UN TEAM'S FIRST KUWAIT-IRAQ BORDER ASSESSMENT ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 000659

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/ARPI, USUN FOR LAPENN, BAGHDAD FOR PILZ,
LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS FOR ZEYA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2016
TAGS: PBTS PREL PGOV MOPS IZ UN KU
KUWAIT-IRAQ RELATIONS
SUBJECT: UN TEAM'S FIRST KUWAIT-IRAQ BORDER ASSESSMENT ON
DEMARCATION MAINTENANCE

REF: A. USUN 346


B. USUN 245

C. KUWAIT 263

D. KUWAIT 201

E. 05 KUWAIT 4380

Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4 (a) and (b)


1. (C) Summary: United Nations (UN) Iraq Desk Officer Eliza
Kimball and UN cartographer Vladimir Bessarabov, part of a
four person UN border team, discussed the UN team's first
assessment of the Kuwait-Iraq border demarcation with pol/mil
officer on February 22. The team's February 10-24 visit to
Kuwait was initially postponed when MNF-I support and
security failed to appear but the team decided, nonetheless,
to proceed and successfully completed field assessments of
nearly all land border markers, from marker 1 to 105. (Note:
Marker 106 is in a highly contentious area and could not be
safely assessed during this visit. End note.) Contrary to
local media reports published February 23, the team avoided
discussion or planning of the marine boundary as they felt it
would be "too difficult" to accomplish and "would be
detrimental to the Iraqi side especially if the buoy markers
shifted out of place." According to Kimball, the next
mission would require construction and razing of some Iraqi
dwellings inside the Kuwaiti border and MNF-I support would
be crucial to its success and security as she believed Iraqi
police were not able to provide adequate security in the
field. She requested that the Embassy work to ensure MNF-I
would be available and on-site for the next mission which is
planned for sometime in the fall. Both Kimball and
Bessarabov expressed their thanks to the U.S. military for
providing satellite imagery used to complete this mission.
End summary.

Praise For Kuwaiti-Iraqi Cooperation
--------------


2. (C) On February 22, pol/mil officer met with UN Iraq Desk
Officer and border team leader Eliza Kimball as well as UN
cartographer Vladimir Bessarabov to discuss their recently
completed initial assessment of the Kuwait-Iraq border
maintenance project. The team arrived on February 10 and
conducted field assessments February 13-15, and 18-19. They
had planned to begin at the southern border area but the
Iraqis and Kuwaitis both requested that they start at Umm
Qasr, the point of most contention, along the northeastern
border markers. Working with Iraqi and Kuwaiti police as
escorts, the team finished their field assessment days
earlier than expected and Kimball remarked that the Iraqi and
Kuwaiti members of the entourage "were very congenial and
worked well together." According to Kimball, there were five
Iraqi officials (NFI) present for the assessment who were
hosted by the GOK during their stay. She stated that all of
the border pillars were located on the demarcation
coordinates but that some of the "witnesses", or directional
markers, had been moved. Bessarabov added that the border
pillars were not within sight of each other, a fact which
would likely have to be remedied with the placement of
additional pillars.

Where was MNF-I?
--------------


3. (C) According to Kimball when the team arrived in Kuwait
February 10, they were shocked to learn that the promised
MNF-I support was non-existent. Kimball added that she had
been told several "confusing tales" regarding the failure of
MNF-I to support the mission: firstly, that MNF-I decided it
was outside its mandate; secondly, that CENTCOM had to direct
MNF-I to support and secure the mission and CENTCOM had
failed to do so; and thirdly, that the promised support was
never enunciated to MNF-I in the field and that is why they
didn't appear. Pol/miloff explained that the Embassy had
never received word MNF-I support was guaranteed but that in
January post had sent Washington the UN representative's
request to follow-up the mission support request (ref C).
Kimball allowed that for the purpose of this initial
assessment, the absence of MNF-I worked in their favor,
especially along the northeastern border sector and in

KUWAIT 00000659 002 OF 003


getting the Kuwait and Iraqi police to talk to each other.

