Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06LAPAZ644
2006-03-09 21:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy La Paz
Cable title:  

MORALES TO FOCUS ON ECONOMIC ISSUES WITH SECRETARY

Tags:  PGOV PREL ECON EPET EINV ELAB PMAR BL 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4129
PP RUEHLMC
DE RUEHLP #0644/01 0682112
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 092112Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8367
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 5665
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 2935
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6808
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 4039
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1370
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 1278
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 3617
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 4008
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 8529
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LA PAZ 000644 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA A/S SHANNON AND PDAS SHAPIRO
STATE ALSO FOR WHA/AND
NSC FOR DFISK
USCINCSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EPET EINV ELAB PMAR BL
SUBJECT: MORALES TO FOCUS ON ECONOMIC ISSUES WITH SECRETARY
RICE

REF: A. LA PAZ 615

B. LA PAZ 584

Classified By: Ambassador David N. Greenlee for reasons 1.4d and b.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LA PAZ 000644

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA A/S SHANNON AND PDAS SHAPIRO
STATE ALSO FOR WHA/AND
NSC FOR DFISK
USCINCSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EPET EINV ELAB PMAR BL
SUBJECT: MORALES TO FOCUS ON ECONOMIC ISSUES WITH SECRETARY
RICE

REF: A. LA PAZ 615

B. LA PAZ 584

Classified By: Ambassador David N. Greenlee for reasons 1.4d and b.


1. (C) Summary: In a March 8 meeting, President Evo Morales
told the Ambassador he would raise Bolivia's threatened soy
markets, the extension of U.S. trade preferences and the
Millennium Challenge Account in his discussion with Secretary
Rice in Chile. The Ambassador said the Secretary would
likely reiterate U.S. priority interests in democracy and
counter-narcotics. Morales reaffirmed his commitment to
combating narcotics trafficking, but asserted that the
emphasis should be placed on interdiction. In response to
the Ambassador's query about bilateral friction, Morales
raised the military counter-terrorism unit (ref) and said he
had interpreted the Embassy's ending support for it as a
"decertification" of himself as President. The Ambassador
gave a detailed explanation of the CT unit and clarified the
concrete reasons for the Embassy's action. He also urged the
President to keep confidential matters like this and the visa
revocation of the MAS alternate Senator in their proper
channels, and speculated that Morales deliberately used such
issues with the U.S. to score political points at home.
After pointedly asking -- "Do you trust me?" -- Morales
petitioned the Ambassador to bring sensitive information
directly to him to ensure its appropriate handling, and said
he had felt "attacked" by U.S. actions. Separately, VP
Alvaro Garcia Linera confirmed that he had cancelled his
scheduled visit to Washington.


2. (C) Notwithstanding the rancorous public rhetoric, the
mood of the meeting was basically cordial and direct. This,
Morales' focus on Bolivia's commercial interests and his
non-mention of Bolivian efforts to extradite former President

Sanchez de Lozada ("Goni") suggest, in the best case, that
pragmatism may be gaining on ideology in the President's
sense of how to conduct the U.S. relationship. End Summary.



3. (SBU) The Ambassador met with President Morales in the
late afternoon of March 8 at the National Palace. (In the
President's somewhat spare office hung two co-equal portraits
made exclusively with coca leaves: one of Che Guevara, the
other of Morales.) The meeting, which we requested to
clarify Morales' plans with respect to his scheduled March 11
meeting with Secretary Rice in Santiago, lasted 90 minutes.
Vice-President Alvaro Garcia Linera and poloff (note-taker)
also participated.

Morales as Economic Minister
--------------

4. (C) President Morales expressed thanks for the meeting
with Secretary Rice, and said he would use the opportunity to
focus on Bolivia's commercial and economic interests. He
underscored the democratic gains represented by his election
and by the subsequent approval of the Constituent Assembly
legislation (ref B),but claimed these would be jeopardized
if Bolivia lost its access to key markets. He said he would
first raise Bolivia's soy markets, particularly in Colombia,
that were threatened by that country's accession to a free
trade agreement with the U.S. The possible immediate loss of
the Colombian market, Morales averred, had "hit me like a
bucket of cold water." Morales said Bolivia's producers
needed several years to adjust to the competition, and
entreated the Ambassador to help them secure a window of
continued protection. The second issue, he said, was the
government's desire for an extension of its trade preferences
in the U.S. market under the Andean Trade Preferences and
Drug Enforcement Act (ATPDEA),emphasizing the vulnerability
of Bolivia's key export sectors such as wood, textiles and

LA PAZ 00000644 002 OF 004


jewelry. Morales' final issue was the government's intention
to pursue a compact with the Millennium Challenge Corporation
(MCC). Morales noted the success of the U.S. "Alliance for
Progress" policy in the past, particularly in regard to
crucial road infrastructure projects, and hoped to pursue an
MCA agreement that would have a similar impact.


