Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06LAPAZ3314
2006-12-07 19:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy La Paz
Cable title:  

MORALES: A POTENT FORCE DESPITE SHRINKING SUPPORT

Tags:  PGOV PREL ECON BL 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 003314 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON BL
SUBJECT: MORALES: A POTENT FORCE DESPITE SHRINKING SUPPORT

REF: A. LA PAZ 3204


B. LA PAZ 3131

C. LA PAZ 3191

D. LA PAZ 3000

E. LA PAZ 3061

F. LA PAZ 3063

G. LA PAZ 3301

Classified By: Ecopol Counselor Andrew Erickson for reason 1.4 (d).

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 003314

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON BL
SUBJECT: MORALES: A POTENT FORCE DESPITE SHRINKING SUPPORT

REF: A. LA PAZ 3204


B. LA PAZ 3131

C. LA PAZ 3191

D. LA PAZ 3000

E. LA PAZ 3061

F. LA PAZ 3063

G. LA PAZ 3301

Classified By: Ecopol Counselor Andrew Erickson for reason 1.4 (d).

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) While President Morales' popularity has dropped from a
May high of 81 percent, his current 67 percent approval
demonstrates he remains a potent force. To maintain his
standing, Morales has engaged in a propaganda strategy of ads
espousing his accomplishments, rhetorical attacks aimed at
undermining the mainstream press, and the creation of
state-sponsored media outlets to broadcast his party's
ideology. Hydrocarbons nationalization remains hugely
popular and a new school subsidy program which the GOB claims
is a result of nationalization also enjoys widespread
approval. Capitalizing on the opposition's mistakes, Morales
and the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) moved the
Constituent Assembly forward and passed key land reform laws,
and while doing so may have captured full control of the
legislature (reftel A). Morales is also astutely aware of
the racial complexities of Bolivian society and is not afraid
to play the "race card" to his political advantage. At the
MAS' November conference, Morales showed that he remains in
control of the party, but pressure is mounting from all
sides. Bolivia's prefects are trying to exert themselves
(reftel B) and civic groups are promoting civil disobedience
(reftel C). If he wants to stay on top, Morales will need
all the political weapons in his arsenal -- propaganda, high
profile announcements, the mobilization of social groups, and
large state coffers. End Summary.

--------------
The Poll Numbers
--------------


2. (U) While President Morales' popularity has dropped from a
May high of 81 percent, his 67 percent approval per a
November 20 Apoyo Opinion poll shows he is still a potent
force. A separate November 1 poll showed 84 percent of
Bolivians approve of gas nationalization and 60 percent feel
the economy is growing. Both polls were conducted after the

signing of new hydrocarbons contracts but before the signing
of the new land reform law (reftel A).

-------------- --------------
The Propaganda War - Bolivia is Changing, Evo Delivers
-------------- --------------


3. (SBU) To maintain his standing, Morales has engaged in a
propaganda strategy of ads espousing his accomplishments,
rhetorical attacks aimed at undermining the mainstream press,
and the creation of state-sponsored media outlets to
broadcast his party's ideology. The ads that he has delivered
low inflation, record-high foreign reserves, an unprecedented
budget surplus and a projected 4.5 percent economic growth
rate. They each bear the tag line "Bolivia is Changing, Evo
Delivers." The president of the association of journalists
told poloff that the strategy to undermine the mainstream
press is working and that public confidence in the press has
declined dramatically. MAS militants are increasingly
hostile to journalists. On November 27 they assaulted five
journalists in Cochabamba; there is no evidence of GOB
involvement in the attacks. To better disseminate its
message the GOB announced it will create, with Venezuelan
funding, a 30 station "communitarian" radio and TV network.
The network's role is clear Morales has declared that the GOB
will arm itself. Later he announced that state-run networks
would soon air a show similar to Hugo Chavez's "Alo,
Presidente," (reftel D).

--------------
Nationalization = Subsidies = Money to Spend
--------------


4. (U) Hydrocarbons nationalization remains hugely popular
and a new school subsidy program which the GOB claims is a
result of nationalization also enjoys widespread approval.
The October 28 signing of new hydrocarbons contracts buoyed
Morales' base and temporarily hushed his critics. Two days
prior, the GOB announced the primary school subsidy program.
The subsidy, intended for children to buy educational
supplies, can be used to purchase anything. The program
should reach close to 1.2 million children with each
receiving about 25 USD, which equals a month's salary for 40
percent of the population.

