DEJA VU--IS MORALES FOLLOWING THE CHAVEZ MODEL?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LA PAZ 001414

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/2016
TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL BL
SUBJECT: DEJA VU--IS MORALES FOLLOWING THE CHAVEZ MODEL?

REF: A. LA PAZ 1357

B. LA PAZ 1322

C. LA PAZ 1317

Classified By: Amb. David N. Greenlee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: As the Morales government hits the four month
mark and further strengthens its relationships with Cuba and
Venezuela, there is increasing speculation about the extent
to which Morales is following the Chavista model of
governance. Three Venezuelan USAID contractors working on
democracy in Bolivia recently made an in-house presentation
noting that many of the circumstances which led to Chavez's
election in Venezuela also exist in Bolivia. The
presentation concluded that as the relationship between
Chavez and Morales deepens, signs are emerging that Morales
is not only accepting Chavez' counsel, but that he is using
Chavez's playbook to further consolidate hegemonic control of
Bolivia's democratic institutions. While Bolivia's democracy
may be more firmly rooted than Venezuela's at the same point
in Chavez's tenure, and may contain additional barriers to
the establishment of a more authoritarian regime, Morales
appears clearly attracted to that path. End summary.

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ALL VENEZUELA, ALL THE TIME
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2. (C) After four months in office, there is considerable
speculation about the extent to which Morales is following
the Chavista model of governance, particularly in light of
the GOB's stronger-than-ever relationships with Venezuela and
Cuba. Such discussions typically take place among the more
educated Bolivians, where resentment is growing regarding
Venezuelan (and Cuban) influence and presence in Bolivia.
According to press reports, approximately 700 Venezuelans
entered Bolivia between December and March, and the numbers
continue to grow. Cuba's literacy and health projects,
Venezuela's agreement to purchase all of Bolivia's soy, and
weekly announcements of new Venezuelan projects receive
extensive press coverage. Public reports about Venezuelan
infiltration of Bolivian security forces also alarm many
Bolivians. Chavez-Morales meetings are becoming a regular
occurrence, with the latest taking place May 26, the MAS'
launching of its Constituent Assembly campaign in the
Chapare. On the occasion, the GOB will sign numerous
agreements with Venezuela and Cuba pertaining to
hydrocarbons, mining, health, education, commerce and
integral development in the Chapare and the Yungas.

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THE RIGHT CONDITIONS
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3. (C) In response to increased Venezuelan influence in
Bolivia, three USAID contractors, all Venezuelans experienced
in civil society democracy work (both in their own country
and in Bolivia),recently made an in-house presentation
noting that many of the circumstances which led to Chavez's
election in Venezuela also exist in Bolivia. When Chavez was
elected in 1998, Venezuela suffered from weak political
parties, widespread perceptions of inequality in wealth
distribution, poor economic conditions (in part due to low
oil prices in 1998),and a collective sense that the entire
political system was corrupt.


4. (C) The speakers noted that many of these conditions were
present in Bolivia when Morales was elected president in
December 2005. Bolivia's traditional political parties were
so weak that many did not directly participate in the
elections, including the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR)
and the National Democratic Action (ADN) party. Those which
did compete -- Tuto Quiroga's new Podemos party, Samuel Doria
Media's National Unity (UN) party (created in 2003),and the
MNR (the party of the 1952 revolution) -- failed to join
forces and divided the center-right vote. As in Venezuela,
the speakers noted, many voters (particularly the

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marginalized indigenous) supported the MAS in the hope that
it would correct hundreds of years of economic disparity and
nationalize Bolivia's wealth of natural resources. A growing
public concern regarding systemic corruption, a mistrust of
public institutions and a desire for change also drove
election results.

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STRAIGHT FROM THE CHAVEZ PLAYBOOK?
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5. (C) The USAID presentation further noted that as the
relationship between Chavez and Morales deepens, darker signs
are emerging that Morales is not only accepting Chavez'
counsel, but that his intent is to use Chavez' playbook to
further consolidate hegemonic control of Bolivia's democratic
structures. The speakers listed the following political
tools employed by Chavez that Morales seeks to employ in
Bolivia:

-- Inaugurating a Constituent Assembly, followed by a series
of elections, including national elections for assembly
representatives, a referendum to approve the new
constitution, national elections following the Constituent
Assembly, and municipal/legislative elections. The speakers
referred to this as "excessive democracy" which in Venezuela
only served to bankrupt the opposition.

-- Removal of state financial support for opposition
political parties.

