SCENESETTER FOR VP GARCIA LINERA VISIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LA PAZ 001952

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/AND P.FRENCH AND L.PETRONI
MCC FOR A.KRISCHENBAUM
NSC FOR D.FISK
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2016
TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL MCC BL
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VP GARCIA LINERA VISIT


Classified By: Amb. David N. Greenlee for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Bolivian Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera
will arrive in Washington late July 19 to push for an
extension of ATPDEA benefits. In its first six months in
office, the Morales administration has maintained popularity
ratings of 70 to 80 percent by nationalizing hydrocarbons,
announcing land reforms, and unveiling an economic plan to
improve conditions for Bolivia's poor. Despite its
successes, the administration has been hampered by
inexperience, which, along with increased Venezuelan and
Cuban influence, has translated into mixed signals about GOB
plans and intentions. Frank dialogue has been the hallmark
of the U.S.-Bolivia bilateral relationship, buoyed at times
by limited cooperation but damaged at others by anti-U.S.
rhetoric. Since July 2, the GOB appears to be reaching out
to the United States anew, but its end game remains unclear.
End summary.


2. (C) Bolivian Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera will
arrive in Washington late July 19 to push for an extension of
Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA)
benefits. He and his delegation (Bolivian MCC representative
Javier Hurtado, two members of Congress, and several private
business representatives) will meet executive and legislative
branch representatives July 20-21. Despite Embassy warnings
to the contrary, many GOB officials have publicly stated that
they are confident they will obtain an ATPDEA extension.
Beginning the weekend of July 15-16, GOB officials began
attempts to lower those expectations.


3. (C) In its first six months in office, the Morales
administration has maintained popularity ratings of 70 to 80
percent by nationalizing hydrocarbons, announcing land
reforms, and unveiling an economic plan to improve conditions
for Bolivia,s poor. On August 6, the Morales government
will deliver on its biggest promise: a Constituent Assembly
charged with "refounding" Bolivia. While Morales' Movement
Toward Socialism (MAS) party is currently squabbling over who
will preside over the Assembly, the MAS will enter it with a
secure position. It will control a majority of Assembly
delegates, and it is working to pick off opposition party
delegates in an attempt to reach the two-thirds necessary to
control the Assembly's outcome.


4. (C) Despite its successes, the Morales administration has
been hampered by inexperience, which, along with increased
Venezuelan and Cuban influence, has translated into mixed
signals about GOB plans and intentions. The GOB continues to
suffer from intra-governmental miscommunication, the most
recent example being Minister of Education Felix Patzi's
triumphant declarations about the outcome of the July 10-14
education congress, which was later criticized by Minister of
the Presidency Juan de la Quintana as too one-sided (septel).
The GOB has issued conflicting public and private statements
on the nationalization of natural resources (whether mining
would be affected),counternarcotics policy (mostly on
eradication),its intent to sign a free trade agreement with
the United States (ranging from rejecting the possibility
outright to suggesting an agreement under another name),and
military relations (regarding the return of U.S.
counter-terrorism equipment). While Morales speaks publicly
about making democracy more inclusive for Bolivia's
indigenous (and seems to believe he is effecting positive
change),he has also attempted to undermine democratic
institutions by criticizing the courts, the media, and the
opposition for "working against" his government and initiated
legal action against political opposition and several former
presidents, including Gonzalo "Goni" Sanchez de Lozada.
Morales bills the upcoming Constituent Assembly as the
vehicle for democratic change, but many worry that he will
use it to consolidate power much like Venezuelan President

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Hugo Chavez.


5. (C) Frank and open dialogue has been the hallmark of the
U.S.-Bolivia bilateral relationship. Since January,
relations have been buoyed at times by limited GOB
cooperation but damaged at others by anti-U.S. rhetoric. The
Morales government has cooperated with the Embassy on drug
interdiction but is significantly behind on eradication
efforts. Mil-to-mil cooperation has decreased significantly.
U.S. assistance via USAID continues at previous levels, but
the focus of assistance has shifted from the central
government to Bolivia's prefects and other decentralized
players. Overall, the GOB has used the bilateral relationship
for its own political gain, since criticizing the USG and
defending Bolivia against "the northern empire" generated
support among many indigenous and rural voters in the run-up
to the July 2 Constituent Assembly elections.


6. (C) Comment: Since the elections, the GOB appears to be
reaching out to the United States anew, but its end game
remains unclear. Recent positive overtures include the vice
president's attendance at the Embassy's July 4 reception, the
defense minister's request for additional U.S. assistance,
and close collaboration on Garcia Linera's trip to
Washington. While perhaps an optimistic view, continued
offers of U.S. support and assistance, extended in the
context of stark Washington reality and with clearly
delineated USG expectations, might keep the GOB on the
straight and narrow path, at least for now. End comment.
GREENLEE