Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KUWAIT4506
2006-11-25 10:21:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Kuwait
Cable title:  

APHSCT TOWNSEND BRIEFING AND TOUR OF KUWAIT

Tags:  EPET ENRG PTER KU OIL SECTOR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8254
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHKU #4506/01 3291021
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 251021Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7676
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 004506 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

WHITE HOUSE FOR APHSCT TOWNSEND; NSC FOR HINNEN; DOE FOR
IE; STATE FOR EB/ESC, NEA/ARP, PM/PPA, S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2016
TAGS: EPET ENRG PTER KU OIL SECTOR
SUBJECT: APHSCT TOWNSEND BRIEFING AND TOUR OF KUWAIT
CRITICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY

REF: A. KUWAIT 4425

B. KUWAIT 3071

C. 05 KUWAIT 4400

Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 004506

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

WHITE HOUSE FOR APHSCT TOWNSEND; NSC FOR HINNEN; DOE FOR
IE; STATE FOR EB/ESC, NEA/ARP, PM/PPA, S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2016
TAGS: EPET ENRG PTER KU OIL SECTOR
SUBJECT: APHSCT TOWNSEND BRIEFING AND TOUR OF KUWAIT
CRITICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY

REF: A. KUWAIT 4425

B. KUWAIT 3071

C. 05 KUWAIT 4400

Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: On 14 November, Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism (APHSCT)
Frances Fragos Townsend received a briefing from Director of
the Kuwait National Security Bureau (NSB) Shaykh Thamer Ali

A. Al-Salem Al-Sabah and senior managers of Kuwait National
Petroleum Company (KNPC) regarding the status of Kuwait's
critical energy infrastructure security and plans for
improvements. Shaykh Thamer outlined the responsibilities
and organizational structure of the agencies tasked with
managing Kuwait's energy infrastructure security, described
existing and planned security systems and hardware
installations, and referred to the development of standard
operating procedures and doctrine. The briefing was followed
by a tour of selected security facilities at KNPC's Shuaiba
and Mina Al-Ahmadi refinery complexes including a crisis
response center, a refinery control room, and perimeter
security installations. Townsend emphasized the importance
of a clear doctrine and unified chain of command and control,
integrated communications, integrated response procedures,
including the evacuation of surrounding populations if
necessary, and frequent practice and refinement of procedures
through repeated drills and exercises. The NSB and KNPC
briefers acknowledged that they had identified the same
priorities and were in the process of installing the systems
and developing the training and procedures needed to better
deter possible threats and respond to major incidents whether
they be terrorist attacks or industrial accidents. The
Kuwaitis announced plans to conduct a major security exercise
in December. END SUMMARY.


2. (S/NF) On 14 November, APHSCT Townsend received a
briefing led by Shaykh Thamer, Director of the Kuwait
National Security Bureau and supported by KNPC Deputy

Managing Director Suhail Yusef Bu-Grace and the Deputy
Managing Directors of Kuwait's three refineries, Husain
Ismail of Shuaiba, Asa'ad Ahmad Al-Saad of Mina-Al-Ahmadi,
and Abdul Mohsen Ali Khajah of Mina Al-Abdulla. The briefers
explained that overall responsibility for energy
infrastructure security was assigned to a high-level,
inter-ministerial Security Decision Follow-up Committee.
This committee is led by the President of the NSB, Shaykh
Ahmed Al-Fahd, and reports directly to the Council of
Ministers. The KNPC Deputy explained that Kuwait Petroleum
Corporation (KPC),which manages all of Kuwait's oil
industry, is in the process of consolidating security
functions and organizations across all of its subsidiaries.
A new KPC subsidiary called the Oil Sector Services Company
(OSSCo) is gradually assuming the security responsibilities
that were previously managed separately by each of the
individual subsidiaries including the Kuwait Oil Company
(KOC),Kuwait National Petroleum Company (KNPC),Kuwait Gulf
Oil Company (KGOC),and Petrochemical Industries Company
(PIC). OSSCo plans to gradually acquire these management
responsibilities over a period of twelve to eighteen months.
The security force for the oil sector is currently comprised
of personnel from the Ministry of the Interior, the National
Guard, the Coast Guard and security personnel employed by
each of the KPC subsidiaries. This last group is not allowed
to carry arms. OSSCo is also in the process of establishing
a shore protection force to enhance the security of the
seaward approaches to the refineries and loading terminals.
Although OSSCo will eventually assume overall responsibility
for security within KPC, the company is not expected to have
control over Interior Ministry personnel.


