Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KUWAIT4220
2006-10-26 09:40:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Kuwait
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER: APHSCT TOWNSEND VISIT TO KUWAIT,

Tags:  PTER EFIN KTFN PGOV PREL KU TERRORISM 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0567
OO RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHKU #4220/01 2990940
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 260940Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7308
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 004220 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2016
TAGS: PTER EFIN KTFN PGOV PREL KU TERRORISM
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: APHSCT TOWNSEND VISIT TO KUWAIT,
NOVEMBER 3-4, 2006

REF: A) KUWAIT 3597 B) KUWAIT 4178 C) 05 KUWAIT 5283

Classified By: CDA Matt Tueller for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 004220

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2016
TAGS: PTER EFIN KTFN PGOV PREL KU TERRORISM
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: APHSCT TOWNSEND VISIT TO KUWAIT,
NOVEMBER 3-4, 2006

REF: A) KUWAIT 3597 B) KUWAIT 4178 C) 05 KUWAIT 5283

Classified By: CDA Matt Tueller for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S/NF) Embassy Kuwait welcomes your visit, which comes
in the general framework of a longstanding and productive CT
relationship between Kuwait and the United States, and
continued close, effective cooperation on the ground across a
range of issues. During your visit, you will meet with
several key Kuwaiti players on CT issues, including First
Deputy Prime Minister, Interior and Defense Minister Shaykh
Jabar Al-Mubarak Al-Sabah, Foreign Minister Shaykh Dr.
Mohammed Al-Salem Al-Sabah and National Security Bureau
President Shaykh Ahmed Al-Fahad Al-Sabah. The United States
enjoys a strong intelligence-sharing relationship with Kuwait
in a number of critical areas, including for protection of
the thousands of U.S. troops who are present in or transit
Kuwait and a robust coordinated effort on selected terrorist
targets in Iraq. In the military context, Kuwait has been a
strong partner. It devotes a high level of intelligence and
effort to protecting our large military presence in Kuwait.
Our massive troop and equipment convoys that travel
constantly on Kuwaiti highways are probably the most visible
targets for attack. These have not been attacked successfully
despite some occasional reports of plotting. Kuwait is
currently drafting new legislation to criminalize terrorist
financing. There has been a marked improvement in the GOK's
regulation of the domestic activities of Kuwaiti charities,
yet we remain concerned about the activities of overseas
branches of some Kuwaiti charities such as the Revival of
Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS) (ref a).


2. (S/NF) We also continue to be concerned by Kuwait's
co-optation policy that seeks to moderate and control
Kuwait-based extremists, activities inside Kuwait, but does
much less to moderate facilitation of terror activities and
jihad by Kuwaitis related to Iraq and Afghanistan. However,

we have not seen in Kuwait the same level of regime
dissatisfaction and organized radical terrorism as in Saudi
Arabia. The most recent clashes with terrorists, in January
2005, were pre-emptive moves based on information from
intelligence, partially provided by family members of the
terrorists. No U.S. or Kuwaiti targets in Kuwait have been
hit by terrorists since an attack on U.S. contractors outside
Camp Doha in January 2003.

Cooperation in Tracking and Apprehending Extremists
-------------- --------------


3. (S/NF) The United States enjoys an excellent
information-sharing relationship with Kuwaiti CT officials,
particularly in regard to disrupting support networks
comprised of non-Kuwaiti extremists. However, at times the
Kuwaitis are less forthcoming with regard to Kuwaiti
networks, unless there is a clear and present danger to
Kuwaiti or U.S. interests inside the country. Often, this
stems from the Kuwaiti leadership's belief that it can
prevent the emergence of major terror threats through a
policy of dialogue and co-optation with extremists. While
this policy has been arguably successful in preventing
terrorist attacks inside Kuwait since January 2005, it is
less effective in preventing Kuwaiti extremists from
continuing their efforts to send money (to the Palestinian
territories) and fighters (in the case of Iraq and the
Pakistan/Afghanistan theater) outside Kuwait to confront us,
and our allies, in these locations.


4. (S/NF) Kuwait has arrested low-level terrorists but has
failed to locate core Sunni extremists, including Muhsin
Al-Fadhli and Khalid Al-Dusari, both prominent Sunni
extremists who were convicted in absentia for their roles in
the 2005 plotting against Kuwaiti and U.S. targets. Both
Fadhli and Dusari are fugitives and their current whereabouts
are unknown. While we have no indications that either Fadhli
or Dusari are currently active, Fadhli is wanted by both
Saudi and MNF-I forces for his connections to active
networks, and because of intelligence gaps, we cannot account
for his activities in the last year. Fadhli was a major
financier of Iraq-based Sunni extremist forces and both have
been associated with Al-Qa,ida and Zarqawi networks.


5. (S/NF) The greater threat arises from the presence of
active AQSL-affiliated facilitation networks moving funds and
fighters to confront our forces and interests in Iraq and the
Pakistan/Afghanistan theater. Moreover, the GOK,s
acquiescence in allowing HAMAS fund raising and visits of
senior representatives also serves to undermine U.S. policy
related to the Middle East Peace Process. Kuwait has
detained and deported several non-Kuwaiti residents engaged
in moving money and people to the insurgency, and engaging in

KUWAIT 00004220 002 OF 003


internet propaganda for Al-Qa,ida in Iraq.

