SAO TOME PARTIES JOCKEYING TO FORM GOVERNMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L LIBREVILLE 000216

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

KINSHASA ALSO FOR BRAZZAVILLE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL TP GB
SUBJECT: SAO TOME PARTIES JOCKEYING TO FORM GOVERNMENT

REF: LIBREVILLE 200

Classified By: Ambassador Barrie Walkley for reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (C) Summary: Legislative elections in Sao Tome and
Principe (STP) gave no party a majority of seats in the
National Assembly (an institution that has much more power
constitutionally than the Presidency). President de
Menezes's MDFM party won the most seats, with 23 out of 55.
De Menezes hopes to form a government by persuading Patrice
Trovoada's ADI (in third place with 12 seats) either to
support or abstain when the MDFM presents its program to the
National Assembly. The second biggest vote getter, Posser da
Costa's MLSTP (19 seats),and the ADI are also negotiating to
create a majority coalition. Even if those two parties reach
an agreement, however, de Menezes told Ambassador Walkley he
interprets the constitution as allowing him to propose his
own MDFM government -- and to call new elections if it is
rejected by any MLSTP-ADI coalition. Unless de Menezes wins
Trovoada over, or changes his own mind, STP could be headed
for more political turmoil. End summary.


2. (U) The results of the legislative elections held in Sao
Tome and Principe on March 26 and on April 2 are now in, with
President Fradique de Menezes's MDFM taking 23 seats, Prime
Minister Maria do Carmo Silveira's MLSTP winning 19 seats,
Patrice Trovoada's ADI garnering 12 seats and Jao Gomes's
Novo Rumo capturing 1 seat. As 28 seats are needed to form a
governing majority in the 55-seat National Assembly, Patrice
Trovoada becomes the "king-maker," currently assessing offers
from both the MLSTP and the MDFM. The election results will
become official once they are certified by the Supreme Court.


3. (U) STP legislative elections are significant. Unlike
many African countries -- where there is generally a strong
presidency and a weak legislature -- power in Sao Tome and
Principe (STP) is vested in the National Assembly. Under
agreements ending a dispute in 2003, the next president's
position will be further diminished: he/she will lose the
right to select the minister of defense and minister of
foreign affairs (all ministers will be selected by the prime
minister),will not preside over cabinet meetings and will no
longer have the authority to dismiss parliament.
Presidential elections are anticipated in July, 2006.


4. (C) Last week, once it became clear that no party was
going to win a majority in parliament, the Ambassador met
separately in Sao Tome with President de Menezes, Patrice
Trovoada and Posser da Costa (the actual president of the
MLSTP) to discuss the situation. De Menezes said that under
no conditions will he enter into any coalition or
power-sharing agreement with Posser da Costa ("other members
of the MLSTP, perhaps, but not Posser da Costa"). His
preferred plan is to attempt to control the legislature as a
"relative majority" party, which requires the assistance --
or at least the acquiescence -- of Patrice Trovoada. De
Menezes thus called Gabon's President Omar Bongo, with whom
he is on good terms, and asked Bongo to influence Trovoada's
thinking (Patrice Trovoada was born in Libreville and grew up
in Gabon, from where -- at the time -- his father was leading
the struggle for STP's independence from Portugal). On March
28, Bongo sent a plane to transport Trovoada to Libreville
and two days later sent another one to pick up de Menezes so
that the three could meet. However, de Menezes and Trovoada
returned to STP apparently without any agreement having been
reached.


5. (C) In a meeting that took place before the trip to
Libreville, Patrice Trovoada told the Ambassador that he had
hoped to win 14 seats in the elections but was satisfied to
have taken 12. He said he is open to offers from both the
MLSTP and the MDFM but "temperamentally" feels closer to
Posser da Costa than to de Menezes (he was de Menezes's
advisor on oil affairs until he was fired last year; he was
also in an informal alliance with the MLSTP in parliament).
Trovoada said he expected de Menezes to try everything to
secure his support, even offering him the prime minister job.
However, Trovoada stressed, he is more interested in having
his ADI campaign program accepted publicly as the program of
the government than he is in any job or "division of the
spoils." Trovoada explained that he sees these elections as
a stepping stone to the next legislative elections (in four
years),which he hopes to win.


