VIEWS FROM THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL: UNIDAD NACIONAL

S E C R E T LIMA 001233

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR PE
SUBJECT: VIEWS FROM THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL: UNIDAD NACIONAL
CANDIDATE LOURDES FLORES TRIES TO PULL HER CAMPAIGN
TOGETHER FOR THE STRETCH RUN

REF: A. LIMA 1197

B. LIMA 1064

C. LIMA 348

Classified By: Political Counselor Alexander Margulies.
Reason: 1.4(d).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) In recent conversations with Poloffs, Unidad
Nacional alliance congressional candidates and advisors
described a disorganized campaign struggling to come up with
a formula to reverse presidential candidate Lourdes Flores'
steady fall in the polls. Going into the last three weeks of
the campaign, the plan is for Flores to concentrate her
efforts on Lima and populous coastal regions where her base
of support lies, and to paint the election as a contest
between Flores, standing for democracy and economic growth,
against ultra-nationalist "outsider" Union por el Peru
candidate Ollanta Humala, who represents authoritarianism and
a return to the failed statist economic policies of the past.
Infighting and distrust between the alliance's component
parties remains a problem, as does coordination between the
campaign's Lima headquarters and its provincial officials.
END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) Poloffs have been sounding out Unidad Nacional
(UN) alliance congressional candidates and advisors on the
direction and prospects of their presidential and legislative
campaign (UN is made up of Flores' Popular Christian Party
(PPC),Lima Mayor Luis Castaneda's National Solidarity party
(SN) and Congressman Rafael Rey's Renovation party). Over
the past several weeks Poloffs met with UN congressional
candidates Marco Parra (also Deputy Mayor of Lima and SN
Secretary General),Raul Castro (also PCP Secretary General)

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and Milagros Campos; Andean Parliament candidate Francisco
Sarmiento; PPC Political Secretary Percy Tabory; and former
Interior Minister Fernando Rospigliosi (who has been
counseling the Flores campaign).

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A DISORGANIZED CAMPAIGN
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3. (C) The general picture that emerged from these
conversations was of a chronically disorganized campaign that
still has yet to figure out how to get its act together. Two
months ago Arturo Woodman, UN's candidate for First Vice
President, lamented to visiting WHA P/DAS Charles Shapiro
that the alliance's campaign had no/no formal command
structure, with all decision-making up to Flores, who was on
the campaign trail 24/7 and had little time to deal with
organizational or logistical issues, which tended to fester
in her absence (Ref C). None of those interviewed by Poloffs
gave any indication that the situation has changed:

-- Rospigliosi described the campaign's organization as
"hopeless," opining that Flores' Colombian advisor Gloria
Ramirez does not/not have a clue regarding the Peruvian
electorate, and doubting that contracting Venezuelan
political consultant Juan Jose Rendon will do anything but
add to the campaign's confusion (Note: While a reliable
source and newspaper reports stated that Rendon's contracting
was a done deal, UN campaign headquarters told us 3/28 that
no/no agreement has been reached. End Note). In comments to
the media, the former Interior Minister said that UN's chief
shortcoming has been Flores' failure to base the campaign on
a single "strong idea or axis" that can resonate with voters.

-- Castro complained that UN's press advisors are not up to
par, noting that they have failed to obtain the necessary
publicity for Flores' concrete proposals that could have wide
popular appeal, such as her "My Neighborhood Secure, Peru
Secure" law and order initiative.

-- Tabory and Sarmiento agreed that the campaign has been
badly managed, but argued that this is finally being
addressed. They pointed out that Flores is making hard


decisions on campaign strategy, including a recent shift
aimed at polarizing the electoral debate between Flores and
Humala. They added that, with three weeks to go before the
first round of voting, "coordinators" are finally being sent
out from campaign headquarters in Lima to the provinces to
ensure diffusion of a common message and to improve
management of meetings and rallies.

