FIRESTORM OVER EMBASSY CUTTING SUPPORT FOR

S E C R E T LA PAZ 000615

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA A/S T.SHANNON AND PDAS C.SHAPIRO
STATE ALSO FOR WHA/AND P.FRENCH AND L.PETRONI
NSC FOR D.FISK
USCINCSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINS PARM BL
SUBJECT: FIRESTORM OVER EMBASSY CUTTING SUPPORT FOR
BOLIVIAN COUNTER-TERRORISM UNIT

REF: A. USDAO LA PAZ IIR ID 6808-9632-06


B. USDAO LA PAZ 6808-9748-06

C. USDAO LA PAZ 6808-9847-06

D. USDAO LA PAZ 6808-9846-06

E. USDAO LA PAZ 6808-9890-06

F. TD-314/62437-05

G. TD-314/62541-05

Classified By: Ambassador David N. Greenlee for reasons 1.4(d) and (b).


1. (C) Summary: In response to our ending support for a
specialized Bolivian military counter-terrorism (CT) unit,
President Evo Morales publicly blasted the U.S. for
interfering in Bolivia's internal affairs. The decision to
sever ties with the outfit was taken after the GOB appointed
as commander a military officer who had previously leaked
sensitive information to the press, among other
indiscretions, but the media have portrayed it as reflecting
a broader U.S. dissatisfaction with the new Bolivian
government's policies. The Ambassador met with journalists
March 7 to provide a detailed background briefing to clarify
the issue. Severing ties with the unit was the culmination
of a six month dialog with successive GOB's about our lack of
confidence in the CT team's leadership. The expected
political blowback, now a reality, may reflect both real and
manufactured outrage at U.S. "arrogance," but does not
undermine the fundamental prudence of our action. End
Summary.


2. (C) On March 3, we formally conveyed the decision to end
support for the Bolivian military's specialized
counter-terrorism unit: the Joint Counter-Terrorism Force
("Fuerza Contraterrorista Conjunta"). For the past three
years, the Embassy has backed the confidential Bolivian CT
force with training, equipment and other cooperation, such as
facilitating annual joint exercises with the counterpart CT
forces in the region. In the view of its U.S. military
colleagues, the Bolivian CT unit was highly disciplined,
competent and capable under its past leadership -- a genuine
professional elite within Bolivia's relatively
undistinguished armed forces.


3. (S) Despite the team's relative professionalism, however,
Embassy MilGroup liaison officers repeatedly expressed
discontent with the performance of its deputy commander,
Lieutenant Colonel Rory Rodriguez, beginning in September

2005. Rodriguez had a tendency to stray dangerously from
established U.S. tactical doctrine, was not respected by his
subordinates, and, perhaps most damningly, had leaked to the
press sensitive information in connection with the transfer
of Bolivia's Chinese-manufactured MANPADS to the U.S. (Refs F
and G). Milgroup and other Embassy officers repeatedly
underscored, both to the administrations of then-President
Rodriguez and of President Morales, the difficulty we would
have in maintaining support for the unit if LTC Rodriguez
remained in a leadership position.


4. (C) Our warnings aside, Rodriguez was appointed interim
commander in early December, toward the close of the
presidential elections, according to some reports, in
response to pressure from then front-running candidate
Morales as a reward for the lieutenant colonel's "heroic"
actions in the Chinese missile case. Embassy officers
protested the appointment to the outgoing government and
Rodriguez was removed from command. In early February 2006,
however, the new Morales administration reinstated Rodriguez.
In a March 3 letter to the head of Bolivia's armed forces,
BG Wilfredo Vargas, we noted our lack of confidence in the CT
unit's leadership and announced an immdiate end to our
support, including calling back Bolivian officers being
trained in the U.S. and requesting the return of U.S.
military equipment donated to the force.


5. (C) Formal Embassy communications on this matter were

conducted within the relevant (sensitive)
military-to-military channels, but once the information got
to the government it quickly broke out of those channels and
burst into public view. During a March 6 community
celebration in El Alto, President Morales, referring to the
confidential Embassy communication, took the opportunity to

SIPDIS
blast U.S. "interference" in Bolivia's internal affairs and
to denounce U.S. "blackmail." Copies of the Embassy letter
to the GOB were provided to the press, and showed up in
several March 7 morning newspapers. "The time when the
United States appoints Ministers and Commanders is over,"
Morales railed. Morales also noted that a lowly Colonel had
transmitted the message, and not the U.S. Ambassador,
insinuating that a dreadful breach of protocol had taken
place. According to March 7 news reports, Morales also said
Bolivia would refuse the Embassy's request to return the U.S.
military equipment used by the CT unit. In a March 7 written
response to the Embassy, Armed Forces Commander Vargas said
the formal U.S. communication needed to be made through the
proper "diplomatic" channels.


6. (C) Notwithstanding the real, somewhat narrow reasons
behind the Embassy's decision, it appears to have struck an
emotional nerve (or, alternatively, to serve the needs of
Bolivia's anti-American establishment) and, consequently, has
been blown significantly out of proportion by Bolivians
inside and outside of the government. The media have
portrayed it as reflecting a broader U.S. dissatisfaction
with the new Bolivian government's policies, and even as
intending to punish the Morales administration for
undetermined wrongs. In a March 7 background briefing with
two dozen journalists, the Ambassador clarified the facts,
placed the episode in its appropriate military-to-military
context, and hoped the situation could be rectified to
facilitate continued U.S.-Bolivian cooperation in the
important counterterrorism arena. He also drew attention to
the Bolivian government's persistently confusing signals with
respect to our broader bilateral relations.


7. (C) Comment: The March 3 letter was the culmination of
six months dialog with successvie GOB's about our lack of
confidence in the CT unit's commander. Political backlash
has been stiff, at least initially, and may reflect some real
anger on the part of President Morales, always quick to
perceive slights, but also mirrors broader anti-U.S.
sentiment among some of his closest advisors. At the same
time, appointing Rodriguez as commander against our
well-known objections politicized an otherwise well-trained,
lethal unit, and resurrected memories of a similar police
unit that went rogue in February 2003 with fatal results.
With Rodriguez in place, we are better off without it.
GREENLEE