3. (S/NF) Shaykh Thamer explained that in the event of a
security incident, the MOI assumes operational control,
whereas in the event of an industrial incident, the oil
company operations managers take control. Townsend suggested
that this might be an artificial distinction and said that
one lesson learned in the U.S. was that an integrated
response was required including integrated communications and
an integrated command-and-control structure. The NSB and
KNPC briefers acknowledged the need for greater integration
and said that they were in the process of installing the
communications systems and establishing the standard
operating procedures and protocols required to enable this
level of integration. When Townsend asked about the quality
of information sharing and management across the facilities

KUWAIT 00004506 002 OF 002


and companies, including the effective dissemination of
threat information, the NSB and KNPC reps answered that there
is currently no effective system for managing information.
They said that moving from the current "ad-hoc" approach to a
more systematic one was a high priority. When Townsend asked
about the development of crisis management doctrine, the
Kuwaitis replied that the development and reinforcement of
standard operating procedures is currently their greatest
focus of activity. They plan to test these systems and
procedures during a major security exercise to be conducted
in December. Townsend stressed the importance of drills and
exercises and also emphasized the need to be prepared to
coordinate with local authorities during a major incident due
to the proximity of the refineries to the city of Fahaheel.


4. (S/NF) With regard to hardware and systems, Shaykh
Thamer explained that each of the individual KPC subsidiaries
had been working with its own private security contractor to
identify gaps and prioritize hardware installations to fill
those gaps. The refineries have already completed a major
upgrade of perimeter fencing (now three layers instead of one
surrounding the entire facility and extending into the sea),
a large-scale CCTV installation, placement of security buoys
and a radar system in the maritime exclusion zone, and the
establishment of a temporary Crisis Center. The construction
of a high-tech, permanent crisis center is part of the plan
for a fully-integrated security system scheduled to be
completed by 2009-2010.


5. (S/NF) Following the briefing, Shaykh Thamer led
Townsend on a tour of some of the security installations at
the Shuaiba and Mina-Al-Ahmadi refinery complexes. This
began with a tour of the temporary Crisis Center which is
manned 24-hours by a 5-person security watch section
including KNPC and Ministry of Interior personnel. From the
Crisis Center, watchstanders can control and monitor an
extensive network of security cameras, perimeter alarms,
electrified fences, and radar. They can also communicate
with the guard force, security agencies, and the refinery
control room. En route to the next stop, the motorcade
traveled along the perimeter to observe the triple-layer
barrier, electrified fence, and perimeter cameras. The next
stop was the control center for the Shuaiba refinery which
was manned by about 20 personnel who monitor plant operations
and equipment status. The monitoring and communications
equipment appeared modern and comprehensive. The final stop
was an electronics shed near the perimeter that contained
processing equipment and an operator-interface for the
perimeter surveillance equipment, including cameras and
alarms. A security contractor demonstrated how the system
responds to a perimeter alarm by alerting the operator,
indicating the location of the intrusion, and slaving a
camera to the location.


6. (S/NF) In separate meetings with Townsend (septel) and
earlier with the Ambassador (ref. A),President of the Kuwait
National Security Bureau and former Energy Minister Shaykh
Ahmed Al-Fahd expressed the desire to cooperate with the USG
to enhance Kuwait's critical energy infrastructure as a top
priority under the Gulf Security Dialogue.


7. (U) This cable was cleared by APHSCT Townsend.

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For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s

Visit Kuwait's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/
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