Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06LAPAZ1456
2006-05-31 19:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy La Paz
Cable title:  

TUTO QUIROGA ON CHAVEZ DOMINO EFFECT

Tags:  ECON PGOV PREL EFIN BL 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3529
PP RUEHLMC
DE RUEHLP #1456/01 1511919
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 311919Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9342
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 5883
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 3196
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 7045
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 4295
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1592
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 1573
RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA 0470
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 1707
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 3812
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 4228
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 8767
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0035
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LA PAZ 001456 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2016
TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL EFIN BL
SUBJECT: TUTO QUIROGA ON CHAVEZ DOMINO EFFECT

Classified By: Amb. David N. Greenlee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LA PAZ 001456

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2016
TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL EFIN BL
SUBJECT: TUTO QUIROGA ON CHAVEZ DOMINO EFFECT

Classified By: Amb. David N. Greenlee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Former President and opposition leader Jorge
"Tuto" Quiroga told the Ambassador on May 30 that the USG
should help "stop Chavez" in Peru, or risk the domino effect
in Ecuador and elsewhere. Quiroga talked at length about
Chavez's visions of a Bolivarian state, and said that after
Peru, Chavez will focus on the upcoming electoral contests in
Mexico and Nicaragua. Quiroga had firm ideas about how the
international community and the United States should respond
to the Morales government, suggesting that World Bank and IDB
debt relief for Bolivia be blocked, and that the U.S. take
ATPDEA and MCC off the table. Quiroga remains hopeful about
his party's chances for the Constituent Assembly, and thinks
Podemos has a realistic chances of winning one-third of the
255 seats. End summary.


2. (C) Former President and opposition leader Jorge "Tuto"
Quiroga told the Ambassador on May 30 that the USG should
help "stop" Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in Peru, or risk
the domino effect in Ecuador and elsewhere. Quiroga said if
former Peruvian President Alan Garcia wins on June 4, Chavez
will mobilize the opposition (via presidential candidate
Ollanta Humula) at some point to riot and force Garcia to
respond. When Garcia uses force to restore order, and the
inevitable casualties result, Quiroga says that Garcia will
"go down like (former Bolivian President) Gonzalo "Goni"
Sanchez de Lozada." After Peru, Quiroga predicts a showdown
between the United States and Venezuela in Ecuador. Quiroga
says that because Ecuador has many people who oppose free
trade and hosts a significant indigenous population, it is
"ripe" for Chavez's influence.


3. (C) Quiroga talked at length about Chavez's visions of a
Bolivarian state, and said that after Peru, Chavez will focus
on the upcoming electoral contests in Mexico and Nicaragua.
He said we should make no mistake -- Chavez, who Quiroga
called "delusional," thinks he is the new Simon Bolivar and

wants to take over Latin America. Quiroga cited the many
Chavez posters plastered across the Chapare for the MAS
Constituent Assembly kickoff May 26, and that the Venezuelans
were teaching their national anthem to the Bolivian crowd.
Quiroga said that in addition to his grip on Bolivia, Chavez
holds Argentina, Brazil and Chile "hostage" by controlling
the radical left in each of those countries, and effectively
uses such control to minimize the actions those governments
are willing to take against him publicly. Quiroga asserted
that even Lula's closest advisors are Chavistas (including
Jose Dirceu and Mario
Aurelio Garcia),and that those under indictment in Brazil
are more loyal to Chavez than Lula, as Chavez has promised
them asylum in Venezuela if necessary. Quiroga characterized
Chavez's power as "black" (referring to oil/energy) and
"white" (referring to cocaine, given that Venezuela has
become one of Latin America's biggest transshipment points
for the drug trade).


4. (C) Quiroga, a technocrat with a clear understanding of
international finance, had firm ideas about how the
international community should respond to the Morales
government. His primary concern is that Morales can
nationalize hydrocarbons, undermine democratic institutions
and increase coca growth without consequences, particularly
from the IDB and World Bank. Quiroga said if Bolivia
receives significant debt relief from the IDB and World Bank,
"we can turn the light off in Bolivia and give the keys to
Chavez." Quiroga said that Brazil and Mexico oppose IDB debt
relief for Bolivia and that based on his recent consultations
in Washington, the IDB package might be on hold. He urged
the USG to coordinate with Brazil, Mexico and Europe to block
further debt relief for Bolivia.


5. (C) Regarding the bilateral relationship, Quiroga
advocated that the United States refuse to extend ATPDEA and

LA PAZ 00001456 002 OF 002


reject Bolivia's MCC proposal, but continue to offer a free
trade agreement. Quiroga said an FTA is the one thing that
"Chavez would never allow Bolivia to sign." In response to
the Ambassador's question as to whether a decline in U.S.
presence would create more space for Chavez in Bolivia,
Quiroga said that "Chavez has already taken the territory"
and will continue to expand his influence "no matter what the
U.S. does." Quiroga believes that within two years, Bolivia
will be in economic dire straits and that Morales' political
project will unravel. In the meantime, he thinks the United
States should work with the prefects and municipal
governments, and possibly build up Vice-President Alvaro
Garcia Linera, who he says is not a Chavista.


6. (C) Quiroga remains hopeful about his party's chances for
the Constituent Assembly, and thinks Podemos has a realistic
chances of winning 86 of the 255 seats. Quiroga says that
twelve candidates on the MAS lists are actually sympathetic
to Podemos, undermining the MAS's chances of controlling the
Assembly. He lamented voter apathy for the Assembly
election, stating that even the MAS has "gotten lazy" now
that it is in government.


7. (C) Comment: While Quiroga can sound alarmist about
Bolivia's political future, his insights regarding Chavez's
regional plans merit attention. Quiroga's strong public
comments following Chavez's May 26-27 visit that decried the
Venezuelan leader's interference in domestic Bolivian
politics indicate that Quiroga may be re-engaging as an
opposition leader. Allaying doubts expressed by many that
Quiroga might leave the country, he told us the MAS would
have to "detain him or kill him" to silence his dissenting
voice. End comment.
GREENLEE