Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06LAPAZ6
2006-01-03 16:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy La Paz
Cable title:  

INITIAL MEETING WITH EVO MORALES: BRASS TACKS

Tags:  PGOV PREL ECON EINV ENRG SOCI ELAB BL SIPDIS 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LA PAZ 000006 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA A/S SHANNON AND PDAS SHAPIRO
STATE ALSO FOR WHA/AND
NSC FOR DFISK
USCINCSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EINV ENRG SOCI ELAB BL SIPDIS
SUBJECT: INITIAL MEETING WITH EVO MORALES: BRASS TACKS

REF: A. LA PAZ 3807

B. LA PAZ 3803

Classified By: Ambassador David N. Greenlee for reasons 1.4d and b.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LA PAZ 000006

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA A/S SHANNON AND PDAS SHAPIRO
STATE ALSO FOR WHA/AND
NSC FOR DFISK
USCINCSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EINV ENRG SOCI ELAB BL SIPDIS
SUBJECT: INITIAL MEETING WITH EVO MORALES: BRASS TACKS

REF: A. LA PAZ 3807

B. LA PAZ 3803

Classified By: Ambassador David N. Greenlee for reasons 1.4d and b.


1. (C) Summary: In a January 2 "breaking the ice" meeting
with the Ambassador, President-elect Evo Morales claimed he
had not publicly maligned President Bush (at least not in the
post-election period) and expressed deep resentment about
being branded a "narco-terrorist" by U.S. officials. Morales
confirmed he was prepared to cooperate on counter-narcotics,
with the 3.2 thousand hectare set-aside in the Chapare
serving as the basis for future work (ref). The Ambassador
acknowledged the GOB-cocalero agreement as a continuing
reality, but clarified that we were not party to it. The
president-elect said he would change the existing
"neo-liberal" model because it had failed to help the poor,
but seek a strictly Bolivian (not a Cuban, Venezuelan or
American) solution to the country's economic challenges.
Throughout the discussion, Morales repeatedly stated that he
wanted to resolve disagreements, including with the U.S.,
through dialogue, and that eliminating corruption was his top
priority. The Ambassador reviewed the range of our
cooperation (which eclipses that of all other countries by
far),underscored our interest in maintaining a constructive
relationship, but emphasized that this would depend on the
words and actions of government leaders. VP-elect Alvaro
Garcia Linera affirmed the future government's commitment to
democracy and its desire for U.S. cooperation in creating a
better future for all Bolivians. This initial meeting
included some necessarily frank exchanges on thorny issues;
the president-elect came across as guarded and somewhat
defensive, but also as sincere and at ease in his role as
number one. End Summary.


2. (U) President-elect Evo Morales and VP-elect Alvaro

Garcia Linera came to the Ambassador's residence in the late
afternoon of January 2, at our invitation, for an initial
"breaking the ice" session that lasted just over one hour.
(In accordance with long-standing policy, U.S. diplomats had
not previously met with Morales.) Ambassador Greenlee, DCM
Robinson and acting Ecopol counselor Ludwig (note-taker)
represented the Embassy.

Congratulations, Please Clarify Your Comments
--------------

3. (C) The Ambassador began by congratulating Morales for
his electoral victory, and noted that the decisive result
gave the government at once a clear mandate and great
responsibility. He welcomed the opportunity to review issues
of shared concern with the future Bolivian president
(remarking that the term "indigenous President" was in our
view misleading and narrow),and also to turn the page on our
testy relations of the past. At the same time, the
Ambassador said, we were interested in receiving
clarifications regarding the president-elect's reported
verbal attacks against President Bush and the United States.
Morales thanked the Ambassador for the invitation, and joked
that he would travel the next day to visit "a friend of
yours" (i.e., Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. Note:
Morales is visiting Venezuela on January 3, before continuing
to Europe - ref B). The Ambassador replied that it then must
be a mutual friend.


