Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KUWAIT4511
2006-11-25 11:47:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Kuwait
Cable title:  

APHSCT TOWNSEND BRIEFING AND TOUR OF KUWAIT

Tags:  EPET ENRG PTER KU OIL SECTOR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8271
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHKU #4511/01 3291147
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 251147Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7690
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 004511 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

WHITE HOUSE FOR APHSCT TOWNSEND; NSC FOR HINNEN; DOE FOR IE;
STATE FOR EB/ESC, NEA/ARP, PM/PPA, S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2016
TAGS: EPET ENRG PTER KU OIL SECTOR
SUBJECT: APHSCT TOWNSEND BRIEFING AND TOUR OF KUWAIT
CRITICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY

REF: A. KUWAIT 4425

B. KUWAIT 3071

C. 05 KUWAIT 4400

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 004511

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

WHITE HOUSE FOR APHSCT TOWNSEND; NSC FOR HINNEN; DOE FOR IE;
STATE FOR EB/ESC, NEA/ARP, PM/PPA, S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2016
TAGS: EPET ENRG PTER KU OIL SECTOR
SUBJECT: APHSCT TOWNSEND BRIEFING AND TOUR OF KUWAIT
CRITICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY

REF: A. KUWAIT 4425

B. KUWAIT 3071

C. 05 KUWAIT 4400

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d).


1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: On 14 November, Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism
(APHSCT) Frances Fragos Townsend received a briefing from
Director of the Kuwait National Security Bureau (NSB)
Shaykh Thamer Ali A. Al-Salem Al-Sabah and senior managers
of Kuwait National Petroleum Company (KNPC) regarding the
status of Kuwait's critical energy infrastructure security
and plans for improvements. Shaykh Thamer outlined the
responsibilities and organizational structure of the
agencies tasked with managing Kuwait's energy
infrastructure security, described existing and planned
security systems and hardware installations, and referred
to the development of standard operating procedures and
doctrine. The briefing was followed by a tour of selected
security facilities at KNPC's Shuaiba and Mina Al-Ahmadi
refinery complexes including a crisis response center, a
refinery control room, and perimeter security
installations. Townsend emphasized the importance
of a clear doctrine and unified chain of command and control,
integrated communications, integrated response procedures,
including the evacuation of surrounding populations if
necessary,
and frequent practice and refinement of procedures through
repeated drills and exercises. The NSB and KNPC briefers
acknowledged that they had identified the same priorities
and were in the process of installing the systems and
developing the training and procedures needed to better
deter possible threats and respond to major incidents
whether they be terrorist attacks or industrial accidents.
The Kuwaitis announced plans to conduct a major security
exercise in December. END SUMMARY.


2. (S/NF) On 14 November, APHSCT Townsend received a
briefing led by Shaykh Thamer, Director of the Kuwait
National Security Bureau and supported by KNPC Deputy

Managing Director Suhail Yusef Bu-Grace and the Deputy
Managing Directors of Kuwait's three refineries, Husain
Ismail of Shuaiba, Asa'ad Ahmad Al-Saad of Mina-Al-Ahmadi,
and Abdul Mohsen Ali Khajah of Mina Al-Abdulla. The
briefers explained that overall responsibility for energy
infrastructure security was assigned to a high-level,
inter-ministerial Security Decision Follow-up Committee.
This committee is led by the President of the NSB, Shaykh
Ahmed Al-Fahd, and reports directly to the Council of
Ministers. The KNPC Deputy explained that Kuwait Petroleum
Corporation (KPC),which manages all of Kuwait's oil
industry, is in the process of consolidating security
functions and organizations across all of its
subsidiaries. A new KPC subsidiary called the Oil Sector
Services Company (OSSCo) is gradually assuming the security
responsibilities that were previously managed separately
by each of the individual subsidiaries including the Kuwait
Oil Company (KOC),Kuwait National Petroleum Company
(KNPC),Kuwait Gulf Oil Company (KGOC),and Petrochemical
Industries Company (PIC). OSSCo plans to gradually acquire
these management responsibilities over a period of twelve
to eighteen months. The security force for the oil sector
is currently comprised of personnel from the Ministry of
the Interior, the National Guard, the Coast Guard and
security personnel employed by each of the KPC
subsidiaries. This last group is not allowed to carry
arms. OSSCo is also in the process of establishing a shore
protection force to enhance the security of the seaward
approaches to the refineries and loading terminals.
Although OSSCo will eventually assume overall
responsibility for security within KPC, the company is not
expected to have control over Interior Ministry personnel.