Fifty in the Group
--------------


4. (C) The UN team had planned for the movement of ten
people including their team of four. Instead the Iraqis
insisted that all five of their delegation accompany the team
as well as a large contingent of officials from Kuwait's
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Ministry of Interior
(MOI) so that, in the end, the group contained 50 people.
The Iraqi Ministry of the Interior (IMOI) supplied a number
of Iraqi policemen to secure the border team as they traveled
the old UNIKOM routes north and west of the border itself.
The Kuwaiti and Iraqi police were friendly and talkative with
each other, but Kimball expressed reservations about IMOI's
ability to support a later mission that might be entirely
within Iraq territory.

Security and Umm Qasr
--------------


5. (C) Kimball explained that the area in greatest need of
work was between border marker 104 and 106 (the northeast
corner) inside Iraq. "Dilapidated houses" were crowded
around maker 105 and would have to be razed and their
inhabitants moved, Kimball stated, adding that the job of
clearing the area and constructing a path for the border
access road would be "extremely sensitive" and likely
"dangerous" and, in her opinion, could only be completed with
MNF-I support. When pol/miloff suggested the presence of UN
peacekeepers for the mission Kimball scoffed at the
suggestion, saying "UN peacekeeping troops would probably
run" if confronted by any sort of real threat and that they
would not be up to that type of job.

The GOK and MNF-I Role
--------------


6. (C) Talking about Kuwait, Kimball suggested that the GOK
be asked to "pay for decent housing, maybe an apartment
building" for the displaced inhabitants near marker 105 in
order to ease tensions. Pol/miloff reminded Kimball that the
GOK had already set aside funds to compensate Iraqis for
shifting back into Iraqi territory but that they were waiting
for the new government to be seated (ref D). Kimball asked
if the Embassy could dual-track the request of MNF-I security
for a future mission with the request to the GOK to finance
housing and possibly a school for the affected inhabitants.
She stated that "this trip worked out better" without the
high profile of MNF-I but that, in her opinion, "there was no
possibility of success" for a maintenance and construction
mission without MNF-I's visible security on the Iraqi side of
the border. (Note. The mission that the team is considering
would take place sometime this autumn. End note.)

The Marine Border
--------------


7. (C) Pol/miloff raised the question of marking and
extending the marine border, in light of an increasing,
albeit minor, number of territorial incidents involving
Kuwaiti, Iraqi, and, closer to Bubiyan Island, Iranian
vessels. Both Kimball and Bessarabov admitted that they did
not volunteer to discuss the marine border because they both
saw it as "problematic" and something not easily solved.
Bessarabov stated that "marker buoys could shift, especially
in the river channel, cutting off Iraqi access to the Gulf"
and he was trying to consider ways to address that particular
part of the border if asked to by the GOK. (Note: The first
GPS coordinate east of border marker 106 is less than a
kilometer from shore. If a marker buoy was placed there and
the river current shifted it westward, Iraq could lose
partial access to the new harbor at Umm Qasr. End note.) In
addition, Kimball said that the GOK had a special committee
set up to address marine border issues and, since they had
not brought up any concerns, the UN team would wait before
making any suggestions.


8. (C) Finally, Kimball thanked the Embassy and the U.S.

KUWAIT 00000659 003 OF 003


military for the satellite imagery of the border which was an
integral part of completing this mission. Bessarabov added
his deep gratitude for the digital imagery and data which, he
said, would enable them to work on a number of different
possibilities to address problems and issues that might come
up in the future. He stated that without the IKONOS digital
data, future missions would be extremely difficult to plan
and execute and asked that the thanks of the UN cartography
office be passed on to the U. S. military unit responsible.


********************************************* *
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s

Visit Kuwait's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/
********************************************* *

LEBARON