BONGA SECURITY: IS DISTANCE ENOUGH PROTECTION FROM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LAGOS 000435

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE PASS DOE FOR GPERSON AND CGAY
TREASURY FOR ASEVERENS AND SRENENDER
COMMERCE FOR KBURRESS
STATE PASS TRANSPORTATION FOR MARAD
STATE PASS USTR FOR ASST USTR SLISER
STATE PASS USAID FOR GWEYNAND AND SLAWAETZ

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2016
TAGS: EPET ENERG PTER NI
SUBJECT: BONGA SECURITY: IS DISTANCE ENOUGH PROTECTION FROM
MEND?

REF: A. 2005 LAGOS 1917 B. LAGOS 48 C. LAGOS 250

D. LAGOS 367

Classified By: Acting Pol/Econ Chief Shannon Ross for
Reasons 1.4 (D & E)

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Summary
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1. (C) In a meeting with the Operations Manager of
Nigeria,s first deepwater mega-project, Shell,s Bonga
field, he delivered a sobering assessment of the security
situation for the Floating, Production, Storage and
Offloading (FPSO) vessels Bonga and the SeaEagle. His
views are not necessarily those of senior Shell management,
but represent the views of a man charged with the
day-to-day management of the Bonga and Eastern Area
(SeaEagle) fields. He views the Bonga as vulnerable to
attack by militia groups, and operations on the SeaEagle as
simply "untenable" in the current security environment.
Nonetheless, Shell maintains its official position: it
does not want its employees to carry heavy weapons due to
human rights concerns, and looks to the GON to ensure FPSO
security.

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Bonga Operations Manager Assesses Bonga
Security as Poor; Naval "Presence" Only
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2. (C) Bonga Operations Manager Mihlon assesses the Bonga
FPSO as vulnerable to attack by the Movement for the
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) or other militia
groups, which he believes have ample resources to attack
the vessel. Mihlon stated there is currently "no security
at Bonga, just a naval presence (one small vessel),which
would be quickly overwhelmed in an attack." Mihlon states
security for Bonga is typically less robust than for
near-shore facilities, such as the Forcados Export
Terminal, which MEND quickly overwhelmed in its February
attack (reftel C). While he notes reaching Bonga in
relatively small flyboats would be logistically more
complex for MEND than attacking near-shore facilities, he
assesses the group is capable of doing so. Mihlon
categorically stated neither Shell nor the Nigerian
military can design a security system robust enough to
repel an attack by 20-30 MEND flyboats, such as that
carried out on March 11 (reftel D). The Bonga FPSO is
located about 150 kilometers off the coast of Nigeria,
southwest of Warri, Delta State, in oil mining lease (OML)
bloc 118. Bonga initiated operations in December 2005, and
produces about 225,000 bpd (reftel A).

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The Outlook for Sea Eagle Production Grim,
Security Situation "Untenable"
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3. (C) Echoing earlier comments by Shell,s West African
Security Manager Colgate, Mihlon told us he does not see
the FPSO Sea Eagle, with production of 115,000 bpd, coming
back into operation for "months." Mihlon had previously
been steadfast in his demand for two naval vessels to
protect the SeaEagle before he would authorize re-manning
it. However, after a recent MEND attack with at least
twenty flyboats (reftel D),he has abandoned this demand,
saying "all bets are off." He has now concluded it doesn't
matter whether the Nigerian Navy provides two or ten
vessels for the SeaEagle, since they remained incapable of
defending against such an overwhelming attack. Mihlon, a
former U.S. military officer, described a threat matrix
with threat levels on one axis, and hardness of target on
the other. He explained he has always been a proponent of
focusing on hardness of target, since one cannot control an
external threat level. However, he is now at a loss, since

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he does not consider any hardness of target adequate to
re-man the SeaEagle. In sum, he currently considers the
SeaEagle,s security situation "simply untenable."


4. (SBU) On the technical front, Mihlon said the SeaEagle
will continue to deteriorate. The vessel was abandoned
with little warning in January after a sea-based assault
and the kidnapping of four hostages from a nearby Tidex
vessel (reftel B). The vessel was not properly shut down
to prepare for long-term inactivity, and equipment and
pipes are deteriorating. Mihlon expects that repairs which
might have taken three weeks if carried out immediately
could take eight weeks or more by the time Shell is able to
re-secure access to the vessel. Shell was able to send a
crew to the vessel for three days two weeks ago, but the
visit was not long enough to accomplish much.

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Shell: "We,re Not in the Militia Business"
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5. (C) Despite Mihlon,s frustration with security
challenges, he indicated Shell,s official position remains
the same: it does not want its employees to carry heavy
weapons due to the potential for human rights abuses.
(Note: Given accusations against Shell for previous
human rights abuses, particularly during the era of military
rule in Nigeria, Shell remains sensitive to any suggestion
its employees have arms, which Nigerian law limits to
government security forces (GSF). End note.)
If the Nigerian military is unable to provide effective
security,
Mihlon indicated Shell will simply withdraw from the
operational
area. Mihon stated, "We,re not in the militia business,"
explaining that Shell is willing to mount security to repel
a limited assault, but no more. He voiced his frustration
that the military is not responding to the breakdown of order
in
the Delta, stating Nigeria needs to have "some baseline of
law and order." He concluded, noting "Nigeria needs to get
its military up to speed, or we can,t operate here."
Mihlon indicated that a Nigerian military capacity to mount
effective perimeter security for facilities such as Bonga
would be acceptable.

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Helicopter Warning of Threats to Bonga:
On a Propeller and a Prayer?
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6. (C) Mihlon notes Shell sends three helicopters per day
on round trips to Bonga, and hopes the helicopters might
provide some type of early warning in the event of any
attack. However, the helicopter flights are not designed
to provide security for Bonga, nor manned by security
personnel, so any contribution to Bonga security would
purely fortuitous. Mihlon also voiced his
frustration Bonga was not receiving the support of fast
vessels the U.S. Coast Guard recently donated to the GON
for use in Delta security.

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A Bonga and SeaEagle Security Wish List
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7. (C) To provide early warning of a possible attack on
Bonga, Mihlon has requested a 30-knot patrol vessel to
patrol the passage between Bonga and shore. He has also
requested a 40-50 meter, 30-knot vessel with defensive
capability, for surveillance. Mihlon stated the Sea
Eagle needs a full complement of security craft, including
at least two 20-meter, 30-40 knot interceptor craft,
with crew residing on a 75-meter, 15-knot supply vessel
equipped with weaponry. He stated this would allow Shell
to intercept one to two boats attacking SeaEagle, which

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he considers a bare minimum. It remains unclear whether
senior Shell management will authorize these acquisitions.

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Security Information Sharing Next on the Agenda
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8. (C) In the meantime, Mihlon is planning to reach out
to other oil companies to carry out information-sharing and
benchmarking exercises on security issues. Among other
goals, he would like to develop common industry standards
regarding when to de-man and re-man facilities under
threat. His current goal is to convince Shell management
to concur with his recommendation for Shell to match AGIP,s
use of crew-served weapons, rather than personal weapons,
even if only to allow GSF to cover a retreat by Shell
personnel and security forces. (Note: Mihlon,s insistence
on "getting across" to Shell management the need for
crew-served weapons suggests he may be waging a losing
battle. End note.)


9. This cable was cleared by Embassy Abuja.
HOWE