3. (S/NF) Shaykh Thamer explained that in the event of a
security incident, the MOI assumes operational control,
whereas in the event of an industrial incident, the oil
company operations managers take control. Townsend
suggested that this might be an artificial distinction and
said that one lesson learned in the U.S. was that an
integrated response was required including integrated
communications and an integrated command-and-control
structure. The NSB and KNPC briefers acknowledged the need
for greater integration and said that they were in the

KUWAIT 00004511 002 OF 002


process of installing the communications systems and
establishing the standard operating procedures and
protocols required to enable this level of integration.
When Townsend asked about the quality of information sharing
and
Management across facilities and companies, including the
effective dissemination of threat information, the NSB and
KNPC
reps answered that there is currently no effective system for
managing information. They said that moving from the current
"ad-hoc" approach to a more systematic one was a high
priority. When
Townsend asked about the development of crisis management
doctrine, the Kuwaitis replied that the development and
reinforcement of standard operating procedures is currently
their greatest focus of activity. They plan to test these
systems and procedures during a major security exercise to
be conducted in December. Townsend stressed the importance
of
drills and exercises and also emphasized the need to be
prepared
to coordinate with local authorities during a major incident
due
to the proximity of the refineries to the city of Fahaheel.


4. (S/NF) With regard to hardware and systems, Shaykh
Thamer explained that each of the individual KPC
subsidiaries had been working with its own private security
contractor to identify gaps and prioritize hardware
installations to fill those gaps. The refineries have
already completed a major upgrade of perimeter fencing (now
three layers instead of one surrounding the entire facility
and extending into the sea),a large-scale CCTV
installation, placement of security buoys and a radar
system in the maritime exclusion zone, and the
establishment of a temporary Crisis Center. The
construction of a high-tech, permanent crisis center is
part of the plan for a fully-integrated security system
scheduled to be completed by 2009-2010.


5. (S/NF) Following the briefing, Shaykh Thamer led
Townsend on a tour of some of the security
installations at the Shuaiba and Mina-Al-Ahmadi refinery
complexes. This began with a tour of the temporary Crisis
Center which is manned 24-hours by a 5-person security
watch section including KNPC and Ministry of Interior
personnel. From the Crisis Center, watchstanders can
control and monitor an extensive network of security
cameras, perimeter alarms, electrified fences, and radar.
They can also communicate with the guard force, security
agencies, and the refinery control room. En route to the
next stop, the motorcade traveled along the perimeter to
observe the triple-layer barrier, electrified fence, and
perimeter cameras. The next stop was the control center
for the Shuaiba refinery which was manned by about 20
personnel who monitor plant operations and equipment
status. The monitoring and communications equipment
appeared modern and comprehensive. The final stop was an
electronics shed near the perimeter that contained
processing equipment and an operator-interface for the
perimeter surveillance equipment, including cameras and
alarms. A security contractor demonstrated how the system
responds to a perimeter alarm by alerting the operator,
indicating the location of the intrusion, and slaving a
camera to the location.


6. (S/NF) In separate meetings with APHSCT Townsend
(septel) and earlier with the Ambassador (ref. A),
President of the Kuwait National Security Bureau and former
Energy Minister Shaykh Ahmed Al-Fahd expressed the desire
to cooperate with the USG to enhance Kuwait's critical
energy infrastructure as a top priority under the Gulf
Security Dialogue.

********************************************* *
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s

Visit Kuwait's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/
********************************************* *
Tueller