4. (C) In response to the Ambassador's question, Morales
claimed he had never referred to President Bush as a
"terrorist" and was not even aware of having given an
interview with the Arab TV network Al Jazeera (at least not
after the December 18 elections),but, backtracking somewhat,
acknowledged that he might have made that kind of remark in
the heat of the campaign. Seeking to make light of the
situation, Morales said he had referred to Secretary Rice as
"Condolencia" partly because he wasn't sure how to pronounce
her name. The Ambassador retorted that Washington officials
were researching the veracity of the Al Jazeera quote and
that Morales' reported mocking references to U.S. officials
were seen as indicative of his political intentions, and had
been unhelpful thus far. He also suggested that Morales
practice pronouncing the Secretary's name correctly.

Morales: I'm No Narco-Terrorist!
--------------

5. (C) Morales, with a defensiveness bordering on vehemence,
responded that efforts by U.S. officials to brand him as a
narco-trafficker and narco-terrorist were totally inaccurate,
unjust and counterproductive. He was, he said, a committed
democrat who had competed in three successive national
elections and, in the most recent vote, had been chosen by a
clear majority of Bolivians to lead the country into the
future. That, he emphasized, is "why you have agreed to meet
with me." (Comment: Rightly or wrongly, Morales clearly
nurses a psychological wound rooted in what he views as the
patent unfairness of our past treatment of him. End Comment.)

Coca: Some Room to Work
--------------

6. (C) The Ambassador then turned to coca, and asked the
president-elect about the accuracy of reports we had read in
the press and received from his alleged collaborators that
the future government would be disposed to continued
cooperation on this important front (ref A). He noted that
U.S. assistance in this area had three intertwined facets -
eradication, interdiction and integral development - that
were difficult to separate from one another. Morales said
that his public declarations underlining his opposition to
cocaine production and narcotics trafficking were accurate
and true, and reiterated his commitment to cooperating with
us in countering them.


7. (C) He noted that, while his government would face
pressures from certain sectors, it would be able to work with
us on the basis of the existing agreement setting aside one
"cato" (actually, 3.2 thousand hectares, slightly less than
one cato) per family in the Chapare as an eradication free
zone, which had demonstrably eased tensions there. He also
claimed that cocalero syndicates in the Chapare were already
assisting in the eradication of coca in excess of that limit.
The Ambassador acknowledged the existence of the so-called
cato agreement - signed by the Mesa Government and cocaleros
- but reminded Morales that the U.S. was not a party to it
and that, while we admitted its apparent effectiveness in
practice of reducing anti-eradication violence, we did not
support the agreement in principle. In response to further
probing, Morales suggested that other counter-narcotics
cooperation, including with military support forces, could be
negotiated and go forward.

Change the Model
--------------

8. (C) The Ambassador asked about the MAS's government plan
and the concrete significance of its campaign pledge to
change the economic model, calling attention to the fact that
state-led planning had failed everywhere in the world it had
been tried. An impassioned Morales explained that
"neo-liberalism" had proved incapable of helping the
country's poor majority - who had only grown poorer since the
model was implemented - and needed to be replaced. He
emphasized, however, that his government would not borrow a
Cuban, Venezuelan, North-American or any other foreign
prescription to address economic challenges that were
Bolivian in origin and that therefore required strictly
home-grown solutions. In concrete terms, he continued, this
meant he would respect the foreign investment, private
property and juridical security that the Bolivian economy
needed to grow. He noted that he himself owned land and
would not want to lose it. At the same time, the government
would diversify its economic approach, including with
autonomous zones that respected the communitarian practices
of indigenous peoples where private property did not exist.


9. (C) Unprompted, Morales acknowledged that the future
government would "reclaim ownership" of Bolivia's
hydrocarbons resources, which he said had been exploited by
foreign interests at the people's expense under the old
system. The Ambassador responded that, while the U.S.
attached great importance to the respect for contractual
obligations and the need for legal certainty, other
governments such as those of Spain, France and Brazil had
greater commercial interests in the gas sector, and would
likely be raising these interests with his government in the
near future.

