Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06LAPAZ336
2006-02-09 21:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy La Paz
Cable title:  

SIGNS OF EVO'S AUTOCRATIC BENT

Tags:  ECON PGOV PREL ELAB BL 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6985
PP RUEHLMC
DE RUEHLP #0336/01 0402125
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 092125Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8010
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 5587
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 2852
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6724
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 3936
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1296
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 1195
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 3551
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 3934
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 8450
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LA PAZ 000336 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2016
TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL ELAB BL
SUBJECT: SIGNS OF EVO'S AUTOCRATIC BENT

REF: A. LA PAZ 240

B. LA PAX 229

Classified By: Amb. David N. Greenlee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LA PAZ 000336

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2016
TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL ELAB BL
SUBJECT: SIGNS OF EVO'S AUTOCRATIC BENT

REF: A. LA PAZ 240

B. LA PAX 229

Classified By: Amb. David N. Greenlee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: The MAS government has moved to control a
range of institutions, including nominally independent ones,
and many observers believe President Morales plans to use the
Constituent Assembly (CA) to consolidate this control. Other
worrying signs include the substantial halting of forced
eradication of illegal coca and reports of increasing
Venezuelan and Cuban activity in Bolivia. Morales' first two
weeks in office reveal an autocratic bent, and the early
invocation of phantom conspiracies, to consolidate power in
the face of internal opposition. End summary.

Consolidating Control
--------------

2. (C) In his first two weeks in office, President Morales
has moved to consolidate his control over a range of
institutions. The MAS's unprecedented victory on December 18
enabled it to take over the executive branch of government
wholesale, bypassing the traditional backroom bargaining with
other parties. To some analysts, Morales has gone further,
exerting a more direct "personal" control by appointing
ministers exclusively for their loyalty to him rather than
for their links to powerful constituencies or for their
technical expertise. Many observers also believe that
Morales has pushed for lower government salaries, including
in the judicial and legislative branches, in order to purge
MAS rivals from those institutions (see reftel). One
opposition congressman told us that his MAS colleagues would
receive "other" financial compensation to offset salary
reductions, while those from other parties would not. An
opposition senator also told us that the MAS steamrolled the
opposition and seized control of key congressional committees
in violation of internal regulations. Some in the
congressional opposition have told us their concern is
compounded by the fact that Morales won't take their calls.


3. (C) The MAS government has also moved to take over
autonomous social sector organizations. Contacts in the

Santa Cruz regional labor confederation (COD) told us
recently that a number of sitting regional labor leaders,
accused of favoring "Podemos" during the electoral campaign,
have been the object of a MAS-led smear campaign for
"representing the interests of the multinationals, not the
people" and targeted for purging from their posts. These
leaders were legitimately elected according to their
organization's internal statutes and are only several months
into what is supposed to be a two-year term. There have been
sketchier reports of similar (presumably) MAS-led pressures
in a broad range of organizations, including the original
Sole Confederation of Campesino Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB)
led by Morales rival Felipe Quispe.

Constituent Assembly
--------------

4. (C) Morales appears to be gearing up to use the
Constituent Assembly (CA) to secure MAS power for the long
term. On February 7, Morales presented to Congress the
executive's legislative proposal for the CA. The proposal
provides for three assembly representatives per legislative
district, two for the party of the top vote-getter and one
for the second place finisher (assuming no party wins an
outright majority). The potentially significant caveat is
that the "winner takes all" three seats if the first place
finisher wins by more than 50 percent. Analysts and social
sectors speculate that the government is banking on winning
an outright majority in the key western departments (La Paz,
Oruro, Potosi, Cochabamba and Chuquisaca),and thereby
gaining absolute representation in the CA for those areas,
while also grabbing representation from the remaining
departments. Should this happen, the government would have
far more than the two-thirds majority needed to control the
process and to "refound" Bolivia as it sees fit, while the
minority would have virtually no representation or influence

LA PAZ 00000336 002 OF 003


at all.


