BOLIVIA: A CONCILIATORY MORALES RETRACTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000938

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA A/S SHANNON AND PDAS SHAPIRO
STATE ALSO FOR WHA/AND PFRENCH, DHENIFIN AND LPETRONI
SECDEF FOR OSD/WHA PARDO-MAURER
TREASURY FOR RTOLOUI AND SGOOCH
USCINCSO ALSO FOR AMB MOORE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR SNAR BL
SUBJECT: BOLIVIA: A CONCILIATORY MORALES RETRACTS
ANTI-U.S.TERRORISM CHARGES

Classified By: AMBASSADOR DAVID N. GREENLEE FOR REASON 1.5(d)

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) During a private dinner President Evo Morales and
Vice President Garcia Linera hosted for the Ambassador, DCM
and the Embassy's declared intelligence chief late April 1,
Morales backtracked on accusations of U.S. involvement in
recent hotel bombings in La Paz, denied targeting the
judiciary and other democratic institutions, and reiterated
GOB support on the counter-narcotics (CN) front. His
conciliatory repositioning came in response to the
Ambassador's sharp expressions of concern on those issues and
on Morales' subordinates' failure to follow through on his
promise to return counter-terrorism weapons to MILGRP
custody. Morales' and Garcia Linera's purpose at the dinner
seemed to be to close the gap in comity that had been opened
by Morales' accusations about the hotel attacks and to
measure our support for a GOB delegation to the U.S. to
discuss soy and a possible extension of ATPDEA benefits. On
leaving, the Ambassador prevailed on Morales to reverse his
public stance on the bombings in front of a waiting press
scrum and to thank the Embassy for its help apprehending the
suspects. Morales was submissive and quiet most of the
evening and his olive branch was welcome--but we fully expect
our relationship to suffer more Morales-inflicted wounds in
the future. End summary.


2. (C) VP Garcia Linera called late March 31 to invite the
Ambassador and emboffs to dinner with the Vice President and
Morales at the President's residence April 1. Morales
arrived about twenty minutes late but established a positive
mood by excessively apologizing for his delay and sticking to
light banter, mainly with the Vice President, for about a
half hour before dinner.

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MORALES RETRACTS BOMBING ACCUSATION
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3. (C) The tone changed at the table, however, when, at
Morales' query of "what's new," the Ambassador asked sharply
why he had made four public statements insinuating official
U.S. involvement in the La Paz hotel bombings. Morales
blamed his first accusation on poor information but had no
explanation for subsequent inflammatory statements. He also
claimed ignorance when our intelligence chief explained that
a police unit we train and support investigated the blast and
netted the suspects within a few hours. We added that the
national police chief and the Minister of the Presidency were
involved in the investigation from the outset, knew which
unit had conducted it, and either misinformed or failed to
inform the President about the facts. The Ambassador also
reminded Morales that the American suspect had entered
Bolivia with a valid visa affixed to a fantasy passport
(World Service Authority) and had obtained a license to use
and sell explosives in Potosi despite a well-known,
multi-national list of prior crimes. The blame, therefore,
should not be laid on the U.S., but rather on Bolivian
incompetence. The Ambassador suggested that, to put the
matter behind us, it would be useful for Morales to correct
the record publicly. Morales nodded slightly and said he
might be willing, at some point, to do so.

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DELAY IN CT WEAPONS TRANSFER
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4. (C) The Ambassador reminded Morales that we had cut all
ties with an elite counter-terrorism unit and asked why the
Minister of Defense had failed to follow through on the
President's promise to return the unit's U.S.-owned weapons
and equipment to MILGRP custody. Morales wondered if we had
provided documentation on the materiel for his staff to
review and seemed suprised to learn that we had done so two
weeks previously. He suggested that his attention had been
diverted by the Lloyd Bolivian Airlines meltdown and other
looming problems, but said he would take up the issue early
in the week with the high command on his return from the IDB
summit in Brazil. Vice President Garcia Linera asked whether
he could see the MILGRP warehouse in El Alto where the
weapons and equipment would be placed. The Ambassador said
we would be pleased to arrange such a visit at his
convenience -- and he could also see the other equipment
stored there for possible future use by the Bolivian armed
forces.

