Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06LAPAZ2992
2006-11-03 18:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy La Paz
Cable title:  

MORALES' SHRINKING CIRCLE OF SUPPORT?

Tags:  ECON PGOV PREL BL 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LA PAZ 002992 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2016
TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL BL
SUBJECT: MORALES' SHRINKING CIRCLE OF SUPPORT?

REF: A. LA PAZ 2637

B. LA PAZ 2798

C. LA PAZ 2860

D. LA PAZ 2618

E. LA PAZ 2743

F. LA PAZ 2943

Classified By: Ecopol Counselor Andrew Erickson for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LA PAZ 002992

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2016
TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL BL
SUBJECT: MORALES' SHRINKING CIRCLE OF SUPPORT?

REF: A. LA PAZ 2637

B. LA PAZ 2798

C. LA PAZ 2860

D. LA PAZ 2618

E. LA PAZ 2743

F. LA PAZ 2943

Classified By: Ecopol Counselor Andrew Erickson for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) Summary: Evo Morales rode a wave of popularity to the
Bolivian presidency, winning the December 2005 elections by
the largest margin in Bolivia's democratic history.
Throughout that campaign, and to a lesser extent during the
July Constituent Assembly elections, his support base
consisted of coca growers, social sectors, the indigenous,
and the middle class. After eight months in office, Morales
has alienated many of his supporters by failing to respond to
their specific demands. His attempts to win them back have
further estranged him from moderates who saw him as a welcome
change from Bolivian politics-as-usual. Finally, his
deepening ties with Venezuela seem to further undermine his
popularity due to the perception of Venezuelan interference
in Bolivia's internal affairs. Morales seems to recognize
his support base is narrowing, and is attempting to
revitalize his popularity, as evidenced by his recognition of
the importance of meeting the deadline for signing new
hydrocarbons contracts. However, it remains unclear whether
he can satisfy his supporters' competing demands in the long
term. End summary.

-------------- -
SLOWLY LOSING SUPPORT AMONG TRADITIONAL ALLIES
-------------- -


2. (C) Evo Morales rode a wave of popularity to the Bolivian
presidency, winning the December 2005 elections by the
largest margin in Bolivia's democratic history. Initially
the driving force for Morales' 2005 presidential electoral
victory, his traditional base of support that consists of
coca growers, social sector members, indigenous
organizations, and labor unions (miners, teachers,
transportation and other national and regional labor groups)
are increasingly pressing Morales to make good on his
campaign promises.


3. (C) This rising public pressure is beginning to take its
toll on the GOB, is straining its ability to respond, and is

delivering crises that weigh heavily against the GOB's
initially high public support and its capability to govern.
Eight months into office, Morales has failed to respond
effectively to many of his core constituencies' specific
demands, leading to a recent storm of public protests,
conflicts and criticisms of the GOB, including the following:

-- On September 29, 50 to 60 GOB security force members
attempted to enter Carrasco National park in Cochabamba to
eradicate coca when armed cocaleros attacked them (reftel A).
Two cocaleros died in the ensuing melee. (They may have
been the victims of friendly fire.) Despite attempts to spin
the conflict to maintain the loyalty of his cocalero base,
the confrontation revealed the natural tension that exists
between Morales' efforts to meet coca reduction targets and
his ties to the country's major coca federation. Morales
publicly accused the Carrasco group of being
narco-traffickers, to which one replied "who is (Morales) to
be accusing us of being narco-traffickers!"

-- October 4-5 clashes between cooperative miners and
salaried employees in Huanuni, in the department of Oruro,
resulted in 16 deaths, numerous injuries, and substantial
property damage caused by demonstrators' extensive use of

LA PAZ 00002992 002 OF 003


dynamite (reftels B and C). Although the GOB and miners
signed an agreement October 23 to end a two-week standoff,
the National Federation of Cooperative Miners (Fencomin)
formally withdrew its support of the GOB in response to the
government's mishandling of the situation. Members of the
Central Workers Union (COB) also marched against the
government October 10 to demand nationalization of all
natural resources, including mineral deposits. Huanuni
remains a source of lingering tensions, leaving the GOB
without a major ally and having alienated a highly
politicized sector: miners. (Both cooperative and salaried
miners strongly supported Morales during his presidential run
in December 2005).

-- The Assembly of Guarani Peoples (AGP) paralyzed traffic
and cut off major routes leading into Argentina and Paraguay
October 23 to demand land titles, protest that their rights
be formally incorporated into Bolivian law, and press for the
establishment of a Guarani development fund to be created
with hydrocarbons revenues. AGP leaders have threaten to
expand their protests if the GOB fails to respond.

