SOMETIME STRATEGIC ADVISOR TO GOK SAYS IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 000086

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/ARPI - BRUDER AND BERNS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2015
TAGS: PREL PINR IR KU KUWAIT IRAN RELATIONS
SUBJECT: SOMETIME STRATEGIC ADVISOR TO GOK SAYS IRAN
"ABSOLUTELY" A THREAT TO KUWAIT

REF: KUWAIT 71

Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Dr. Sami Al-Faraj, the director of the
Kuwait Center for Strategic Studies (KCSS) and a regularly
contracted advisor to various government ministries in Kuwait
on national security issues, told Poloff January 8 that the
GOK views Iran as a threat. According to Al-Faraj, the
Government of Kuwait (GOK) recently began developing
contingency plans to deal with three possible threats from
Iran: direct military aggression, Iranian-backed low-level
violence and/or terrorism, and a targeted propaganda "blitz."
The GOK is also "very concerned" about the possibility that
an accident at one of Iran's nuclear facilities, specifically
Bushehr, could have devastating environmental effects on
Kuwait. Al-Faraj stressed the GOK's preference to address
its concerns with the Iranians diplomatically; he was
optimistic that GCC diplomatic efforts would be more
successful than European efforts, since GCC countries' vital
interests were at stake and they could offer more "financial
incentives." President Ahmadinejad was no more a threat than
previous leaders, Al-Faraj said, noting that, "Iran has
always been a threat." End summary.

GOK Preparing Contingency Plans for Iranian Threats
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2. (C) In a January 8 meeting with liberal academic Dr. Sami
Al-Faraj, whom the GOK regularly contracts to advise on
national security issues and to prepare "sensitive" reports,
Poloff asked if the GOK viewed Iran as a threat. Al-Faraj
responded emphatically, "Absolutely." Specifically, Al-Faraj
said the GOK had begun preparing plans in the last year to
deal with three contingencies: a direct military
confrontation, which "Kuwait could not handle";
Iranian-backed low-level violence and/or terrorism in Kuwait,
which is a "great concern" for the GOK; and civil unrest
sparked by an Iranian propaganda "blitz" focused on Kuwait's
"80,000 plus" Iranian expatriates, Shi'a community
(approximately 30-35% of the population),and Sunni Islamists
who sympathize with Iran's hard line policies towards the
U.S. and Israel.


3. (C) A direct military confrontation with Iran was beyond
Kuwait's ability to even plan for, Al-Faraj said. The GOK
worried that even a substantial movement of Iranian forces
within Iran's territorial waters could quickly "saturate"
Kuwait's defense networks. On the threat of
Iranian-sponsored terrorism in Kuwait, Al-Faraj said he
believed Iranian-backed terrorist cells were present in
Kuwait. When asked what measures the GOK was taking to
counter this threat, Al-Faraj replied vaguely that the GOK
was aware of their existence and was "monitoring" them.

GOK "Very Concerned" About Possible Nuclear Accident
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4. (C) According to Al-Faraj, the GOK is "very concerned"
about Iran's nuclear program, particularly "the best
worst-case scenario": the possibility of an accident at one
of Iran's nuclear facilities, specifically Bushehr, with
devastating environmental consequences for the entire Gulf
region. Kuwait could not even contemplate the worst
possibility arising from the Iranian nuclear program, he
said. Al-Faraj told Poloff that the GOK had commissioned
several studies on the environmental impacts of a nuclear
accident. He also noted that currents in the Gulf flow
counter-clockwise and would bring contaminants to Kuwait
"before they reached the city of Bushehr." (See reftel for a
report on Kuwaiti radiation monitoring plans.)


5. (S) Al-Faraj said, and stressed repeatedly, that the GOK
preferred to deal with Iran diplomatically and had conveyed
its concerns about Iran's nuclear program to the Iranian
Government through both front- and back-channel means,
including through Iranian "spies." He was very optimistic
that GCC diplomatic efforts would be more successful than
U.S. and European efforts to dissuade Iran from pursuing a
nuclear program since GCC countries vital interests were at
stake and they could offer more "financial incentives." He
noted, however, that Kuwait was unlikely to directly confront
Iran over its nuclear program because it did not want to be
seen as a U.S. puppet; although Al-Faraj claimed GCC
countries, including Kuwait, use the U.S. military presence
in the Gulf to exert pressure on Iran during negotiations.

KCSS Training on "Escalation In Iran's Nuclear Crisis"
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6. (C) Al-Faraj shared with Poloff the content of a
"strategic exercise on crisis management" from one of KCSS'
training courses. The exercise, entitled "Contingency
Planning for a Possible Escalation In Iran's Nuclear Crisis,"
required students to "assess and evaluate" the following
scenarios in order to draw lessons for "planning, organizing,
and coordinating the national effort to manage the crisis":

- An Unidentified Pollutant or Radiation Emission;
- Terrorist Operations Against and Disruption of the
Domestic Front;
- Confronting Conventional and Non-Conventional Attacks;
- Saturation of Emergency Services Due to Tempo of
Operations;
- Threatening Strategic Economic Resources;
- Threatening Financial, Commercial Services, and
Communications;
- Inability to Control Domestic Situation;
- Tension on the Diplomatic Front with Iran's Allies;
- The Armed Forces Reach a Situation of Attrition.

(Comment: Given that the KCSS' training programs are designed
almost exclusively for small classes of GOK political and
military officials, this exercise may give some insight into
the issues of concern to the GOK. End comment.)

Bio Note
--------------


7. (C) Dr. Sami Al-Faraj is the director of the Kuwait
Center for Strategic Studies, a private, research institute
specializing in strategic planning, crisis management, and
national security issues in the Gulf. Al-Faraj teaches small
classes of GOK political and security officials at his center
and writes, what he terms, "sensitive" reports for the GOK.
He said he also serves as an advisor to GCC Secretary General
Abdul Rahman Al-Attiyah. Al-Faraj, a former military
officer, referred to himself as a "Najdi," suggesting his
family is originally from the Najd region of Saudi Arabia.
Al-Faraj is unmarried and appears to be in his mid-50s. He
speaks excellent English.

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