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MILITARY FRICTIONS
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5. (C) The Ambassador went on to advise that the delay in
the transfer had hurt other areas of cooperation, including
abandoning planned construction of a civil defense emergency
operations center, and seemed to fit a pattern of creeping
estrangement between our militaries, such as new access
restrictions for our attaches. He said it would be
unfortunate for our relationship if we were forced down the
road of tit-for-tat reciprocity on access or other issues.


6. (C) Garcia Linera retorted that unfriendly signals were
coming from our side as well, citing as proof our refusal to
support with NAS helicopters a recent planned presidential
visit to a flood-ravaged Santa Cruz town. The Ambassador
responded that an earlier flight, at our considerable
expense, produced only thanks to Cuban doctors and silence
for us. We viewed that as an intentional slap, the
Ambassador said, and noted that we had not even received a
letter of thanks. Garcia Linera smiled darkly. Morales
looked at his plate.

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ERODING DEMOCRACY
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7. (C) The Ambassador said that there was an issue of
broader concern relating to the evolution of Bolivia's
democracy. While we respected the legitimacy of Morales'
overwhelming election triumph -- and wanted him to succeed as
a democratic president -- we had noted moves to dismember the
opposition and amass power in the executive. These included
direct attacks on the judiciary and other independent
institutions, and the subsequent resignation of top officials
on the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Tribunal, the
Judicial Council and the National Electoral Court.
Additionally, four ex-Presidents were facing politically
inspired criminal charges (three for authorizing gas
contracts and one for the Chinese missile transfer),while
other former senior officials or alleged "enemies of the
state" were either in jail or possibly on their way there.


8. (C) Again assuming his counterpoint role, Garcia Linera
rebutted that the new administration respected democratic
institutions and neither pressured nor advocated resignations
from the judiciary, but said it also was committed to rooting
out corruption wherever it prospered, even to the
hypothetical point of condemning their own families to jail.
He added that the governing MAS party was itself a study in
pluralism and did not seek a controlling majority in the
upcoming constituent assembly. The Ambassador said all this
bore further discussion, but we would remain sharply
attentive to the integrity of Bolivian democracy.

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CN/CT
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9. (C) On the counternarcotics front, the Ambassador agreed
that the GOB had been effective in interdiction, but said
eradication had fallen off significantly. While Garcia
Linera tried to split hairs about historically acceptable
rates for pulling coca plants, Morales acknowledged problems
in the Chapare but said he could manage them; the Yungas, he
mused, was a different and more frightening proposition for
which he had no ready answers. The Ambassador suggested that
improved eradication might set the stage for a successful
visit by INL Assistant Secretary Anne Patterson, whom Morales
said he was looking forward to meeting. After characterizing
the FARC as a narcotics trafficking organization, the intel
chief noted the presence in the Morales government of a
prominent FARC contact, leftist Bolivian journalist Hugo
Moldiz, as another mixed signal from an administration
ostensibly fighting the narco trade. Garcia Linera
acknowledged Moldiz might have had contacts with the FARC,
while commenting, as one who himself had been "connected with
the subversive world," that Moldiz was really a man of the
right rather than the left.

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BOLIVIAN-COLOMBIAN DELEGATION VISIT
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10. (C) What may have been the real aim of the
evening--getting planning back on track for a high-level
visit to Washington to discuss Bolivian soy within the
Colombia FTA and to pursue extension of ATPDEA
benefits--emerged only at the end of the dinner. To Morales'
round-about query about the thinking in Washington, the
Ambassador responded that we were prepared to discuss a visit
by a joint Bolivian-Colombian delegation anytime, but the
visit itself should be well prepared and might not be useful
before May or June. Morales and Garcia Linera seemed
comfortable with that timeframe.

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PUBLIC RETRACTION
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11. (C) As we broke from the table, Garcia Linera said the
media had gathered and wanted brief statements, presumably
relating to the improved mood and our continued bilateral
cooperation. The Ambassador insisted that we take the
opportunity to clear the record on Morales' damaging remarks
on the bombing incident. Morales reluctantly agreed, and his
subsequent public retraction was carried in all print and
television media the following two days.

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COMMENT
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12. (C) If past experience is indicative, Morales will
restrain his anti-U.S. impulse for a while, but could well
deliver another anti-U.S. outburst in the near term.
Meantime, our public restraint and willingness to stay
engaged are keeping us on the moral high ground with the
media and the chattering class. Morales, however, continues
to sail in polls that rate his popularity at 80 percent,
despite widely reported missteps with us and others. End
comment.
GREENLEE