URIBE TELLS MORALES "NO" ON SOY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LA PAZ 000712

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA A/S SHANNON AND PDAS SHAPIRO
STATE ALSO FOR WHA/AND FRENCH AND PETRONI
STATE PLS PASS TO USTR FOR BHARMON
NSC FOR DFISK
USCINCSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2016
TAGS: ETRD EAGR EINV ECON PGOV PREL USTR BL
SUBJECT: URIBE TELLS MORALES "NO" ON SOY

REF: A. LA PAZ 692


B. LA PAZ 644

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission David M. Robinson for reasons 1.
4(d) and (b).


1. (SBU) Summary: President Evo Morales' March 14 meeting
with his Colombian counterpart, Alvaro Uribe, appears not to
have gone Bolivia's way. Uribe reportedly told Morales he
could not guarantee continued access to Colombia's market for
Bolivian soy because the free trade agreement (FTA) with the
U.S. was concluded, and that Bolivia should probe the U.S.
side for flexibility instead. Colombia's Ambassador to
Bolivia told us that Bolivian government officials had
insisted that FTA negotiations with Peru provided a precedent
for Colombia's re-opening a finished agreement.
Vice-President Alvaro Garcia Linera called the Ambassador
late March 14 to request an urgent meeting -- now set for
March 16 -- to discuss the issue. In anticipation of that
meeting, post asks the Department to clarify our willingness
to show flexibility, if any, on Bolivian soy and to offer
guidance on what level a probable Bolivian delegation should
be received. In the meantime, the GOB's jitters in the face
of strong public criticism at home for losing the Colombian
market may give us an opening to press for quiet pragmatism
on matters of central concern to us, including
counter-narcotics. See action request in paragraph 7. End
Summary.


2. (SBU) Following the public success of President Evo
Morales' trip to Chile, and the bilateral energy agreement
signed March 13 with Uruguayan President Tabare Vazquez (ref
A),Morales appeared to be on a roll, and may have imbued GOB
officials with a misplaced confidence that Colombian
President Alvaro Uribe, who visited Bolivia briefly on March
14, could be persuaded to allow continued preferential access
for Bolivian soy products to Colombia's markets -- a priority
issue for the GOB. Bolivian soy exporters could lose this
important market to more efficient U.S. producers as a result
of the FTA with Colombia.


3. (SBU) During their March 14 meeting in La Paz, however,
Colombian President Alvaro Uribe gave no ground to Morales on
this issue. (See septel for media reaction.) Colombian
Ambassador to Bolivia, Edgar Papamija (present in the
presidential meeting),told us March 15 that Uribe had
underscored Colombia's solid partnership with the U.S., and
had unambiguously stated that Colombia's free trade agreement
with the U.S. was now concluded and could not be re-opened
for additional negotiation on any issue. Papamija said
Bolivian negotiators had insisted that U.S. FTA negotiations
with Peru provided a precedent for such post-agreement
tinkering, and that Colombia ought to do the same in this
instance. According to Papamija, Uribe responded that he had
no knowledge of the Peru precedent, and recommended that
Morales call President Bush to probe for flexibility on the
U.S. side instead.


4. (SBU) Papamija added that Uribe had also conveyed
willingness to assist Bolivia by providing credits and other
support, including a joint technical commission, to help its
producers become competitive; at the same time, he suggested
Bolivian soy was overpriced and should be lowered and seek
space in the Chinese market. Uribe reportedly also said that
Colombia was prepared to support any Bolivian initiative to
gain U.S. flexibility on this score, but that Bolivia would
need to take the lead because Colombia would not do so.
However, Uribe told reporters after the meeting with Morales
that Colombia would consider joining a high level delegation
to approach Washington for concessions, but in a strictly

LA PAZ 00000712 002 OF 002


supportive role.


5. (C) Papamija said that Uribe's visit was also intended to
expose Morales to regional political and economic
perspectives different from those of Venezuelan President
Hugo Chavez and Cuban dictator Fidel Castro. He noted that
President Morales and his advisors, particularly Vice Foreign
Minister for Economic affairs Maria Luisa Ramos, had behaved
more like union bosses during the meeting -- rudely demanding
concessions and accusing the Colombian President of bending
to U.S. pressures -- rather than as state representatives
disposed to negotiate in favor of Bolivia's national
interests.


6. (SBU) Immediately prior to Morales' March 14 joint press
conference with Uribe, Vice-President Alvaro Garcia Linera
called the Ambassador requesting an urgent meeting to discuss
the soy issue -- now set for March 16. (Comment: When he met
with the Secretary in Chile last week, Morales sounded the
note of a statesman focused on the economy, soliciting
flexibility on soy and an extension of the ATPDEA -- ref B.
In a March 15 media appearance, however, Morales vowed he
would never pursue a Free Trade Agreement but proposed a
"People's Trade Agreement" -- "Tratado Comercial Popular" --
with the U.S., explaining helpfully that the latter would
better protect the interests of Bolivia's small producers.
The technical definition of such an hypothetical agreement is
anyone's guess, but its political meaning -- to placate the
rabid anti-free-traders among the MAS's social sector bases
as the campaign season for the Constituent Assembly gets
underway -- is clear. End Comment.)

Action Request:
--------------

7. (SBU) In anticipation of the Ambassador's March 16
meeting with Morales, post requests the Department clarify
our willingness to show flexibility, if any, on soy in the
Colombian FTA and to offer guidance on what level a probable
Bolivian delegation should be received. In the meantime, the
Morales administration is on the defensive for supposedly
losing its most important agricultural market and knows, as
Vice President Garcia Linera told reporters, "We are in the
U.S.'s hands;" at least on this issue. We may have an
opening, however temporary, to press for quiet pragmatism on
matters central to our own interests, like counter-narcotics.

GREENLEE