Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KUWAIT4345
2006-11-04 12:30:00
SECRET
Embassy Kuwait
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR VOICES U.S. DISAPPOINTMENT AT KUWAIT

Tags:  PARM PREL KNNP MNUC IR KUWAIT RELATIONS 
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VZCZCXRO9713
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHKU #4345 3081230
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 041230Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7470
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T KUWAIT 004345 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR NEA, PM AND ISN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2016
TAGS: PARM PREL KNNP MNUC IR KUWAIT RELATIONS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR VOICES U.S. DISAPPOINTMENT AT KUWAIT
PULLING OUT OF OBSERVING PSI EXERCISE LEADING EDGE

REF: KUWAIT 04265

Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T KUWAIT 004345

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR NEA, PM AND ISN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2016
TAGS: PARM PREL KNNP MNUC IR KUWAIT RELATIONS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR VOICES U.S. DISAPPOINTMENT AT KUWAIT
PULLING OUT OF OBSERVING PSI EXERCISE LEADING EDGE

REF: KUWAIT 04265

Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (S) Taking advantage of opportunities to speak separately
to the Kuwaiti Prime Minister, Defense Minister, and Foreign
Minister on the margins of other events on 1 November, I
expressed U.S. disappointment on the cancellation by Kuwait
of its agreement to observe the recent PSI Leading Edge
exercise in Bahrain. I told these senior officials we were
disappointed for two reasons: 1) the cancellation in the face
of Iranian pressure sent exactly the wrong signal to an
Iranian regime intent on bullying its neighbors, and 2) as
close allies, Kuwait and the U.S. should not take actions
that surprise each other, as did the cancellation by Kuwait.
In response, I got some pretty lame excuses about not being
well-informed on the exercise in advance. (In fact the Armed
Forces Chief of Staff approved attendance by three Kuwaiti
officers, but it appears that the political noise the
Iranians generated resulted in some GOK dissimulation about
who knew what when.)


2. (S) I told the Kuwaiti leaders that my purpose was not to
focus on the past, but to avoid repeat of such problems as we
move ahead in a serious way to confront security challenges
in the Gulf. In that vein, I noted the need to focus
promptly on the paper I had sent over that day to the Foreign
Minister on next steps in the Gulf Security Dialogue. I also
agreed to make sure that the political level is fully briefed
on future PSI exercises. (We sent PSI background material to
the Foreign Minister at his request.) The Defense Minister
was the most forward leaning about the need for Kuwait to
participate in future exercises.


3. (S) Comment: The GOK will continue to try to strike a
balance between its support for the U.S. security umbrella in
the region and avoidance of actions that provoke their big
and powerful neighbor. For example, the Amir told visiting
Gen. Colin Powell last week that he had agreed to visit Iran
in the future, while also saying that none of the bilateral
issues between them had been resolved. GCC Foreign and
Defense Ministers will be meeting over the course of the next
month to prepare for the December 8-9 GCC summit. What to do
about Iran will certainly be on their minds.


4. (S) Comment, continued: I also spoke to Ambassador Salem
Al-Sabah, who came to Kuwait on the inaugural United flight
from Dulles. In addition to repeating the points about the
Leading Edge cancellation, I suggested he meet A/S Hillen
upon his return to go over our ideas for the GSD, noting the
urgency of getting GOK agreement to at least some of the
ideas in the U.S. paper.
LeBaron