Guantanamo Detainees
--------------


6. (S/NF) Five Guantanamo detainees were transferred to
Kuwaiti custody in November 2005. The government brought
terrorism-related charges against them, but in June of this
year, all five were acquitted by the court of all charges,
and four were subsequently released. One remains in prison
on unrelated assault charges. Last month, two more
Guantanamo detainees were transferred to Kuwaiti custody.
The GOK has not decided whether to bring charges against the
two recent transferees. Four Kuwaitis remain at Guantanamo.
Vocal family groups keep the issue in Kuwaiti headlines, and
you may hear from you Kuwaiti interlocutors about the issue.


Terrorist Financing Issues
--------------


7. (S/NF) Within the last two years, the Government of
Kuwait has taken important steps to strengthen its anti-money
laundering and terrorist finance regimes by establishing a
charities oversight office, drafting amendments to its
anti-money laundering laws, and prohibiting fundraising at
mosques and through charity kiosks. Kuwait has also begun to
play a leadership role in the MENA/FATF by hosting regional
training sessions on charities and cash smuggling issues.
While this represents important progress, there are a number
of ways the GOK can further improve its terrorist finance
efforts, including:

-- Empowering and expanding the purview of the charities
oversight office to monitor and regulate not only charities
in Kuwait, but the foreign offices of Kuwait-based charities
as well;

-- Increasing cooperation and information sharing with
foreign governments that host offices of Kuwait-based
charities;

-- Bolstering cooperation with USG counterparts to improve
draft amendments to its anti-money laundering laws and
expedite passage of those amendments into law, including
revision of Law No. 35 to meet international standards;

-- Creating an independent Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU),
or at a minimum increasing the law enforcement and
intelligence authorities of its existing FIU, and relocating
it to a law enforcement or intelligence ministry, as opposed
to the Central Bank, if necessary;

-- Strengthening cash declaration requirements and
enforcement at its borders and enacting monetary export
controls to help stem the flow of funds couriered from
wealthy donors in Kuwait to HAMAS, Lebanese Hizballah, and
other terrorist groups;

-- Increasing cooperation and information sharing with the
USG regarding individuals (such as Jabir Jalahmah, Mubarak
Mishkhas Sanad Al-Bathali, and Hamid Al- Ali) and
Kuwait-based charitable organizations (such as the Revival of
Islamic Heritage Society, or RIHS) of terrorist finance
concern.

-- Expand the GOK role as a regional and Islamic world leader
by ratifying the UN Convention for the Suppression of
Financing of Terrorism and by actively supporting and
participating in the UNSCR 1267 regime for designation and
sanctioning of individuals and organizations who provide
material support to terrorism.

-- Enforcing laws against illegal hawaladar (informal money
transfers) activities.


Security of Critical Energy Infrastructure
--------------


8. (S/NF) The GOK and Kuwait Petroleum Company KPC) have
received numerous assessments and recommendations from
private-sector security contractors regarding the physical
security of critical energy facilities. Since the February
incident at the Abqaiq facility in Saudi Arabia, security at
critical sites has become a higher priority receiving close
attention from the highest levels of KPC, the Ministry of
Energy, and the Ministry of Interior. Significant
enhancements have been implemented in recent months,
especially at the critical Mina Al-Ahmadi refinery

KUWAIT 00004220 003 OF 003


facilities. These include improved access control systems,
installation of additional surveillance equipment, and
extension and reinforcement of perimeter fencing. KPC has
created a new subsidiary company to train security personnel
and manage security across all of KPC's facilities. The
problems of greatest concern are now vulnerability to attack
from the sea and poor dissemination of relevant, actionable
intelligence from the ministerial level down to the working
level. In recent meetings with the Minister of Energy and
the Chairman of KPC, the Ambassador offered USG assistance to
enhance the security of Kuwait's energy infrastructure. The
Minister and Chairman said security assistance issues would
need to be taken up with the Interior Ministry and National
Guard.

Strengthing the Legal System
--------------


9. (S/NF) Kuwait,s legal system does not adequately
address many internationally recognized crimes, such as
membership in a terrorist organization, weapons trafficking,
conspiracy and violent jihad committed in foreign countries.
Hamid Abdallah Ahmad Al-Ali, a radical imam who supports
terrorists in Kuwait and openly advocates jihad, was
acquitted for his role as a spiritual adviser to the gunmen
involved in shootouts in which four government employees were
killed in January 2005. In the same case, six defendants
were sentenced to death and several others to long sentences
or hard labor. While it would be difficult to undertake the
necessary reforms, and there would be a degree of opposition
in Parliament, such legislation likely could be implemented
with strong government support.

Teaching Moderation
--------------


10. (C/NF) Kuwait's Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs
launched an initiative in 2005 to spread moderation among
Muslims and present Islam as a moderate religion to
non-Muslims (ref b). The Ministry has recently opened its
World Moderation Center (WMC),a special agency to implement
the initiative. Moderation activities, such as training of
Imams and Islamic studies teachers and international
conferences, have taken place over the past 18 months and are
ongoing. The Ministry has welcomed U.S. cooperation in the
initiative, and will host a Washington Conference in
mid-November for U.S. Muslims. Here in Kuwait, the WMC has
administered a mandatory 45-day training course for Kuwaiti
Imams, and will soon begin similar training for Islamic
Studies teachers in Kuwaiti schools. In the past year
Kuwait's Ministry of Education also hosted what it billed as
the "First International Conference on the Educational
Dimensions in the Treatment of Terrorism and Extremism
Phenomena," aimed at bringing together Arab and European NGOs
and Governments to explore the nexus between education and
extremism (ref c). Post has successfully used International
Visitors Programs to bring young Kuwaiti Imams to the United
States with the cooperation of the Awqaf Ministry, though
funding issues in Washington have limited the exent of these
programs.

********************************************* *
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s

Visit Kuwait's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/
********************************************* *


Tueller