5. (C) The Ambassador said the Secretary would likely
reiterate the U.S.'s priority interests in defending Bolivian
democracy and in fighting narcotics trafficking, including
limiting coca production. In response to Morales' comments,
the Ambassador commented that FTA negotiations with Andean
countries -- Peru, Colombia and Ecuador -- had been underway
for some time and had concluded with the first two countries.
He acknowledged that the substance of these agreements would
be difficult to alter, particularly for the sole benefit of a
country -- Bolivia -- that had lacked the political consensus
to participate in the FTA negotiations. As for the extension
of preferential trade access to the U.S. market, he noted
that this would depend fundamentally on the U.S. Congress,
where anti-free trade agreement pressures were also strong,
and on Bolivia's decisions with respect to the important
second half of the ATPDEA agreement, specifically anti-drug
cooperation. Nevertheless, he promised to relay Morales'
intentions to the Secretary. The Ambassador welcomed the
President's interest in the MCA, noted that the previous
government's proposal was worth pursuing, but acknowledged
that some economic conditions were attached to Bolivia's
successful accession to an MCC compact.

Commitment to Fight Narco-Trafficking
--------------

6. (C) Morales reaffirmed his government's priority
commitment to fighting narcotics trafficking even while it
sought to "de-penalize" the coca leaf. He said he had made
progress in talks with Chapare-based cocaleros, would
ultimately succeed in limiting production there to 3,200
hectares, and would also begin negotiations to deal with the
separate challenge of the Yungas. The Ambassador reiterated
that the U.S. was not party to the Chapare "cato" accord,
agreed that the Yungas would be difficult and emphasized
that, while interdiction cooperation remained good,
eradication in the Chapare continued to be worryingly slow.
Morales said he and his technical team were prepared to
conduct a detailed discussion of the coca issue with Embassy
counterparts on his return from Chile.

Elements of Bilateral Friction
--------------

7. (C) In response to the Ambassador's open-ended query
about bilateral friction, Morales raised the ending of U.S.
support for the military's special counter-terrorism unit
(ref A). He fixed on the term "decertification" contained in
the Embassy's letter to armed forces commander General
Wilfredo Vargas, and said that because the unit responded
directly to the President he had interpreted this to mean the
U.S. was "decertifying" him as President. The Ambassador
acknowledged Morales' injured feelings, but believed they
were the product of a mistaken interpretation of the facts.
He then explained the background of the case, clarifying that
the term "decertification" related to USG internal criteria
and that the Embassy's formal letter was the culmination, not
the beginning, of a dialogue that had begun months ago.


8. (C) The Ambassador emphasized that we did not seek to
insert any individual into any particular government
position, but did reserve the right to refrain from working
with persons we knew to be untrustworthy, as we had done in
this case. He told Morales that the unit commander, LTC
"Rory" Rodriguez, had strayed from established CT doctrine by
targeting certain political figures ("including yourself")

LA PAZ 00000644 003 OF 004


during the campaign period. "This," the Ambassador
exclaimed, "particularly concerned us," and represented a
dangerous politicization of a unit that was supposed to be
narrowly and professionally focused on countering terrorism.



9. (C) Commenting on Morales' reported reluctance to return
the military equipment donated to the special unit, the
Ambassador relayed his discussion with Defense Minister
Walker earlier in the day, in which the Ambassador had
proposed the elements of a possible solution (septel). He
explained that this could entail placing the equipment in an
Embassy military group warehouse, possibly distributing it to
other Bolivian units in the future, while in the meantime
removing it from a unit led by a potentially rogue commander.
The Ambassador relayed to Morales the Defmin's view that
Bolivian sensitivy over the CT unit issue was connected to
the Chinese-manufactured MANPADS matter, and described the
Minister's apparent interest in completing the deal begun by
the previous government in the latter connection, including
receiving the USD 400K cash payment.


