GCC STRATEGY ON IRAN: "HOPING FOR A MIRACLE"

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 000397

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/ARPI - BRUDER AND BERNS, NSC FOR RAMCHAND,
LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS FOR ZEYA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2016
TAGS: PARM PREL SENV IR KU KUWAIT IRAN RELATIONS
SUBJECT: GCC STRATEGY ON IRAN: "HOPING FOR A MIRACLE"

REF: A. KUWAIT 306

B. KUWAIT 86

Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary and comment: Former Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) Secretary General Ambassador Abdullah Bishara told
Poloff in a February 1 meeting that while the GCC "has no
other option than to comply with any UNSC resolution," it
would not publicly support such a step. GCC countries had
expressed their concerns about the potential economic,
environmental, and security ramifications of Iran's nuclear
program directly to the Iranian government (GOI),but Iran
would "not listen to reason," Bishara claimed. Although
Bishara said he believed Iran would "inevitably" develop
nuclear weapons, an objective Iranian officials had
insinuated during a meeting Bishara participated in, he said
the GCC "hoped for a miracle." GCC countries had no plans
for dealing with the repercussions of any international
military action against Iran, and "had not even talked about"
the policy implications of a nuclear-armed Iran. "The GCC
will adopt whatever the international community adopts,"
Bishara said.


2. (C) Questioning the overall efficacy of sanctions,
Bishara argued that Iran had "a big arsenal of mischief" to
"cause problems" in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinian
territories, and the Gulf. Although intimately involved in
GCC politics and still an influential voice, Bishara does not
formally speak for either the Kuwaiti government (GOK) or the
GCC. In a separate meeting, Chairman of Parliament's
Environmental Affairs Committee Ali Al-Dokbasi told Poloff he
was unaware of any studies conducted on the potential
environmental impact of an accident at Iran's Bushehr nuclear
facility, which GOK officials have repeatedly cited as their
greatest concern with Iran's nuclear program. End summary
and comment.

GCC Concerned, But Iran Undeterred
--------------


3. (C) In a February 1 meeting with Poloff, Ambassador
Abdullah Bishara, formerly Kuwait's Permanent Representative
to the UN (1971-1981) and GCC Secretary General (1981-1992),
and currently one of Kuwait's five members on the GCC
Advisory Committee, said the GCC was concerned about the
economic, environmental, and security implications of Iran's
nuclear program. In particular, Bishara said Gulf countries
feared decreased foreign investment and the possibility of an
accident at the Bushehr nuclear facility. If Iran succeeded
in developing nuclear weapons, which Bishara said was
"inevitable," it "would upset the entire balance of power in
the region."


4. (C) Bishara said GCC countries had expressed their
concerns to Iran bilaterally and collectively, citing the
negative economic and environmental effects, and arguing that
a nuclear program would further isolate Iran and would "push
the region to conflict and division." Iranian officials,
whom Bishara characterized repeatedly as "paranoid, fearful,
suffering from psychological disorientation, and believing in
nightmares and ghosts behind their borders," were dismissive
of these arguments. Bishara said his nephew, Majid
Al-Thufiri, Kuwait's Ambassador to Iran, "always tells
Iranian officials they have no reason to fear, because Iran
is big and not easily threatened," but the Iranians "will not
listen to reason."


5. (C) Bishara said he was part of a Kuwaiti delegation that
met with "five Iranian officials one year ago when the
nuclear rumors were just beginning." In the meetings, the
Iranians said they were "threatened by the U.S., Israel,
Russia, and India," and insisted on their "right" to have a
"deterrent" capability for "protection and as a guarantor of
peace and security." The Iranians had not/not mentioned
"nuclear weapons" specifically, but this was directly implied
from their arguments, he said. Bishara argued that "Iran
would never believe security guarantees," and was very
pessimistic about the possibility of the international
community to deter Iran from pursuing a nuclear program. He
believed Iran had carefully calculated the "pros and cons" of
a nuclear program and devised a clear strategy on how to
obtain it. In his opinion, there was "no doubt" Iran was
pursuing nuclear weapons.


6. (C) The Iranian regime actually "enjoyed confrontation"
with the international community, particularly the "Great
Satan" (the United States) and the "Little Satan" (Israel),
Bishara explained. The Iranian government had made the
nuclear issue into a "national frenzy"; international

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condemnation would likely cause Iranians to rally around the
regime, Bishara claimed.

The GCC's Ostrich-Like Approach to Iran
--------------


7. (C) GCC countries had "no other option, but to comply
with UNSC resolutions" on Iran, Bishara said. He added,
however, that the GCC, represented by Qatar on the UNSC,
would not publicly support a UNSC resolution to impose
sanctions on Iran, but would not oppose it either.
Explaining why, he said the GCC would never confront Iran
directly, but would follow the international community,
giving the GCC the welcome cover of international legitimacy
for any actions against Iran. "For Kuwaitis, international
resolutions provide an anchor of legitimacy," Bishara
explained.


