Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06LIBREVILLE191
2006-03-24 13:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Libreville
Cable title:  

GOG EXPLAINS RAIDS THAT LED OPPOSITION LEADER TO

Tags:  PGOV PHUM GB 
pdf how-to read a cable
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241336Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8914
INFO RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 0602
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 1238
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0278
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0770
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0363
RUEHLU/AMEMBASSY LUANDA 0890
C O N F I D E N T I A L LIBREVILLE 000191 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM GB
SUBJECT: GOG EXPLAINS RAIDS THAT LED OPPOSITION LEADER TO
FLEE

REF: A. LIBREVILLE 186


B. LIBREVILLE 189

Classified By: DCM Katherine Dhanani. Reason: 1.4 (b) & (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L LIBREVILLE 000191

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM GB
SUBJECT: GOG EXPLAINS RAIDS THAT LED OPPOSITION LEADER TO
FLEE

REF: A. LIBREVILLE 186


B. LIBREVILLE 189

Classified By: DCM Katherine Dhanani. Reason: 1.4 (b) & (d).


1. (C) Summary: On March 24 the GoG explained to the
diplomatic corps the circumstances of its March 21 raid on
the headquarters of an opposition political party, which
resulted in party leader Mamboundou's flight to the South
African Embassy (reftels). The GoG told diplomats it had
intelligence indicating the existence of a plot to carry out
a campaign of violent civil disturbances, including the
destruction of infrastructure. The raid, carried out with
all legal authorities, followed demonstrations in which
police were fired upon. The GoG reports the raid yielded
dynamite and 20 rifles, as well as military uniforms and
blank ID cards. The GoG claims it had never sought to arrest
Mamboundou. There may be some weaknesses in the GoG's story,
but they pale in comparison to the implausibility of
Mamboundou's claim that the GoG seeks to assassinate him.
End summary.


2. (U) Minister of Foreign Affairs Jean Ping convoked the
diplomatic corps on March 24 in order to provide them with an
account of the context in which opposition leader Mamboundou
took refuge in the South African Embassy on March 21. Ping
was flanked by Minister of Defense Ali Bongo and government
spokesman Minister of Communication Rene Ndemezo'Obiang.
Minister of Interior Andre Mba Obame was expected but did not
attend. The dip corps was present in force, despite less
than two hours notice of the meeting. The same subject had
been discussed at a press conference the evening of March 23.


3. (SBU) Minister Bongo and Minister Ndemezo'Obiang described
the build up to the governments March 21 raids in much the
same way:
--The government had never impeded Mr. Mamboundou's efforts
to legally participate in elections or to appeal the
announced results in the court system. Mamboundou was
provided a security detachment for his personal protection
when he became an official candidate for the president. He
requested members of the gendarmerie for his bodyguard, and
was granted them. He requested a reinforcement of the
detachment and was given more agents. Although his appeal

failed, his protection has not been removed.
--Both spoke of the increasingly violent nature of recent
civil disturbances. They cited the events of March 7, when a
demonstration by military retirees led to the torching of
several logging trucks and the blockading of both the main
road out of Libreville and the railroad.
--On March 14, Mamboundou wrote a letter to the Minister of
Interior announcing that the Union of Gabonese Patriots (UPG)
would hold a march on Saturday, March 18 and requesting
security for the route. The Minister replied that the ban on
marches imposed during the November 2005 election campaign
remains in effect, and that any march would be illegal.
--The UPG marched anyway on March 18, and the march was
violent and disruptive.
--Further demonstrations on March 20 resulted in more
violence. Demonstrators fired on the police. One
demonstrator was killed. (Bongo said that demonstrators had
also fired on police March 18, while Ndemezo'Obiang said
March 20 was the first time this had occurred.)


4. (SBU) Minister Bongo gave more details on intelligence he
said the GoG has obtained in recent months. According to
Bongo, the GoG had responded to all the legitimate demands of
military retirees, but a few among them were insisting on
additional concessions outside their legal rights. He said
the GoG learned Mamboundou had entered into contact with
these disgruntled elements, and joined with them other former
military agents who had never made it to normal retirement
due to misconduct. Intelligence reports indicated that this
group was going to be used by Mamboundou to carry out attacks
on infrastructure, such as blowing up bridges. This
campaign, including the disturbances of March 7, had been
planned out of the UPG headquarters in Libreville's Awendje
neighborhood.


5. (SBU) Both Ministers told the dip corps that the
government had scrupulously followed the law in responding to
recent events. They obtained search warrants from both the
governor and the prime minister authorizing them to sweep the
entire neighborhood and seize any arms discovered. The

attorney general had dictated in writing the hours during
which the raid could be carried out.


6. (SBU) Both Ministers stressed that the March 21 operation
was a search and seizure raid, and never aimed to arrest Mr.
Mamboundou. The GoG displayed for the press on March 23 the
results of their searches, which included dynamite, 20
rifles, ammunition and military uniforms. (Only 2 of the 20
rifles were found at UPG headquarters; the rest were seized
from homes and shops in the neighborhood.) The Ministers
told the diplomatic corps that they also seized blank
national identity cards and student IDs, as well as a number
of duplicate ID cards, showing the same photo with two
different names. Minister Bongo said the police were pleased
that Mamboundou was not at home, since they would not have
known what to do with him.


7. (SBU) Minister Ping explained that the GoG did not wish to
arrest Mr. Mamboundou and had no interest in whether he
remained at the South African Embassy or not, although an
ongoing inquiry into items seized during the raid might lead
to a request that he answer some questions before the
Minister of Justice. Ping said that the South African
Ambassador (who was present at the briefing) had contacted
him on March 21 and been assured that Mamboundou was not
wanted or in danger. The GoG's only request to the South
African Embassy was that it not permit Mamboundou to contact
directly the media; the South African Ambassador had agreed.
(This followed a number of radio and press interviews on the
22nd by telephone. In some, Mamboundou reportedly claimed to
have the support of the USG as well as the SAG.)


8. (C) Comment: There are discrepancies in the GoG's story.
Emboff went to the UPG headquarters the morning of March 21
and was told by police that they wished to bring Mamboundou
in; this order was only retracted later in the day. If the
GoG has the kind of testimony and evidence it describes, its
lack of interest in arresting Mamboundou is implausible. On
the other hand, the assignment of political motives to the
activist military retirees is interesting, since the violence
of their methods seemed inconsistent with their avowed
intent.


9. (C) Comment cont: Minor discrepancies do not entirely
discredit the GoG's story, nor do they lend credence to
Mamboundou's claims that he fears assassination. The GoG has
been relatively restrained in its response to increasingly
violent demonstrations. Ping stressed this, saying that the
GoG has exercised patience despite accumulating evidence of a
plot to hatch urban guerilla warfare, heretofore unknown in
Gabon. His rhetoric may be somewhat exaggerated, but not
nearly as much as that of Mamboundou.
WALKLEY