-- Growing lines outside Bolivia's Department of Migration
are a concrete demonstration of pressure on the GOB to issue
passports to Bolivians seeking to leave the country. GOB
mismanagement has turned a fact of life into a political
issue, as a passport shortage announced October 25 is stoking
discontent among citizens unable to find jobs within the
country.

-- Political groups traditionally aligned with the MAS
publicly demanded October 23 that President Morales fulfill
his campaign promise to increase the presence of indigenous
workers in the GOB. With government ministries already
creaking from lack of capacity, the prospect of trained civil
servants being replaced wholesale by political novices
threatens to further exacerbate the governance problems that
have already paralyzed the national bureaucratic apparatus.

-- Trade unions blockaded a major traffic tunnel in downtown
La Paz October 23. Union members accused President Morales
of preferential treatment toward businesses affiliated with
the MAS political party.

-- Ebbing and flowing social sector protests regarding the
Constituent Assembly further demonstrate frustration with the
GOB. While Morales was successful in declaring the Assembly
"plenipotentiary," the Assembly has little to show after
almost three months, causing many to begin to lose faith in
the process.

-- Labor union members have been calling for the resignation
of Minister of Education Felix Patzi and Minister of Water
Abel Mamani for several months. Morales has stated that he
will not make any immediate changes in his cabinet, but
protests continue.

--------------
PUSH AND PULL
--------------


4. (C) Morales' attempts to win back his core supporters have
further estranged him from moderates who saw him as a welcome
change from Bolivian politics-as-usual. His anti-U.S.
rhetoric (again recently toned down since the Ambassador's
arrival),his accusations that the opposition has attempted
to assassinate him, and his fervent talk about Bolivia's
indigenous revolution has many moderate or middle class
voters concerned. His frequent statements about legalizing
coca and finding alternative markets satisfy his cocalero
base, but raise eyebrows among Bolivia's elite. Likewise,
while the indigenous applaud Morales' promised land reform,

LA PAZ 00002992 003 OF 003


the eastern half of Bolivia, where large, agricultural
landholdings are concentrated, continue to be worried about
losing their property.


5. (U) There is more than anecdote to all of this. The most
reliable poll numbers we have seen tell a similar story. In
May, following Morales' hydrocarbons nationalization decree,
his popularity was at a high of 81 percent. Since then,
Morales' popularity has been falling for five straight months
to a new low of 50 percent (according to an October 8-16 Mori
poll of Bolivia's five largest cities). In Santa Cruz, 74
percent of citizens do not approve of the Morales government,
but he maintains approval ratings of 62 percent in La Paz and
86 percent in El Alto. (Note: Morales' rating seem sure to
rise after the GOB's successful October renegotiation of
hydrocarbons contracts with ten international exploration and
production companies. End note).

--------------
VENEZUELAN INFLUENCE
--------------


6. (C) Additionally, Hugo Chavez' increasingly stifling
embrace of Morales and his leadership are undermining
Morales' popularity due to a growing perception of Venezuelan
interference in Bolivia's internal affairs. Venezuelan
assistance has grown significantly since Morales took office
in the form of financial, security/military, and trade
support (reftel D). But in the view of some Bolivians, this
aid comes with political strings attached. Rumor has it that
Morales speaks to Venezuelan President Chavez daily, and the
Venezuelan ambassador (like his Cuban counterpart) regularly
attends events at Morales' side. Recent rhetoric and
Venezuelan-Bolivian military cooperation are receiving
increasing negative press, and most opposition and upper
class Bolivians believe that Morales has crossed a line. The
middle class are wavering, and wondering.

-------------- --
COMMENT: HAS MORALES LOST THAT LOVIN' FEELING?
-------------- --


7. (C) Morales seems to recognize that his support base is
narrowing. In a mid-October speech in La Paz (reftel E),he
attempted to reach out to the moderate middle class, when
along with the Cuban ambassador, he led the crowd in a
less-than-rousing cheer of "long live the middle class" (in
Aymara). More recently, he recognized the importance of
meeting the deadline for signing new hydrocarbons contracts
to breathe life back into his administration (reftel F).
Renewing his relationship with moderates and the middle
class, however, is a long-term project which risks further
alienating his more radical supporters who are protesting his
failure to address their demands. In the short term,
Morales' success in signing new hydrocarbons contracts
(reftels) may have won him the renewed affection of all
Bolivians. But as we saw in May, his nationalization of
hydrocarbons bought him only a few months of social peace.
The bigger question will be whether he can satisfy his
supporters' competing demands in the long term. In the end,
the president's greatest appeal to the middle class -- the
prospect of social peace -- may be in the end just as elusive
as his appeal to his radical core -- the prospect of social
justice. End comment.
GOLDBERG