NATO'S ICI VISIT BRINGS MISUNDERSTANDINGS TO A HEAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 000998

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/PM, NEA/ARP, LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS FOR ZEYA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2016
TAGS: MARR NATO PREL PTER IR IZ KU
SUBJECT: NATO'S ICI VISIT BRINGS MISUNDERSTANDINGS TO A HEAD

REF: A. 05 KUWAIT 4231


B. 05 KUWAIT 4150

Classified By: DCM Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4. (a) and (b)


1. (C) Summary and Comment: NATO's Istanbul Cooperation
Initiative (ICI) delegation to Kuwait briefed over a dozen
NATO member country mission chiefs on its March 19 meetings
with GOK officials. According to the head of the six-person
delegation, Rear Admiral Dr. Deniz Kutluk of Turkey, the
Kuwaitis had "unrealistic expectations of NATO" and the GOK
was only prepared to sign a transit agreement with NATO but
not a security agreement which would allow the GOK access to
NATO's classified documents--a prerequisite for hosting
Kuwaiti officials in NATO seminars. Kutluk went on to state
that the GOK "needed to be educated" but that some
misperceptions had "been rectified" and, in the end, the
delegation felt the meetings had been fruitful. In a
follow-up conversation with the office manager to the
President of the National Security Bureau (NSB),Shaykh
Thamer Ali Al-Sabah, Shaykh Thamer said that the GOK was
"very happy" with the visit and meetings and looked forward
to signing the security agreement after some "review."


2. (C) The atmosphere in NATO's meeting with member country
reps was one of surprise. Some chiefs of mission commented
after the meeting that the NATO delegation was obviously not
well briefed by the Italians and that a special brief should
be offered to the delegation by the British Brigadier General
who works as an advisor with the Ministry of Defense. One
ambassador said he could not imagine "how they got it so
wrong," commenting on the NATO delegation's belief that the
GOK was not interested in consequence management while
another diplomat expressed surprise that the delegation head,
Turkish Navy Rear Admiral Kutluk, did not connect with the
Kuwaitis on a cultural level--his briefing came across as
rather patronizing. Regardless, the GOK seems to be taking
the high road by stating that the visit was "excellent." End
summary and comment.

Different Priorities
--------------


3. (C) On March 19, NATO's ICI delegation gave a readout of
its meetings with GOK officials to over a dozen NATO country
mission chiefs and asked for guidance on how NATO should
encourage the GOK to sign a security agreement. The security
agreement would allow the GOK access to classified files of
NATO's 26 countries and would ease the ability of GOK
officials to participate in NATO seminars and workshops.
According to RADM Kutluk, NSB's Shaykh Thamer nixed the
possibility of signing the security agreement and instead
attempted to focus NATO's attention on the transit agreement
which would allow for the movement of troops and materiel
between Kuwait and Iraq; an item the GOK finally agreed to
after almost a year. After some heated discussions, neither
agreement was signed and Kutluk told the heads of mission
that Kuwait could not come closer to NATO without being part
of the security information network. "If they don't make a
move (on signing),then we can't make a move," Kutluk added.


4. (C) In addition to the security agreement, Kutluk
informed the group that Kuwait "did not know how NATO
operated" and that "they had to be educated." He explained
that even though the GOK had submitted a list of five areas
of cooperation (out of 12) that they would like to focus on,
the GOK failed to realize the submission would "have to be
translated, disseminated to different offices, brought back
to Kuwait, evaluated, and then discussed" before a decision
could be made on what workshops would be most effective. He
stressed that the GOK refused to go through the proper
point-of-contact (referring to the Italian Embassy, NATO's
representative mission in Kuwait) which caused "problems" but
informed the group that NATO made sure that "they would stick
with the POC now."

What Does The GOK Want?
--------------


5. (C) In concluding his brief, Kutluk asked the group to
describe "Kuwait's aspirations" besides protecting its
borders. Having met with officials from ministries of
Defense and Interior, including the Chief of Staff, Kutluk
said that he felt the Kuwaitis were not/not interested in
consequence management, as defined by NATO, and GOK officials
he met seemed to have little interest with regard to Iran's
nuclear plant at Bushehr and the environmental threat it

KUWAIT 00000998 002 OF 002


might pose. Several diplomats present cautioned that the
image NATO was taking away of the GOK was inaccurate and that
the level of GOK concerns could not be gauged by meetings
with officials who might not be knowledgeable on that
specific subject matter.

The Admiral Offline
--------------


6. (C) A reception at the Italian ambassador's residence
following the brief afforded Poloff the opportunity to speak
with Kutluk at length. The Admiral admitted that perhaps
NATO did not have enough information on the GOK's concerns
before coming on the trip and that his dismissive attitude
towards Kuwait's border concerns were because "materially"
they were more secure than their neighbors (i.e. fencing,
berms, and police border posts). He was unaware of the Iraqi
border protests at the northeast corner of the border and did
not know of possible security concerns along the shared
maritime areas between Iraq, Iran, and Kuwait. He confided
that he felt border security was a "domestic issue" and not a
NATO priority; even though it is listed as one of the 12
areas of possible cooperation. The Admiral went on to say
that he was unaware Kuwait's rapid signing onto the ICI and
subsequent repeat travel to Brussels was either unusual or
expeditious. Discussing how NATO is perceived in the region,
Kutluk offered that most of the GOK's misconceptions could be
overcome and that the relationship would move forward; just
not as quickly as he had hoped.

The GOK's View
--------------


7. (C) In Poloff's follow-on conversation with Shaykh
Thamer, the office manager for NSB President Shaykh Sabah
Al-Khalid, he downplayed the friction between NATO and the
GOK and asserted that the meetings "gave a better
understanding of how we can work with NATO." Continuing, he
pointed out that "in a region with so many problems, for NATO
to come up with ICI was amazing." "The region," he stressed,
"is not stable" and NATO's offerings are welcome. The
misunderstandings have been cleared up and the GOK "now
understands how to get tailored courses and seminars" from
NATO although the security agreement still needs further
discussion and review. (Note. The security agreement would
have to be vetted by Ministries of Interior and Defense
before being passed to the National Assembly (NA) for
approval. Once passed, it is likely to take a year or more
to be reviewed by the NA's Interior and Defense Committee, be
listed on the agenda, and sent for a vote unless the
Government presses for prompt consideration. End note.)


8. (C) Shaykh Thamer added that the NSB President was
considering placing a military attache in Kuwait's embassy in
Brussels as a means of improving the relationship. He also
raised the possibility that one of NATO's 80 courses might be
held in Kuwait since the NATO delegation told the GOK that
the Command and Staff College was "up to NATO standards."

Saudi and ICI
--------------


9. (C) In response to a question about whether Saudi Arabia
was serious about joining ICI, Thamer advised that Saudi
would indeed join "but only after they see how things turn
out" with other countries first. He claimed that the Saudis
demonstrated their real interest by sending Prince Mohammed
bin Turki, a senior MFA official, to Brussels to meet with
NATO. According to Thamer, by sending such a high ranking
official, the Saudis were signaling their intent to join.
Finally, he admitted that "Saudi needs to be part of ICI for
it to be effective."

********************************************* *
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s

Visit Kuwait's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/
********************************************* *
LEBARON