5. (C) Some observers believe that Morales abandoned his
previous proposal, which included a set number of
representatives for "indigenous" groups, because the MAS's
unexpectedly decisive victory on December 18 led him to
believe he would be better off with a strict "one person -
one vote" approach. Still, a 2/3 majority of the combined
congress is needed to pass the CA proposal into law, and the
MAS falls short of that number by 21 representatives. Aware
of this, Morales has threatened that "if congress doesn't
pass his law, the social sectors will." Morales has also
indicated he wants his bill passed "as is," but many
congressional insiders believe that that won't be easy.
According to several opposition legislators, non-MAS
representatives will push for a law that better reflects the
interests of Bolivia's political minority, and none are
likely to vote to give the MAS a "blank check." Civic
committees of the "media luna" (Santa Cruz, Tarija, Beni and
Pando) have already publicly rejected the Morales proposal.
This early balking at the executive's proposal will lead to
an inevitable give and take, and probably include the
consideration of other CA proposals as well. Labor leaders
in Cochabamba for example, told us they didn't support the
MAS proposal because it would exclude the very people the
government purports to represent. Several indigenous leaders
and former MAS (dissident) deputies told us Morales aimed to
control the selection of assembly representatives outright.
Congressional debate is scheduled to begin on February 10 and
is likely to last at least one month. The election of
representatives is slated for July 2, and the GOB plans to
convene the CA on August 6.

Eradication Halted
--------------

6. (C) Another disturbing trend is the suspension since
January 24 of most forced eradication of illegal coca (ref
B). While the new Minister of Government Alicia Munoz and
her Vice-Minister Felipe Caceres (septel) have affirmed the
GOB's commitment to our three-pronged approach --
interdiction, eradication and alternative development --
substantive eradication has only partially resumed. We
received reports that a small amount of eradication occurred
February 9, but faced considerable community resistance.
President Morales is scheduled to meet with the Chapare
cocalero federations this weekend (February 11-12),
reportedly to formalize the "cato" agreement and to reach
consensus on the resumption of eradication of coca exceeding
that one cato per family limit. Several Embassy contacts
worried that if the current policy confusion continues
unresolved, the Chapare could soon become a "no man's land."


Venezuela and Cuba
--------------

7. (C) Additionally, there are reports of increasing
Venezuelan and Cuban activity in Bolivia. Embassy contacts
have noted the continued presence of Venezuelan security
forces in and around the presidential palace and in the
Ministry of Defense. Venezuelan TV station "Telesur" has a
dedicated channel on Bolivian television, and Telesur
reporters are now an integral part of Bolivia's media swarm.
Venezuelan state oil company (PDVSA) officials are becoming
increasingly involved in Bolivian oil matters, with a PDVSA
office recently opened in downtown La Paz. Under the
umbrella of disaster relief, Cuba sent a team of close to 150
"doctors" to help Bolivians in need, particularly in rural
areas, and promised that there were more where those came
from. Cochabamba Prefect Manfred Reyes Villa told us that
the MAS offered his department Cuban teachers and doctors,
but that he had declined the offer.


8. (C) Comment: President Morales' first two weeks in office
appear to reveal a more autocratic bent, or at least a plan
to consolidate power before the early momentum slips away.
To this end, the MAS government is focusing on the
Constituent Assembly, to the apparent exclusion of other

LA PAZ 00000336 003 OF 003


priorities such as changing the neoliberal economic model,
reforming Law 1008 (Bolivia's centerpiece anti-drug law) or
redesigning the mining code. Many observers believe this is
because the MAS government believes it will have free reign
on these and other issues once it has the CA in the bag. In
seeking to clear the ground toward its kind of assembly,
Morales has threatened to mobilize social sectors to pressure
the congress. More recently, the president and
vice-president have upped the ante, publicly raising the
specter of a conspiracy by "transnational companies" to
destabilize the government. Most observers see this as a
phantom outside threat, used by the government (somewhat
sooner than most had expected it would) as a political tool
to rally its forces and to forge national unity in the face
of the inevitable internal opposition. These are not good
signs. On the other hand, Morales, beset by a disruptive
airline strike, disastrous nation-wide floods, and discontent
over unmet campaign pledges, is beginning to find governance
an increasingly hard slog.
GREENLEE