The Importance of Dialogue
--------------

10. (C) Throughout the discussion, Morales reiterated his
interest in resolving problems and disagreements through
dialogue (which he emphasized was an integral part of Aymara
culture) and his commitment to democracy. He said he had
long been willing to meet and speak with U.S. officials, and
that his presence in the Ambassador's residence clearly
showed his belief in talking things through. He claimed he
had demonstrated his commitment for negotiation over
confrontation, and that the violence in Bolivia's immediate
past had flowed either from the absence of dialogue or a lack
of good faith efforts during negotiations. In this
connection, Morales stated that the syndicates he led had an
unparalleled track record in keeping their promises and
meeting their side of the various bargains they had entered.
Similarly, he mentioned repeatedly that corruption had been a
major obstacle to Bolivia's development, and that eliminating
it would be a top government priority.

U.S. Cooperation
--------------

11. (C) The Ambassador next reviewed the range of U.S.
cooperation to clarify, he explained, apparent misconceptions
about the significance of our role in Bolivia. Using a
series of slides prepared by USAID-Bolivia, he showed that
U.S. bilateral contributions over the last four years dwarfed
those of other top donors - including Germany, Holland and
Japan - that tended to get the lion's share of the media
recognition. He also showed the crucial importance of U.S.
contributions to key international financial on which Bolivia
depended for assistance, such as the International
Development Bank (IDB),the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund. "When you think of the IDB, you should think
of the U.S.," the Ambassador said. "This is not blackmail,
it is simple reality." He also noted that the U.S. led
other creditors in having fully forgiven Bolivia's debt.


12. (C) The Ambassador underscored the U.S. Government's
interest in maintaining a constructive relationship with the
future government of Bolivia, but noted that the need for
respect and dignity (focal points in the MAS's campaign and
post-electoral rhetoric) was a two-way street. He emphasized
that countries acted, at bottom, according to their perceived
national interests, and hoped that we could continue working
together in pursuit of our shared interests. In this
connection, the Ambassador stated that this prospect would
depend on the words and actions of the Bolivian government.
"I hope you as the next president of Bolivia understand the
importance of this," he said, "because a parting of the ways
would not be good for the region, for Bolivia or for the
United States."

Garcia Linera: We Want to Work With You
--------------

13. (C) VP-elect Alvaro Garcia Linera closed the meeting by
reaffirming the commitment of the president-elect and the
future government to democracy and to the principle of open
dialogue ("as demonstrated today") on the full range of
issues. (Note: Morales said they cabinet members had not yet
been selected, but that in the interim Garcia Linera and
Felipe Caceres - on coca - could serve as our principal
interlocutors. End Note.) He further asked us for patience
- "give us six months before making any judgments" - and
stated his desire that the U.S. accompany the future
government in its efforts to create a more inclusive
democracy and a better future for Bolivians.

Frank Exchange with Number One
--------------

14. (C) This initial meeting, while cordial throughout,
included frank exchanges on a number of thorny and sensitive
issues. As such, it should lay a productive foundation for
more detailed future discussions on the broad menu of
bilateral issues. President-elect Morales projected an air
of caution and guardedness throughout, and on several
occasions baldly conveyed his resentment for the allegedly
false accusations by U.S. officials. During the Ambassador's
description of U.S. assistance to Bolivia, Morales' body
language - arms crossed, eyes darting from side to side -
suggested impatience and even exasperation. At the same
time, his expressed commitment to fight for the interests of
Bolivia's poor appeared to us personally sincere and
politically authentic. By his strong demeanor and lead role
throughout the discussion, Morales also appeared to put to
rest rumors that he is the junior partner in a political
dupla dominated by the more sophisticated and worldly Garcia
Linera. Whatever else he may be, in person Evo Morales
struck as a politician to be reckoned with -- and potentially
one with whom, in certain areas, we might be able to deal
effectively.
GREENLEE