10. (C) The Ambassador emphasized that the U.S. had not paid
any money to anyone in the missile case, and in fact had not
received all the material promised by the previous
government. He added that we considered the matter closed,
but would be open to further discussions if this would help
resolve all concerns conclusively for the current government
and other involved parties. Morales said he would meet with
the Defense Minister Monday morning (March 13) to discuss
both the CT unit and the missiles. (Comment: The body
language of both Morales and Garcia Linera during the missile
discussion -- the former slouching down low on his chair and
skeptically narrowing his eyes, the latter shaking his head
outright -- suggested their extreme discomfort with the
issue, and the likelihood they will choose not to pursue this
kind of solution. End Comment.)


11. (C) The Ambassador urged the President that keeping
confidential matters in their proper channels would better

SIPDIS
facilitate their constructive resolution. For example, he
said, Morales' public attacks against the Embassy in
connection with the visa revocation of MAS alternate Senator
Leonilda Zurita had obscured the facts of the individual
case, which were confidential but not/not related to her
indigenous ethnicity or anti-American views, and had only
guaranteed the delay of a possible resolution. He also
explained that the revocation had occurred in 2004, well
before Morales' ascension as president, and that the Embassy
had regrettably not managed to notify Zurita at the time.
That said, the Ambassador speculated that Morales
deliberately used such sensitive issues connected with the
U.S., choosing to "air dirty laundry in public," in order to
score political points at home -- but at the risk of
undermining bilateral relations.

"Do You Trust Me?"
--------------


12. (C) In a bizarre, almost soul-baring moment of the
conversation, Morales pointedly asked the Ambassador: "Do you
trust me?" After receiving a politic "yes," Morales said "I
trust you." He then urged the Ambassador to contact him
directly with sensitive information, such as that relating to
the CT unit. He emphasized that the controversy in this case
might have been avoided had he been privy to the information
he had just received about it. The Ambassador said that in
the future we would bring matters with potential political
ramifications directly to the President's attention.


13. (C) Morales acknowledged he was still learning on the

LA PAZ 00000644 004 OF 004


job and that he had not entirely shed, as some observers had
suggested, the mindset of a union leader. He continued that
he had felt "attacked" by recent U.S. actions, including the
ending of support for the CT unit, the revocation of Zurita's
visa and the absence of U.S. official representation at last
month's "protocol greeting" ("saludo protocular") for foreign
diplomats. He also embarked on a circuitous and complicated
defense of Zurita, arguing she was completely innocent of the
charges against her and should not be disqualified for a
visa. The Ambassador commented that, while understandable,
Morales' feelings were rooted in a misinterpretation of the
facts, explaining that he had been out of the country on the
date of the protocol event and the Charge had not been
invited to replace him.

VP Cancels U.S. Trip
--------------

14. (SBU) At the close of the meeting, the Ambassador asked
VP Garcia Linera whether reports that he had cancelled his
planned trip to Washington because he had failed to secure a
meeting with Vice-President Cheney were true. Garcia
indicated this was in fact so, but then backtracked about the
reasons for his change of mind, saying he had too many things
to do in Bolivia and would welcome a formal invitation from
the USG before planning a future trip. The Ambassador
lamented the missed opportunity, but said we would look
forward to facilitating a visit in the future.

Comment:
--------------

15. (C) Notwithstanding the rancorous public rhetoric
surrounding the CT unit, visa refusals and other bilateral
issues, the mood of the meeting was essentially cordial. In
this fourth discussion involving the President and the
Ambassador, Morales' apparently growing trust facilitated the
exchange of unvarnished truths on controversial questions.
This, coupled with Morales' exclusive focus on Bolivia's
commercial interests as subjects he would raise with the
Secretary and his non-mention of Bolivian efforts to force

SIPDIS
the return for trial of former President Sanchez de Lozada
("Goni") -- the conversation's equivalent to the "dog that
didn't bark" -- suggest that pragmatism may be gaining on
ideology in the President's mind. It could also mean that
the schism between Bolivia's real interests, which are mainly
economic, and the government's political need to deploy
irresponsible public rhetoric, often targeting the U.S., may
grow wider with time.
GREENLEE