Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06LAGOS1360
2006-11-17 13:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Lagos
Cable title:  

GON HAS SURRENDERED DEFACTO CONTROL OF CREEKS TO

Tags:  EPET ENERG ASEC PTER NI 
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VZCZCXRO2319
OO RUEHPA
DE RUEHOS #1360/01 3211346
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 171346Z NOV 06
FM AMCONSUL LAGOS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8170
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 8026
INFO RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH AFB UK
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LAGOS 001360 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DOE FOR GPERSON, CGAY
TREASURY FOR ASEVERENS, SRENENDER, DFIELDS
COMMERCE FOR KBURRESS
STATE PASS USTR FOR ASST USTR SLISER
STATE PASS TRANSPORTATION FOR MARAD
STATE PASS OPIC FOR ZHAN AND MSTUCKART
STATE PASS TDA FOR NCABOT
STATE PASS EXIM FOR JRICHTER
STATE PASS USAID FOR GWEYNAND AND SLAWAETZ

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2016
TAGS: EPET ENERG ASEC PTER NI
SUBJECT: GON HAS SURRENDERED DEFACTO CONTROL OF CREEKS TO
MILITANTS

REF: A. LAGOS 1249


B. LAGOS 1254

C. LAGOS 1263

D. LAGOS 1264

E. LAGOS 1272

F. LAGOS 1276

G. LAGOS 1278

H. LAGOS 1294

I. ABUJA 2974

Classified By: Consul General Brian Browne for Reasons 1.4 (B,D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LAGOS 001360

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DOE FOR GPERSON, CGAY
TREASURY FOR ASEVERENS, SRENENDER, DFIELDS
COMMERCE FOR KBURRESS
STATE PASS USTR FOR ASST USTR SLISER
STATE PASS TRANSPORTATION FOR MARAD
STATE PASS OPIC FOR ZHAN AND MSTUCKART
STATE PASS TDA FOR NCABOT
STATE PASS EXIM FOR JRICHTER
STATE PASS USAID FOR GWEYNAND AND SLAWAETZ

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2016
TAGS: EPET ENERG ASEC PTER NI
SUBJECT: GON HAS SURRENDERED DEFACTO CONTROL OF CREEKS TO
MILITANTS

REF: A. LAGOS 1249


B. LAGOS 1254

C. LAGOS 1263

D. LAGOS 1264

E. LAGOS 1272

F. LAGOS 1276

G. LAGOS 1278

H. LAGOS 1294

I. ABUJA 2974

Classified By: Consul General Brian Browne for Reasons 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary: Consulate Lagos submits this missive to
complement Abuja 2974. This message provides the consulate's
perspective which is in close accord with that offered in
Reftel. As things now stand, the Government of Nigeria (GON)
has surrendered de facto control over large swathes of the
creeks and waterways to armed militants in the Niger Delta.
Roughly one third of oil production was shut down for a time
due to militant activity, although recently shut-ins have
been reduced to approximately one fifth of production.
International oil companies (IOCs) and oil service companies
basically have pulled expatriate employees from working in
the creeks. The military has mustered on Bonny and Onne
islands (Ref. G) and has reduced its presence in the creeks
to a minimum. Credible sources claim that militants recently
took delivery of a handsome cache of weapons and a number of
speed boats to add to their already considerable strength.
The reduction in the military and oil company presence in the
creeks may be temporary and tactical. Nonetheless, the
longer this retreat lasts, the more the militants will be
imbued with confidence and the stronger they think they are
getting. The less likely will they be to desist in the very
activities from which they believe they derive their
puissance. End Summary.

Reduced Oil Flow, Reduced Company Presence
--------------


2. (C) The situation in the Niger Delta has deteriorated
over the past weeks. Some weeks ago, the Government admitted

800,000 barrels of oil per day, out of current average total
production of 2.55 million barrels per day, had ceased
flowing as the result of militant activity, although by
end-October some militant-affected flowstations had come back
on line, reducing shut-ins to approximately one-fifth of
production (approximately 514,000 barrels per day shut-in).
Small Nigerian oil companies, like Dubri and Oceanic, are
completely inactive because of the danger of militant
activity. Violence and the threat of violence against
workers and facilities have caused international oil
companies (IOCs) to reduce work at most locations, and move
most expatriate employees out of the creeks. Oil services
companies are in an increasingly difficult position. As the
IOCs reduce their operations, the services companies find
their income reduced and have difficulty paying idle
employees. As a result, some oil services firms have begun
to feel the impact of the slowdown, laying off local
employees. (Ref. F)

Reduced Military Presence in the Creeks
--------------


3. (C) The Nigerian military has reduced its deployments in
the Delta creeks. This tacitly cedes control of large tracts
of the area to the militants. Although the Joint Task Force
(JTF) has superior aggregate force, in its tactical
encounters with the militants, the JTF patrols have been
outgunned and outmanned by their militant antagonists on too
many occasions. Due to the disrepair of their air assets,
the military cannot translate what should be an inherent
superiority in its control of the airspace above the creeks
into an operational advantage. We know of no military aerial

LAGOS 00001360 002 OF 002


reconnaissance flights to locate the hostages or stolen
barges taken in September and October.


4. (C) Recent reports suggest that JTF forces have pulled
out of the creeks for concentrated deployment on Onne and
Bonny Islands. (Ref. D) Given the length of time the troops
have been mustered in these two locations, this move appears
more like an attempt to avoid further confrontations with the
militants, rather than to prepare for imminent aggressive
action.

No Government Engagement With Militants Underway
-------------- ---


5. (C) While GON forces are taking a passive approach on the
ground, the GON also appears dormant in making any pacific
overtures to the militants. (Ref. D) GON policy towards the
militants seems to revolve around placating the Warri-based
Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC) group, which
engineered the January and February kidnappings and attack on
oil installations. By mollifying FNDIC, the GON seems to
have initially thought that group would be able to contain
the other militant groups. This strategy has been proven
ineffective by the reality and pace of recent events.

Comment: The Net Effect
--------------


6. (C) Thus far, the GON policy in the Delta has been
laconic in the pursuit of peaceful resolution to militant
stirrings and irresolute in the application of force to
contain the militants. Because of the GON's failure to make
progress in either talking to the militants or in outmuscling
them, the Delta remains a place of significant uncertainty
frequently punctuated by the kidnapping of expatriates,
closure of oil facilities and eruption of localized political
violence.


7. (C) Almost imperceptibly, it seems the current balance
of power has shifted towards the militants. The GON military
posture is less assertive and the oil companies are down to
minimal staffing in the area. Meanwhile, some militant
groups are retooling and attracting recruits. Fortunately,
these groups currently believe their interests are best
served by harassing the oil companies and not shutting them
down.


8. (C) There is no countervailing reason to think the
militants will reduce their level of activity. They are in
as favorable position as they could imagine. We hope their
next success does not embolden them toward ever more risky
behavior. Should the militants radicalize to the extent of
trying to shut down ever greater amounts of production, the
GON might be forced to abandon its passive military strategy.
Any large scale confrontation between the GON and militants
could be dire. The best way to prevent this is for the GON
to engage more actively with representatives of the militants
and other Ijaw groups in hopes of negotiating disruptive
militant action down to a minimum. End Comment.


9. (U) This cable was cleared by Embassy Abuja.

BROWNE