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DIVISIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE
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4. (C) The three parties that make up UN have not/not been
a model of cooperation throughout the campaign. Campos
observed that the preferential voting system for Congress has
a negative effect on alliances, as the component parts
compete against each other for seats in the legislature
(voters cast ballots for an alliance/party and then can
write-in up to two "preferential" candidates: parties are
awarded seats in proportion to their total vote in each
electoral district; the individual candidates of each
alliance/party who garner the most "preferential" votes win
election). Parra agreed that the preferential vote
complicates intra-alliance relations, explaining that many
activists from his party only want to work for SN candidates
and he has had a difficult time convincing them to also
devote themselves to the Flores campaign. Only in early
March, he said, did Flores show leadership on this issue and
begin to rein-in the internal squabbling between alliance
factions.


5. (C) Parra singled out Rafael Rey's Renovacion party as a
particularly troublesome alliance partner. Percy Medina,
Secretary General of the pro-democracy NGO Transparencia,

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told Polcouns that Transparencia's investigation into the
defacing of many of Parra's billboards concluded that
Renovacion members were chiefly responsible, not/not rival
APRA party activists as had first been suspected. Tabory and
Sarmiento, on the other hand, while saying that harmony has
been restored within the alliance, also noted that SN is
spending most of its money promoting Parra, not Flores (who
does not appear on Parra's billboards, and is only mentioned
briefly at the conclusion of his radio ads),and that most of
the campaign's leadership and work force is drawn from the
PPC.

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THE STRATEGY FOR THE STRETCH RUN
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6. (C) Parra, Tabory and Sarmiento stated that in mid-March
Flores decided to shift her campaign rhetoric from talking
about her policy proposals to embrace harsh criticism of
Humala (Ref A). This, they explained, was the central plank
in a strategy to polarize the electorate between Flores, as
the pro-democracy pro-economic growth candidate, and Humala,
as a candidate who represents a return to authoritarianism
and the failed polices of statist economic intervention.
Campos emphasized that Flores needed to make it clear to the
electorate that a vote for her meant a vote for jobs; a
prescription the UN presidential candidate tried to fill with
the claim that her administration would create 650,000 jobs
annually (Ref B). Unfortunately for Flores, Tabory
acknowledged, this claim had a skeptical reception from
economists, the media and the public, although he argued that
it was indeed achievable.


7. (C) Tabory and Sarmiento added that Flores will
henceforth concentrate her personal appearances in Lima and
other heavily populated departments where she has significant
support that can be built on, such as Lambayeque, La
Libertad, Junin, Ica, Piura, Arequipa and perhaps Cuzco.
Other areas in southern Peru, they said, have been written
off as Humala country, although they expect that many rural
women, who have told pollsters they will back Humala like
their husbands, will secretly vote for Flores in the end.
UN's congressional candidates and activists are being
pressured by Flores to start a door-to-door campaign in
marginal and poor neighborhoods, where the C-E sectors (89
percent of the electorate) live. A media blitz is also
planned to target C-E voters, recognizing that Flores already
has the support of most of the A-B (upper and middle-class)
sectors.


8. (S) Castro, Tabory and Sarmiento complained that UN has
severe financial constraints while the Humala campaign is
loaded with cash and spending money well beyond what its
official campaign finance declarations would make possible.
They surmised that Humala is receiving funds from Venezuelan
President Hugo Chavez, but admitted that they had no/no hard
proof to back this up. It is odd, Sarmiento wryly observed,
"that the party of the rich has limited campaign funds, but
the party of the poor is rich." (Note: A reliable source
told us that the Flores campaign has, in fact, recently
received a significant financial contribution. End Note.)

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COMMENT
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9. (C) The disjointed and disorganized Flores campaign is
only starting to get its act together now that the finish
line is coming into view. With adequate funding, a focused
candidate and a strong message it is possible that Flores and
her followers can reverse her steady downward slide in the
polls (one percent weekly since mid-January - see Ref A and
previous election updates). It remains to be seen, however,
the extent to which Flores and the component parts of her UN
alliance will follow-through on implementing their home
stretch strategy, as well as the extent to which the targeted
C-E sector audience will be receptive at this stage of the
campaign. END COMMENT.
STRUBLE