8. (C) Overall, though, Bishara was pessimistic about the
efficacy of sanctions. First, he argued the first UNSC
resolution would be weak, giving Iran three months to "show
progress." He predicted China would insist there had been
progress and would block further resolutions. Second, he
argued that if Saddam Hussein could survive sanctions, Iran
was even better prepared to do so, and noted Iran's numerous
ports on the Persian Gulf. Third, he said sanctions would
only hurt the Iranian people, ultimately causing them to
rally around the regime.


9. (C) While all GCC countries opposed Iran's nuclear
program in principle, Bishara said Saudi Arabia and Oman were
less concerned than the rest of the GCC. According to
Bishara, Saudi King Abdullah commented at the GCC Conference
in Abu Dhabi that he found Iranian President Ahmadinejad
"moderate" in a recent meeting.


10. (C) Dr. Yacoub Al-Hayati, a former MP and another of
Kuwait's members on the GCC Advisory Council, expressed a
similar view, explaining to Poloffs during a dinner January
31 that the GCC was "playing politics" in avoiding public
condemnation of Iran's nuclear program.

And If Diplomacy Fails?
--------------


11. (C) According to Bishara, "the GCC hasn't even talked
about" next steps. "We are hoping diplomacy will succeed,
but we don't believe anything the Iranians say. The GCC will
adopt what the international community adopts," Bishara said.
He further noted that the GCC had not developed contingency
plans to deal with the repercussions of any international
military strike against Iran and had "not even thought about"
how to deal with a nuclear-armed Iran. Although stressing
the importance of diplomacy, Bishara was very pessimistic
about its efficacy. He suggested China and India might slow
Iran's nuclear program by putting more pressure on the GOI,
but would ultimately be unable to stop it. "No one can abort
the Iranian scheme. Some may be able to delay it, but Iran
will eventually get what it wants and will have a nuclear
program," he concluded.

Iran's "Big Arsenal of Mischief"
--------------


12. (C) Bishara claimed Iran had a "big arsenal of
mischief," which included "Hezbollah, Hamas, and the spirit
of martyrdom," and could "create problems throughout the
region." Specifically, Iran could "cause problems" in "Iraq,
Syria, Lebanon, the Gulf, and with Hamas." He dismissed the
possibility that Iranian agents could cause "domestic unrest"
in Kuwait, arguing that Kuwaiti society had historically
always been unified. Bahrain, he said, was more "fragile."
He did "not rule out," however, the possibility of
Iranian-backed terrorist attacks in Kuwait.

Parliament's Role?
--------------


13. (C) Chairman of the National Assembly's Environmental
Affairs Committee Ali Al-Dokbasi, an "independent,"
Government-leaning member of Parliament (MP),told Poloff he
was not aware of any specific studies on the potential
environmental impact on Kuwait of an accident at Iran's
Bushehr nuclear facility, which GOK officials have repeatedly
told Emboffs is their primary concern with Iran's nuclear
program. Dr. Sami Al-Faraj, the Director of the Kuwait
Center for Strategic Studies, a private research institute
that writes "sensitive" reports for the Government, alluded
to such studies during a recent meeting with Poloff (ref B).
(Comment: If such studies exist, it is not surprising that

KUWAIT 00000397 003 OF 003


they would not have been shared with members of Parliament.
End comment.)


14. (C) Al-Dokbasi, who is also the Rapporteur of the
Foreign Affairs Committee, said Parliament supported the
GOK's approach to Iran "100%," though he did not seem to know
exactly what the GOK's policy was. Emphasizing his comments
reflected his personal view, he said Kuwait opposed "all
nuclear activity in the region," including "Israel's nuclear
program," which he said should be addressed at the same time
as Iran's. He said Kuwait's concerns with Iran were
expressed "openly" and were shared by all GCC countries.
Al-Dokbasi stressed the need for "international solidarity"
when dealing with Iran. (Comment: Al-Dokbasi seemed unaware
of the specifics of the GOK's policy towards Iran, a likely
indication of how little Parliament is involved in the
shaping of this policy. End comment.)

Bio Note
--------------


15. (SBU) Ambassador Abdullah Bishara has had an illustrious
career in public service, serving both as Kuwait's Permanent
Representative to the UN (1971-1981) and as GCC Secretary
General (1981-1994). Currently, he is an advisor in the Gulf
Affairs Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; one of
Kuwait's five GCC Advisory Committee members; President of
the Diplomatic Studies Center; and Chairman of the Board for
the United Real Estate Company, a large real estate holding
company. Bishara has written several books, including ones
on his experience at the UN and as GCC Secretary General.


16. (C) Bishara was born on November 6, 1936. He received a
B.A. from Cairo University (1955-1959). He also studied
diplomacy and international law at Balliol College at Oxford
University, and received a M.A. in political science from St.
John's University in New York. Bishara is the nephew of
former National Assembly Speaker and current MP Ahmed
Al-Saadoun. Kuwait's current Ambassador to Iran, Majid
Al-Thufiri, is Bishara's nephew. While intimately involved
in GCC politics, Bishara does not formerly speak for the
Kuwaiti government or the GCC.

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