THIRD TERM DEFEAT TRIGGERS EUPHORIA AMONG SOUTHERN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LAGOS 000690

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/W
STATE FOR INR/AA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV NI THIRDTERM
SUBJECT: THIRD TERM DEFEAT TRIGGERS EUPHORIA AMONG SOUTHERN
POLITICOS

REF: ABUJA 1149

Classified By: Consul General Brian L. Browne for Reason 1.4 (D).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) The demise of the third term amendment has most
southern politicians happier than they have been in months.
Many believe the President will not easily accept defeat and
will search for another device to extend his presidency.
Cynics believe he will foment or encourage unrest,
particularly in the Niger Delta, in order to create a state
of emergency where elections are impossible and thus tenure
extension is warranted. His staunch critics warn the only
way to ensure Obasanjo behaves responsibly is to keep him on
the defensive -- by starting impeachment proceedings against
him for attempting to bribe his way into a third term. End
summary.

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ELEVENTH HOUR MANEUVERS FAIL TO KEEP TERM EXTENSION ALIVE
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2. (C) Most southern politicians and many prominent
businesspeople were ebullient when the National Assembly
shelved the proposed third term constitutional amendment.
However, most politicians tempered their euphoria with the
sober recognition that this issue, for now dead, could be
resurrected.


3. (C) Lagos State sources report President Obasanjo was
actively canvassing for help as late as Sunday. Showing a
sense of desperation, he even stooped to soliciting aid from
an unlikely source, his Yoruba political arch-enemy Lagos
Governor Tinubu. On Sunday, Obasanjo summoned Tinubu to a
one-on-one. The usually rough-edged President was at his
friendliest in attempting to coax Tinubu his way. Obasanjo
appealed to Tinubu to exercise ethnic solidarity and pressed
the Lagos executive to back a "compromise" wherein Obasanjo's
and the state governors' current terms would be extended by
two years, thereby obviating elections in 2007. Tinubu
refused to bite the Obasanjo lure, according to a Tinubu
aide. Tinubu saw Obasanjo's request for a two-year extension
as an attempt to sneak in through the back door what was
denied through the front. A two-year extension would simply
move the third term debate from 2006 to 2008, Tinubu felt.


4. (C) Noted economist and Lagos Business School Dean Pat
Utomi recounted a conversation with Nasir El-Rufai, Minister
of the Federal Capital Territory, who said members of the
Presidents economic team warned the President not to let the
third term amendment go to a decisive vote in the Assembly.
However, Obasanjo's political hacks prevailed. El-Rufai
feared the defeat would now make the President the lamest of
ducks, and may make it difficult to govern for the remaining
period of this term, particularly should officials start to
abandon the President in droves.

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THE PRESIDENT IS DOWN, BUT NONE SAY HE IS OUT...YET
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5. (C) While El-Rufai feared the President might suffer a
mortal political wound, many southern politicians still felt
Obasanjo had enough political ammunition and personal
gumption to revisit tenure extension, either by reviving
debate in the National Assembly, perhaps after engineering
the removal of some key members who opposed this initial
attempt, or perhaps by simply waiting for violence in the
Delta to erupt, providing justification for a state of
emergency which would "compel" him to stay in office and
postpone elections. For the time being, most observers
thought he would act conciliatory, in order to break the
unity his political opponents forged against the third term
campaign. These observers think Obasanjo's talk of
reconciliation is not heartfelt but just a tactical retreat
to keep the heat off him and give him time to seek another
opening to press his objective.


6. (C) Differing opinions emerged regarding how to encourage
the President to shelve any future moves to extend his
tenure. Some have discussed engineering a graceful exit by
offering him a special position for African peacekeeping
under the joint auspices of the UN and AU, or perhaps a
professorial chair at a university (reftel). Others favor a
more aggressive approach to contain Obasanjo, such as a
motion of impeachment or various offenses, including the
bribery and coercion of assemblymen during the third term
debate. (The impeachment option was raised by an attorney
who is a close associate of Usman Bugaji, Vice President
Atiku's most trusted ally in the National Assembly.)


7. (C) Even if he does not succeed in extending his stay in
office, Obasanjo would still have control of the PDP.
Observers believed the President would use his position in
the party to actively block Atiku from the nomination.

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COMMENT
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8. (C) The reactions communicated to us following the third
term defeat indicate that most southerners, even in
Obasanjo's Yoruba homeland, opposed the third term and the
political temperature has eased somewhat. There were actual
reports of small public celebrations in some southern cities.
Ironically, Obasanjo's third term setback makes the future
more uncertain than if the obverse had occurred. The
jockeying for position has already intensified, not only at
the Presidential level but for state governorships as well.
While everyone is now looking to their political future, the
most prudent, astute practitioners will also keep an eye on
Obasanjo. End comment.
BROWNE