Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06LAPAZ2657
2006-10-02 20:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy La Paz
Cable title:  

MORALES: WALKING A FINE LINE ON DRUGS

Tags:  SNAR PGOV PREL BL 
pdf how-to read a cable
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PP RUEHLMC
DE RUEHLP #2657/01 2752018
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 022018Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0756
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 6148
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 3464
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 7322
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 4584
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1841
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 1881
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 4051
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 4477
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 9051
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LA PAZ 002657 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2016
TAGS: SNAR PGOV PREL BL
SUBJECT: MORALES: WALKING A FINE LINE ON DRUGS

REF: A. LA PAZ 2637

B. LA PAZ 2647

Classified By: Amb. Philip S. Goldberg for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LA PAZ 002657

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2016
TAGS: SNAR PGOV PREL BL
SUBJECT: MORALES: WALKING A FINE LINE ON DRUGS

REF: A. LA PAZ 2637

B. LA PAZ 2647

Classified By: Amb. Philip S. Goldberg for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Following the September 29 death of two
civilians who ambushed a GOB eradication operation in
Carrasco National Park in Cochabamba, the Embassy's NAS
section will begin supporting GOB eradication efforts in the
park at the GOB's request. President Morales started
spinning the conflict October 2, publicly declaring that the
two civilians killed "are not cocaleros but narcotraffickers"
in an effort to maintain the loyalty of his cocalero base.
Regardless of how the GOB moves forward, this is likely a
lose-lose situation for it, given Bolivians' predisposition
toward blaming their government for civilian deaths. While
Morales attempts to walk the political highwire, our role is
to provide assistance to achieve US goals while keeping the
GOB out in front. This event demonstrates that enforcing
anti-drug laws can require tough decisions that go beyond
Morales' simplistic rhetoric about coca being harmless. End
summary.


2. (C) Following the September 29 death of two civilians who
ambushed a GOB eradication operation in Carrasco National
Park in Cochabamba, the Embassy's NAS section will begin
supporting GOB eradication efforts in the park at the GOB's
request. Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera expressed
gratitude for the Embassy's September 29 offer to assist,
stating that President Morales had decided to begin a serious
eradication campaign in the park and would need U.S. backing.
At Garcia Linera's suggestion, the DCM met September 30 with
Defense Minister Walker San Miguel to coordinate Embassy
logistical support for the GOB campaign. Based on that
meeting, NAS-owned C-130s and helicopters will begin
transporting Bolivian eradicators and troops October 2. San
Miguel told the DCM that this crisis has created an
opportunity for improved mil-mil relations. We are taking
careful measures to provide only logistical support, and to
encourage the GOB to respect human rights throughout the
planned operations.


3. (C) President Morales started spinning the conflict
October 2, publicly declaring that the two civilians killed
"are not cocaleros but narcotraffickers" in an effort to
maintain the loyalty of his cocalero base. (Note: In fact,
the civilians did not belong to the Six Federations of
Cocaleros of the Chapare, and therefore were not part of
Morales' core political support. End note). Cocaleros in
Carrasco National Park have defiantly challenged the GOB,
saying that they will defend their coca "with blood." While
Morales manages the public side of the conflict, the GOB is
investigating the deaths to confirm that GOB forces did not
commit human rights abuses. (Ironically, forensic experts
have determined that at least one of the injured was a victim
of cocaleros' friendly fire).


4. (C) Comment: Regardless of how the GOB moves forward, this
is likely a lose-lose situation for it given Bolivians'
predisposition toward blaming their government for civilian
deaths, as in October 2003. If the GOB takes a hard line and
begins eradicating Carrasco National Park in earnest, the
backlash from Morales' core political base could be strong.
Morales went to the Chapare October 2 to meet with his base,
and we will provide a read-out of that meeting septel. If the
GOB instead attempts to finesse this conflict and fails, it
will become vulnerable to further conflicts which it will
also likely lose. The final option -- negotiating a deal
which neither comes down too hard nor caves to cocalero
demands -- is a fine line that may be impossible to walk,
particularly since keeping the Constituent Assembly on track
requires the GOB's full attention.


5. (C) Comment continued: While Morales attempts to walk the
political highwire, our role is to provide assistance to
achieve US goals while keeping the GOB out in front. In a
rare move, the GOB has asked for Embassy logistical

LA PAZ 00002657 002 OF 002


assistance to move military units to begin the forceful
eradication of coca. We'll try to use opportunities that
present themselves to help the GOB get back onto the right
track on counternarcotics, including in signing a new LOA on
future cooperation, and will hold out hope that the goodwill
stemming from our assistance may create an opening for
increased dialogue on broader issues, including democracy and
mil-mil relations. In any case, this event demonstrates that
enforcing anti-drug laws can require tough decisions that go
beyond Morales' simplistic rhetoric about coca being
harmless. End comment.
GOLDBERG