-------------- --------------
The Constituent Assembly (CA) -- Mobilizing the Masses
-------------- --------------


5. (C) The prevailing wisdom prior to November was that the
CA was losing credibility as evidenced by the drop in its
approval rating from 69 percent in August to 46 percent in
October. However, the CA's approval rebounded to 58 percent
in November per the latest Apoyo Opinion poll. The increase
appears related to the MAS' securing a simple majority vote
for constitutional changes on November 17 (reftel E). To
influence the CA and other institutions Morales can mobilize
large groups (at times mobs) to push his agenda. In Sucre,
marches have served to intimidate opponents and pressure MAS
moderates to hold the party's line.

--------------
Land Reform
--------------


6. (SBU) Capitalizing on the opposition's mistakes, Morales
and the MAS managed to get the senate to pass key land reform
laws. In doing, the MAS appears to have captured full
control of the Congress (reftel A). Using a favorite tactic,
Morales urged indigenous groups to march to La Paz in favor
of land reform. The marchers and the MAS succeeded in
pressuring three opposition members to cross party lines to
pass the legislation. Land reform could end up being more
popular than nationalization because Morales will be able to
provide land directly to his supporters.

--------------
Playing the Race Card
--------------


7. (C) Morales is astutely aware of the racial complexities
of Bolivian society and is not afraid to play the "race card"
for political advantage. A 2006 UNIR Foundation poll
revealed that 66 percent of Bolivians identify themselves as
indigenous; over 50 percent view racism as an issue. After
the December 2005 election hope emerged that the new GOB
would reduce racial tension. But Potosi Mayor Rene Joaquino
has argued that racism under the current GOB has worsened.
Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca's inflammatory racist
comments aimed at La Paz's upper and middle class, (mostly of
European descent),have likely alienated both groups.
Minister of Education Felix Patzi agreed that some GOB
statements contain "elements of discrimination," but excused
them as a byproduct of Bolivia's history.

-------------- --------------
Firmly in Charge of MAS -- GOB Jobs Remain a Carrot to Base
-------------- --------------


8. (C) At his party's November conference, Morales
demonstrated that he remains in control of the MAS. The
party re-elected him president as he choreographed the
expulsion of "disloyal members" (reftel F). Meanwhile, he
resisted one of the rank and files' thorniest demands, the
desire for more GOB jobs. A recently retired MFA employee
confirmed that the MAS continues to send people to Cuba and
Venezuela for government training, indicating that GOB
positions will eventually be filled by MAS acolytes.

--------------
Comment
--------------


9. (C) Given Bolivia's social tensions, Morales' 67 percent
approval rating is impressive. Morales "delivery" of
nationalization and land reform, his attacks on the media,
his exploitation of racial divisions and his providing of
subsidies to the general public have contributed to his
continued support. Morales also enjoys greater power now
that the MAS controls both the CA and may control the
Congress. The opposition is showing signs of fighting back,
holding a separate senate session on December 6 (Note: The
"opposition senate" passed three resolutions supporting a
two-thirds voting mechanism for the CA, a resolution to
censure Minister of Government Alicia Munoz for the December
5 incident reported in reftel G, and a petition to be
delivered to the Summit of South American Nations. End
Note). Pressure is mounting from all sides. Bolivia's
prefects are trying to exert themselves and civic groups are
promoting civil disobedience. Following his pattern of
announcing major populist "reforms" when his approval ratings
start to sag -- such as hydrocarbons nationalization in May
or the school subsidy program -- Morales will likely unveil
mining nationalization upon the next drop in his popularity.
Coca-farmers, leftists and other backers can be expected to
continue to plead for the GOB to "deliver" on the dividends
of nationalization. Morales' political savvy has been
evident in his first ten months. But if he wants to stay on
top, he will need all the political weapons in his arsenal --
propaganda, high profile announcements, the mobilization of
social groups, and large state coffers. End Comment.
URS