-- Control of the judicial branch and national electoral
court, the legislative branch, and Venezuela's state-owned
oil company, PDVSA.

-- Use of PDVSA profits to finance government campaigns and
political projects (particularly after oil prices surged).
Bolivian Hydrocarbons Minister Soliz Rada confirmed that the
32 percent hike in hydrocarbons taxes on Bolivia's two
largest gas fields would go to YPFB for the GOB's "special
projects."

-- Construction of a state-controlled community radio
network, planned for but not yet active in Bolivia.

-- Large government investment in its image/public diplomacy,
including anti-U.S. rhetoric.


6. (C) The speakers drew additional parallels between
Venezuela and Bolivia, such as:

-- Both populations' connections with a single, charismatic
leader;

-- Political polarization (left vs. right with few centrist
alternatives);

-- A weak, fragmented opposition;

-- Populist themes and government programs;

-- Stronger executive control of the military and increased
military involvement in civilian issues;

-- Popular support for an overhauled energy policy;

-- Disappointment among the electorate with the ability of
country's previous political leaders and political system to
address the country's needs;

-- A weak private sector which is on the defensive in light
of aggressive government policy; and

-- A tolerant international response to the governments'
policies.

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COMMENT
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7. (C) While the parallels are not exact, we found this
presentation by Venezuelan democracy contractors indicative.
The Constituent Assembly has long been key to Morales'
political strategy, and he has attempted to cut off state
support for the political opposition. Morales is setting the
stage for back-to-back elections, a la Chavez, beginning with
the July 2 Constituent Assembly election, followed by a
national referendum to approve the new constitution, and
possibly another national contest to re-elect Morales. The
MAS has a firm majority in Congress, and via salary cuts and
public criticism has sought to undermine the judicial branch.
Morales cleared out three generations of military officers
to engender loyalty amongst the new military leadership, and
employed the military to help enforce the decree to
nationalize hydrocarbons on May 1. With Venezuelan
assistance, the GOB is constructing a state-controlled
national radio network to expand information dissemination to
Bolivia's poor campesinos. Morales also regularly employs
Chavez's "anti-imperialist" rhetoric for domestic political
gain.


8. (C) While Morales appears to be following many aspects of
Chavez's playbook, Bolivia's democracy may be more firmly
rooted than Venezuela's at the same point in Chavez's tenure,
and may contain additional hurdles to the establishment of a
more authoritarian regime. We see the following factors as
possible barriers:

-- Bolivia's enabling legislation for the Constituent
Assembly guarantees a significant minority presence,
something that was absent in Venezuela. Only six opposition
members were elected to the Venezuelan Constituent Assembly,
whereas in Bolivia it appears difficult for the MAS to obtain
the two-thirds majority needed to control it.

-- A system of checks and balances among the branches of
government, while possibly weakening, remains intact here.
Bolivia's National Electoral Court, whose equivalent Chavez
co-opted early on in Venezuela, remains independent. The
Constitutional Tribunal and Supreme Court (reftels) have not
yielded to the GOB's intimidation tactics. Other "vertical"
checks and balances in the form of independent prefects and
municipal governments, also remain.

-- The opposition has so far thwarted Morales' efforts to do
away with their state electoral funding. (NOTE: While the
state subsidies continue, they are modest, and of the 25
parties participating in the July 2 election, only Podemos,
the UN and the MNR qualify for funds because they ran
candidates in December. END NOTE).

-- Civil society representatives continue to educate the
populace about democracy and the Constituent Assembly.

-- An active social sector continues to use street pressure
(tactics employed by the MAS to influence previous
governments) to force the GOB to attend to its demands.

-- Cultural and ethnic diversity translates into diverse
social interests and demands upon the central government.


9. (C) As the Venezuelan analysts' presentation highlights,
there are many similarities between the Venezuelan and
Bolivian experiences, both in the conditions that brought
Chavez and Morales to power and the tools they seem to be
using to maintain it. While Morales appears to be headed
down a more autocratic path, Bolivia's experience in the end,
as so often in its history, will be defined by its own
peculiar social and political realities. Perhaps the most
significant difference between Venezuela and Bolivia is that
Morales may not gain absolute control of the upcoming
Assembly (see reftels),which will make consolidation of
political power more difficult. Whether Morales' political
project will have as much "success" as Chavez's will become

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more evident as the MAS seeks to impose its will on the
Constituent Assembly, Bolivia's next major political event.
GREENLEE