6. (U) In a radio interview on April 4, Trovoada claimed to
be no longer in negotiations with de Menezes because of "a
lack of flexibility" on the part of the MDFM. He said that
the MDFM has drafted a government program which the ADI
cannot support. He made no mention of the MLSTP in his
interview.


7. (C) Posser da Costa, when the Ambassador met him the day
after the elections, was exhausted. (Although Maria do Carmo
Silveira is the Prime Minister in the about-to-depart MLSTP
government, Posser da Costa is the president of the MLSTP; it
is expected that Silveira will now return to her old job as
head of the Central Bank). Da Costa attributed the MLSTP's
election loss to a lack of financial support from traditional
supporters China and Angola, which dramatically limited MLSTP
campaign capabilities, while, he claimed, Taiwan and Nigeria
were pouring money into MDFM coffers and Patrice Trovoada was
receiving big money from Nigerian oil interests. "Everyone
thought we were loaded, but we had no money," Da Costa said,
adding that Beijing gave the MLSTP only $40,000, "peanuts
compared to what Taiwan was handing out to de Menezes and the
MDFM." Da Costa revealed that he and other top MDFM leaders
had been forced to mortgage their houses to finance the
campaign. (Note: Lots of foreign exchange arrived in the
country during the campaign; IMF figures indicate that
inflation rose by at least 6% during the month. End Note.)


8. (C) Posser da Costa said that the MLSTP will accept the
election results and that he plans to call a party congress
in the next month or so to elect a new leadership. He
continues to seek ways to establish a coalition government
with Patrice Trovoada's ADI and would like to be the next
Prime Minister (a development which would be strenuously
opposed by de Menezes). If that coalition is not possible,
the MLSTP will serve as a "responsible but aggressive"
opposition party.


9. (C) Meanwhile, President de Menezes is behaving as if his
MDFM party has the right to form a government on the basis of
its plurality. He has established a government plan and is
getting ready to name a Prime Minister and cabinet. Assuming
he carries out this intention, the test will come once the
new parliament is in session. The MDFM government will
deliver its plan to parliament (the plan is essentially the
government's roadmap for the next four years); if a majority
of the 55 members accepts the plan, then the government is in
place.


10. (C) The key questions are: How will de Menezes and the
MDFM secure at least 28 votes when the party has only 23
seats; and What will be the result if the program does not
win approval by a majority of legislators? The answers to
these questions depend, in part, on an interpretation of the
constitution. The constitution, for example, is unclear what
will happen if there is no absolute majority in favor of the
program, due to abstentions, but the plan is not rejected (in
other words, if 23 vote for, 20 against and 12 abstain; there
will be no majority but there will be more votes for than
against). The government might be able to muddle along (if
it does not suffer a "no confidence" motion). If, however,
the ADI joins the MLSTP in a coalition and votes against the
MDFM plan in the Assembly, the MDFM government will fall.
What happens next is unclear, although President de Menezes
appears to think he could call for new elections, blaming the
ADI and MLSTP for the problem. Such an action would almost
certainly provoke constitutional challenges and assure
political turmoil until after the Presidential election in
July.


11. (U) Relevant portions of the STP constitution, informally
translated, include:

Article 110: The Prime Minister shall be appointed by the
President of the Republic after taking into account the
opinion of the parties represented in the National Assembly
and with due regard for the results of the general election.

Article 116: The Government's Program will be submitted for
the approval of the National Assembly...within thirty days
after appointment.

Article 117: The dismissal of the government occurs when:
.....
d) Its program is rejected;
e) A motion of confidence is not passed;
...

Article 103:
...
2) The National Assembly cannot be dissolved in the first
twelve months after its elections, in the last six months of
the President's mandate, or during a state of siege or a
state of emergency.



WALKLEY