer at the
time of our meeting. Paredes also had not yet informed his
staff that they might have been exposed to radiation, as he
was worried about unduly alarming them. Paredes was not
certain to what extent Depuy was wearing protective clothing
when he removed the capsule. Neither Paredes nor his staff
were wearing protective clothing when they transported the
vehicle to the port. Paredes would not speculate as to how
much time his staff had spent near the vehicle between the
capsule removal and its delivery to the port, but said he
would investigate.

HUMAN EXPOSURE - PERUVIANS BUT NO NAS
--------------

8. (C) No NAS personnel were exposed to the unshielded Co-60
capsule during this series of events. Paredes said that
Caddin personnel, exclusively, handled the GaRDS system, its
preparation for shipping and its subsequent transport to the
port. Paredes noted that he personally drove the GaRDS
vehicle to the port for loading on to the ship. Paredes said
that he had no idea of the number of people who were involved
in loading and shipping the vehicle.


9. (SBU) Emboffs stressed to Paredes the importance of
seeking medical advice for him and his staff. We also
emphasized that reporting the incident would be an important
first step in identifying port, ship and other workers who
may have been exposed. When Emboff spoke with Paredes on the
evening of May 8, he was on his way to a medical clinic.

FORMAL NOTICE MADE TO GOP
--------------

10. (C) Emboffs emphasized to Paredes the importance of this
incident on many levels. We urged him to inform the GOP, and
said that we would do that if he did not. Paredes agreed to
call the head or deputy of IPEN while we were present, but
could not reach either of them. During the evening of May 8,
DepEconCouns confirmed with both Paredes and IPEN official
Renan Ramirez that IPEN received electronic notification of a
nuclear accident. Post received a copy of the notification,
which reported only that there had been an incident that
Caddin had learned of on May 8. Ramirez told DepEconCouns
agreed on May 9 that based on his preliminary telephone
conversation with Paredes that morning, there did not appear
to be significant radiation exposures in Peru. He said that
he was still in the initial stage of his investigation, with
a plan to meet with Paredes in the afternoon of May 9.
Ramirez did not ask for USG assistance, and the subject of
USG involvement in GaRDS did not come up.

NO NAS INVOLVEMENT IN INCIDENT
--------------

11. (SBU) NAS Lima was not involved in the importation of the
GaRDS system into Peru. Caddin had already imported the
system when it approached NAS to seek a contract for customs
use. NAS contracted with Caddin for Caddin to operate GaRDS;
NAS personnel were never involved in its operation. At all
times a Caddin driver, technical assistant and computer
screen operator were in charge of the scanner in the vehicle;
it was a "turnkey" operation. NAS was not involved in
obtaining Caddin's authorizations from IPEN and other GOP
agencies for transport and export of the GaRDS to Venezuela.


12. (SBU) NAS has been in the process of contracting with
Rapiscan/Caddin for use of two more GaRDS systems at Peruvian
ports. In view of this incident, NAS is reevaluating this
plan. NAS is also doing a background check on the two Caddin
engineers that have been involved in handling the Co-60
Capsule.

ACTION REQUEST
--------------

13. (SBU) Should the USG send a response team to Venezuela
(Ref A),a subsequent or simultaneous mission to Lima would
have similar benefits for our relationship with the GOP.
Post has so far not suggested USG involvement to IPEN, nor
spoken with other GOP agencies. The Ambassador is briefing
the Prime Minister on May 9. Post requests press guidance,
as the incident may surface in the Lima media.

COMMENT
--------------

14. (C) It remains a mystery how an engineer supposedly
trained by both IPEN and Rapiscan could withdraw a
radioactive capsule (even with some shielding) from a
container with a clearly marked radioactive warning and put
it in an unshielded location. It does not appear that Caddin
was using the Victoreen radiation meter as would be expected
when moving radioactive materials between a storage/shipping
canister and the GaRDS vehicle. We have no reason at this
point to suspect anything but a negligent capsule removal,
but Post will continue to vigorously investigate.
STRUBLE